Opinion
C. A. 9:20-cv-01673-TLW-MHC
05-28-2021
Franklin Antonio Benjamin #126806, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections; Rysheema Davis, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) filed by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and Rysheema Davis (“Davis”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 25. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion, ECF No. 28, and the Motion is ripe for review. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Franklin Antonio Benjamin (“Plaintiff”) brought this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his civil rights while incarcerated within SCDC. Specifically, in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to modify his diet. ECF No. 1 at 5.
Plaintiff is currently serving a life sentence for murder at Lee Correctional Institution. ECF No. 25-2. Plaintiff alleges that on August 4, 2019, he requested a modification to his diet from Defendant Davis. ECF No. 1 at 5. Defendant Davis is a nutritionist employed by SCDC. ECF No. 25-3 at 1. Plaintiff's medical records, provided by SCDC, do not include a doctor's orde special diet. See ECF No. 25-4. According to Defendant Davis, one of her job duties is as inmates who need special diets for medical reasons, and she “did not deny [Plaintiff] a speci based on his medical needs.” ECF No. 25-3 at 1.
Plaintiff commenced this action claiming that he was denied a healthy diet that in wholegrain foods, fruits, and adequate protein. ECF No. 1 at 6-7. He further alleges the provided within SCDC do not meet the current dietary standards established by the USDA 6. He states that the diet “never or very seldom provides [fifty-six] grams of proteins daily does it provide whole grains like oatmeal or wheat products.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges t never gets fruits or the fruit juice equivalent that is specified for optimal health. Id.
As a result, Plaintiff claims this diet has caused him to be diagnosed with high pressure, while also appearing to allege that this has resulted in headaches and psychol distress. Id. at 7. He asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 8-9. Pl requests that his diet, along with the entire inmate population, be modified to include a var wholegrain foods and fruit or fruit juice equivalent. Id. at 7. He further seeks mo compensation in the amount of seven million dollars for the pain caused. Id.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim pursuant to Rule 56 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 25. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “ there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (2) Plaintiff has failed to show a constitutional violation; and (3) Defendant Davis is entitled to qualified immunity. For the following reasons, the Court agrees and recommends granting Defendants' Motion.
A. Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state (and its agencies) may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Here, SCDC is an agency and an alter ego of the state of South Carolina. See S.C. Code § 24-1-30. As a result, the Eleventh Amendment bars the action against Defendant SCDC. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66. Plaintiff has also brought suit against Defendant Davis in her official capacity only. ECF No. 1 at 2. As a result, because Defendant Davis is an employee of SCDC, she is likewise entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Simpson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:19-CV-2245-RMG, 2020 WL 582321, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting SCDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against them in their official capacities). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
B. Plaintiff has failed to show Defendant Davis violated the Constitution.
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to show Defendant Davis violated the Constitution. Plaintiff brought his § 1983 action against Defendant Davis in her official capacity. See ECF No. 1 at 2. In her official capacity, Defendant Davis is entitled to summary judgment, as she is not considered a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991).
Even in her individual capacity, Defendant Davis would still be entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff s claim, that his meals do not meet current dietary standards established by the USDA, is an allegation that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 233 (4th Cir. 2016). To demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment against a defendant in her individual capacity, a plaintiff must establish (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of Defendants. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff has failed to do so.
As an initial matter, although Plaintiff alleges that he is being denied the requested modification to his diet, he has not established a serious medical need for a specialized diet. According to Plaintiff's medical records provided by SCDC, he has no immediate or serious medical condition requiring a special modification to his diet, and Plaintiff has not provided any evidence otherwise. See ECF No. 25-4; Cf. Scinto, 841 F.3d at 233 (recognizing that the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide prisoners special diets when medically appropriate).
Nor has Plaintiff shown a sufficiently serious deprivation of “adequate food” to establish an Eleventh Amendment violation. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 233. To the contrary, Plaintiff himself provides sample menus from SCDC, which show three meals are provided daily. See ECF No. 28-1 at 9. Plaintiff does not contend that he is unable to eat any of the food provided by SCDC such that he is being deprived of adequate nutrition; rather, the gravamen of his complaint is that the menu does not provide him with a desired variety of foods. See ECF No. 28 at 1 (“The SCDC diet seldom promotes a variety of whole grains like oatmeal or bread[.]”); Id. at 2 (“The fact that SCDC does not give fruits or fruit juice equivalent regularly and no fruit minimizes nutrition that can only be achieved by variety.”); Id. (“Due to lack of variety, the only consistent protein source provided is eggs[, ] milk, and beef.”). However, the lack of a desired variety of foods is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Frazier v. Dep't of Corr., 125 F.3d 861, 1997 WL 603773, at *1 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (holding that “Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the menu at the Central New Mexico Correctional Facility is not sufficient to support his Eighth Amendment claim” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Salters v. Wright, No. CIV.A. 4:13-1536, 2013 WL 5739025, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2013) (“The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing.” (quoting LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993))). Consequently, Plaintiff has not established a serious deprivation of a basic human need sufficient to implicate a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Williams, 952 F.2d at 824.
On Sunday, a “brunch” option is provided, resulting in only two meals for that day. See ECF No. 28-1 at 9. Plaintiff takes issue with this and argues that “on any given Sunday [he] is only provided approximately 2, 068 calories” despite the guidelines for dietary allowances suggesting adult males should consume 2, 900 calories daily if they are engaged in light to moderate activity. ECF Nos. 28 at 3-4, 28-1 at 7. In any event, even considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, there has not been a showing that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that a day where the caloric intake dips below suggested guidelines constitutes a serious deprivation of a basic human need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 234 (“Only an ‘extreme deprivation' is actionable under the Eighth Amendment.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to establish Defendant Davis was subjectively aware of-that is, that she knew of and disregarded-this alleged deprivation. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting deliberate indifference requires that a prison official know of and disregard the objectively serious condition or deprivation).
Moreover, Plaintiff has not established that Defendant Davis was deliberately indifferent to his needs. See Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166 (noting deliberate indifference requires that a prison official know of and disregard the objectively serious condition or deprivation). Notably, Defendant Davis testified that she did not deny Plaintiff a special diet based on any medical need, and Plaintiff has not shown otherwise. ECF No. 25-3 at 1. There is no evidence of record that Defendant Davis was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical or a basic human need. See Miller v. Cleek, 198 F.3d 246, 1999 WL 1045156, at *2 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (noting that since there was no instruction by a medical provider that the plaintiff required a special diet, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff's health so as to support a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim). Accordingly, Defendant Davis is entitled to summary judgment for this additional reason.
Defendant Davis would also be entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity, which offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity. “Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996). The threshold inquiry this Court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether Plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). As set forth in detail herein, Plaintiff has failed to establish an issue of material fact on his allegations of constitutional violations. Because Defendant Davis did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, she would also be shielded from liability in her individual capacity by qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) be GRANTED.
Charleston, South Carolina
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).