Benjamin v. State

Full title: CHRISTOPHER DARNELL BENJAMIN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston

Date published: Aug 30, 2007

No. 01-06-00469-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2007)

Opinion

No. 01-06-00469-CR

Opinion Issued August 30, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1029285.

Panel consists of Justices, ALCALA, HANKS, and WILSON.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVIE WILSON,[fn4] Justice. [fn4] The Honorable Davie Wilson, retired Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, participating by assignment.

Christopher Darnell Benjamin pled not guilty to sexual assault. A jury convicted appellant and assessed punishment at 18 years in prison. On appeal, appellant contends (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm.

Background

The 18-year-old complainant and a friend went to a party where complainant became so intoxicated she passed out. In complainant's account of the events, she awoke to discover she was in appellant's apartment. Complainant found herself undressed from the waist down. Appellant was naked and on top of her. Appellant penetrated complainant's vagina with his penis. Complainant tried to push appellant off of her, cried, said it hurt, and asked him to stop. Appellant refused, stating, "Shut up, bitch. I'm rolling." Appellant's roommate, Ricky Ramirez, watched the entire incident. When appellant finally got off of complainant, she put on her pants and tried to leave. Appellant and Ramirez blocked the exit, refusing to let her leave. When appellant and Ramirez were distracted, complainant climbed out a window, leaving her panties and shoes behind. Deputy David Peterson of the Harris County Sheriff's Department saw complainant walking down the road around 3:00 a.m., barefoot and crying. Passers-by Stephen Angelle and Jessica Odale saw the deputy and complainant on the side of the road, felt concern for complainant's safety, and stopped. Odale described complainant as "freaking out and crying and scared." That night, complainant identified appellant as her assailant and also showed officers the apartment in which the assault occurred.¹ Complainant again identified appellant in a photo line-up and at trial. Officers collected complainant's clothes and retrieved several articles from appellant's apartment for DNA testing. DNA testing failed to corroborate complainant's allegations.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2067-68 (1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Because the reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, appellant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, which must demonstrate affirmatively the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 (citing McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)). We will not speculate to find trial counsel ineffective when the record is silent on counsel's reasoning or strategy. Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 624 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). In rare cases, however, the record can be sufficient to prove that counsel's performance was deficient, despite the absence of affirmative evidence of counsel's reasoning or strategy. Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 813 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to obtain rulings on pretrial motions, (2) failing to call Ramirez to testify, (3) failing to object to expert testimony, and (4) failing to object to the State's voir dire and closing argument. Appellant did not pursue a motion for new trial hearing and no evidence establishes the basis for counsel's actions. First, appellant contends counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain rulings on pretrial motions.² However, he fails to show that any of the pretrial motions were meritorious. See Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (to prevail on ineffective assistance claim based on failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, appellant must show motion would have been granted); see also Roberson v. State, 852 S.W.2d 508, 510-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (appellant must show pretrial motion had merit and that ruling would have changed the outcome of the case before counsel will be considered ineffective in failing to assert the motion). Without a showing that rulings on the motions would have changed the outcome of the case, appellant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain a ruling on pre-trial motions. Magic v. State, 217 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Appellant argues that his case is distinguishable from those cases failing to find counsel ineffective for not filing or obtaining rulings on pretrial motions because counsel never consulted with appellant regarding why he had not obtained rulings on the various motions.³ The record fails to support this assertion. With no record of the reasoning behind counsel's failure to obtain rulings on various pre-trial motions, and no showing that any motion would have been granted, we cannot conclude counsel's performance was deficient. See Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Second, appellant argues counsel was ineffective in failing to call Ramirez as a witness. To prevail, appellant must show that Ramirez was available to testify and that his testimony would have been of some benefit. Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 319 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) ("Absent a showing by appellant that he would have benefitted from the testimony, the decision not to call witnesses at either stage of trial does not raise the spectre of ineffective assistance."). Appellant argues alternatively that counsel should have requested a continuance for time to find and subpoena Ramirez. However, appellant fails to show that he would have benefitted from Ramirez's testimony had the trial been delayed to obtain it. See White, 160 S.W.3d at 52. Third, appellant suggests counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Anthony Williams' testimony that, as a social worker employed at the hospital, he gave complainant the "proper information" before she made a decision to have a sexual assault exam. Appellant contends Williams was not qualified to determine what the "proper information" would be for making such a decision. A person who has professional social work training and experience can testify as both a lay and an expert witness. See Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 659 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (holding that social worker was permitted to testify under Rule 701 based on her personal observations of defendant and under Rule 702 based on her training and experience). Williams explained how he provided complainant with information to help her decide whether to have a sexual assault exam performed. For appellant to show ineffective assistance for failure to object to unqualified expert testimony he must demonstrate the trial court would have erred in overruling an objection if made. Vaughn v. State, 931 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Appellant has not made this showing on the record before this Court. Fourth, appellant claims counsel failed to object to what he purports was a misstatement of the law during voir dire and a comment on his failure to testify during closing argument. During voir dire, the State mentioned that "victims under the law have very few rights, if any, and none under the Constitution." Appellant cites no authority to support his contention that this was a misstatement of the law, and references only "Texas' Rape Shield laws" as an example of victims' rights. See Tex. R. Evid. 412 (regarding evidence of previous sexual conduct in criminal cases). The State's comment does not conflict with Rule 412, as it merely references victims' rights as "few," and not as nonexistent. Appellant also contends that the State commented on his failure to testify during closing argument. The State argued:

