Opinion
Case No. 1:01-cv-35.
February 2, 2001.
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis . Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Brooks Correctional Facility, though his action concerns events that occurred when he was incarcerated at the Greensville Correctional Facility within the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC"). Pursuant to an interstate compact, the State of Michigan housed inmates in the State of Virginia. In his prose complaint, plaintiff sues the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections, Bill Martin; "Jane Doe", a nurse at the VDOC; "Jon Doe", a prison director at the VDOC; and Dr. Swetter, the chief physician at the VDOC. Plaintiff's actions concerns his medical care while incarcerated at the VDOC.
Plaintiff contends that in April 2000, he fractured his ankle in the recreation yard. He saw a doctor thirty minutes later. The doctor told him that he had a sprain and did not need x-rays. Plaintiff was sent back to the housing unit on crutches. Two days later he had an x-ray, and then five days later, he got a cast. He was not given a medical detail for a lower bunk bed and had to climb onto a table to get into his bed. Plaintiff asserts that he has reduced mobility in his ankle and recurring problems.
Plaintiff also states that in December 2000, he was called to health care. His inmate pass had the name of another inmate with the same surname as plaintiff. The nurse gave plaintiff shots and took blood. Plaintiff complained about the error, and he received an apology from several staff persons, including Dr. Swetter.
For relief, plaintiff requests an award of one million dollars and an order to have a specialist examine his ankle. He would also like the blood samples to be destroyed.
II. Failure to state a claim
Regardless whether plaintiff has properly exhausted his claims in the appropriate administrative process, the Court may dismiss them for failure to state a claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff's allegations regarding his medical care are properly considered under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). For a medical claim, the Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05;Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1995).
The deliberate indifference standard "describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference. Id. at 837. The reason for focusing on the official's mental attitude is to isolate those defendants who inflict punishment.Id. at 839.
Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (quotations omitted).
Plaintiff's claim that the VODC physician misdiagnosed his fractured ankle as a sprain does not constitute a claim of deliberate indifference. Differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim.Sanderfer, 62 F.3d at 154-55; Ward v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. April 4, 1997). In addition, the failure of the physician to provide a medical detail for a bottom bunk is, at best, a claim of negligence. There are no allegations to support the conclusion that the physician knew that plaintiff had a top bunk and refused to provide plaintiff a medical detail so that he could be moved to a lower bunk. Consequently, plaintiff's allegations arising from his ankle fracture fail to state a claim.
Similarly, plaintiff's allegations that the nurse mistakenly drew blood and administered shots is, at most, a claim of negligence. There are no allegations to show that the nurse realized that plaintiff was the wrong inmate and gave him unnecessary medical treatments. Thus, there is nothing to show that the nurse's actions were anything other than human error, and human error does not form the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference.
Finally, plaintiff alleges that he is bringing a complaint of "deliberate indifference." This assertion does not support his conclusion; merely stating the "magic words" is not enough. See Arnold v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., 843 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D.S.C. 1994) (despite use of phrase "deliberate indifference" in his pleadings, inmate failed to show that defendants possessed the requisite mental state). Rather, plaintiff must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. Because he has not done so, he fails to state a claim.
In addition, plaintiff's claims against MDOC Director Bill Martin, and Dr. Swetter, also fail. Plaintiff's allegations do not show that these defendants were directly involved. Presumably, Bill Martin is being sued because he is the Director of the MDOC, and Dr. Swetter, because he is the chief physician at the VDOC. A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to § 1983 cannot premise liability upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Street, 102 F.3d at 818 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). As the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized:
Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat superior. There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.
Taylor v. Michigan of Corrections, 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984)). Liability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon "a mere failure to act." Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (quotingSalehpour v. University of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998),cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1115 (1999)), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2724 (2000). Plaintiff's allegations fail to meet this standard. In light of the foregoing, plaintiff fails to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that plaintiff's action fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $105 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1),see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $105 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion filed this date:
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997).
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).