What you do know is there is semen on her pants and you know from everything else that she told you the only witness in that room who can tell you, who was here to tell you because the officers did talk to Ramirez. You heard Officer Jenkins say that. And the defense has the same subpoena power the State does. Don't let them tell you that Ramirez could have come. Don't speculate on what they could have done because they have rights. They have the right to bring witnesses to you.

A prosecutor's statements constitute a comment on the failure of a defendant to testify when the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would necessarily and naturally take it as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Bustamante v. State, 48 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Language that can reasonably be construed to refer to a failure to present evidence other than from the defendant's own testimony does not amount to a comment on the failure to testify. Swallow v. State, 829 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). From the context of this argument, it appears the State was referencing Ramirez, and not appellant, when it argued complainant was the only witness who could tell the jury what happened. Further, an attorney must be free to choose not to make an objection even when a legal basis exists for doing so. McKinny v. State, 76 S.W.3d 463, 473 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). We presume counsel had a plausible reason for all his actions. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814; see Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 110. We hold appellant has failed to establish that counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. Additionally, we hold appellant has failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for the errors he alleges, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. We overrule issue one.

Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant contends in his second issue that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he placed his penis in complainant's vagina. He asserts the failure of DNA testing to link him to the assault supports his contention. When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view it in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). We do not weigh any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this was the function of the trier of fact. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Instead, our duty is to determine whether both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 422. In so doing, any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows complainant identified appellant as her assailant and specifically testified that he placed his penis inside her vagina without her consent. See Tinker v. State, 148 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978) (holding that victim's testimony is sufficient to prove sexual contact occurred despite no physical evidence)). We determine a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jensen v. State, 66 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (testimony of a victim, standing alone, is sufficient to support a conviction for sexual assault); see also Satterwhite v. State, 499 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) (victim's testimony that appellant placed "his male organ into her private parts" was sufficient to sustain conviction). We overrule issue two.

Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant's third issue challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence. When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 557 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). We will set aside the verdict only if (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We cannot conclude that the evidence is factually insufficient simply because we disagree with the verdict. See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). As the determiner of the credibility of the witnesses, the fact finder may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2 d 404, 407 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). An opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a discussion of the most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant's complaint on appeal. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); but see Roberts v. State, 221 S.W.3d 659, 665 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Moreover, an opinion reversing and remanding on factual insufficiency grounds must detail all the evidence and clearly state why the finding in question is factually insufficient and under which ground. Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 286-87 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we consider appellant's argument that complainant's testimony should be disregarded because she was inebriated at the time of the assault. However, the jury was entitled to believe complainant's testimony despite her intoxication. See Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 237 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 409. Further, although the DNA evidence failed to corroborate appellant's guilt, it likewise does not weigh against the verdict. "The lack of physical or forensic evidence is a factor for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence." Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff'd, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). After neutrally examining all the evidence, we find the proof of guilt is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust nor is the verdict against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Vasquez, 67 S.W.3d at 238-39. We overrule issue three. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.