Benjamin v. Malcolm

12 Citing cases

  1. Ruiz v. Lynaugh

    811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987)   Cited 31 times
    Discussing deference due district court in institutional reform cases "because it is intimately involved in the often complex process of institutional reformation" and "has the personal knowledge, experience, and insight necessary to evaluate the parties' intentions, performances, and capabilities"

    It has been stated that "modification under rule 60(b) requires `that a significant change of circumstances shall have occurred since the date of the final judgment to warrant its modification.'" Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). In the leading Supreme Court case on modification of consent decrees, Justice Cardozo stated:

  2. Benjamin v. Malcolm

    803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that city had standing to raise constitutional arguments against state because city faced contempt sanctions for noncompliance with court order

    Judge Lasker's analyses of the evidence and legal issues are found in a series of published decisions, familiarity with which is assumed. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F.Supp. 1357 (1980); 88 F.R.D. 333 (1980); 528 F.Supp. 925 (1981); 564 F.Supp. 668 (1983); 626 F.Supp. 1264 (1986); 629 F.Supp. 713 (1986). The complaint, which was filed in June 1975, alleges that in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 various officials of the City of New York (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "City") are responsible for a broad range of conditions at the HDM, which violate the detainees' constitutional rights, including those under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeks appropriate injunctive relief.

  3. Benjamin v. Malcolm

    629 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)   Cited 4 times
    In Benjamin, the court stated that "the `claim' to be examined,... is the City's assertion that the State defendants must be joined in order to assure full compliance with the existing decree which assures the plaintiffs protection of their constitutional rights."

    LASKER, District Judge. The history of this much litigated case involving the overcrowding of New York City jails is set forth in numerous prior decisions, see Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N Y 1981); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 88 F.R.D. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). On January 30, 1986, in the most recent decision in this action, we granted the motion of Governor Mario Cuomo and Thomas A. Coughlin III, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("the State defendants") to vacate this court's August 20, 1981 order requiring the State defendants to accept "state ready" inmates within forty-eight hours.

  4. Duran v. Elrod

    713 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that where it was unmistakable that defendants intended to appeal both lower court's opinion ordering release of low-bond detainees in county jail to meet population "cap" and denial of requested modification of consent order, and both issues were addressed in opinion, final appealable order, there was no prejudice to plaintiff pretrial detainees due to notice of appeal failing to designate order denying modification of final decree, since those parties had argued merits of issues on appeal

    DeFilippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1977). As District Judge Lasker held earlier in Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), modification under Rule 60(b) requires "that a significant change of circumstance shall have occurred since the date of the final judgment to warrant its modification." Justice Cardozo held in United States v. Swift Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1931):

  5. Benjamin v. Malcolm

    626 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    The difference between conditions which exist in detention centers in general and prisons in general." Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). There is no doubt that the situation in the state system is a grave situation, as it also is in the city system.

  6. Wali v. Coughlin

    754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985)   Cited 328 times
    Holding that parties seeking a preliminary injunction that would grant the movant substantially all the relief he ultimately seeks and not merely maintain the status quo "must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, i.e., that their cause is considerably more likely to succeed than fail"

    During the summer of 1981, faced with a choice between opening 600 unused cells at the Rikers Island facility, and requiring DOCS to lift its cap at Attica, the federal district court chose the latter course. See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F.Supp. 925, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Prisoners' Legal Services Report

  7. Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon

    672 F. Supp. 627 (D.P.R. 1987)   Cited 8 times

    The court noted first the "extraordinary" nature of rule 60(b) relief, and the requirement that "a significant change of circumstance shall have occurred since the date of the final judgment to warrant its modification." 713 F.2d at 296, quoting, Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 928 (S.D.N Y 1981). Defendants failed to make this showing, even though they were able to establish unforeseen population increases. The court concluded

  8. Woe v. Cuomo

    638 F. Supp. 1506 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    Analogously, therefore, in the institution-wide setting, the quality of care delivered at BPC must be measured by medical or psychological criteria and not by exigency, administrative convenience, or other non-medical criteria. Defendants cannot justify inadequate care at BPC on the ground that they are preventing similar inadequacies from spreading to other institutions. Cf. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[W]hat the State proposes here is to equalize unconstitutionality by requiring the City to share the burden of impermissible overcrowding with the State. The remedy does not lie in equalizing unconstitutionality but in eliminating it.").

  9. Union County Jail Inmates v. Scanlon

    537 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1982)   Cited 7 times

    As stated by Judge Lasker in the Southern District of New York in a similar State prison-County jail context: "Moreover, the only circumstance which has changed — an increase in the population of the State's prison population — was entirely foreseeable in [October], 1981, and had been for a long period before that date." Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 929 (1981). Because I believe that the provision in the consent order requiring the County to close the doors to the UCJ as a "last-resort" measure is an unnecessarily intrusive and disruptive one, I will relieve the County of complying with it.

  10. Matter of Lynott

    193 B.R. 882 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1996)   Cited 1 times
    Stating that "the `lack of adequate representation of interests' requirement may be shown by establishing an economic interest in the matter which is not otherwise protected"

    A significant change of circumstances must have occurred since the date of the original judgment or order to warrant modification, and a failure to appeal or seek other appropriate relief will not suffice. Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184, 188 (7th Cir.1985) (citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950)); Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir.1983) (citing Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F.Supp. 925, 928 (S.D.N.Y.1981)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1615, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984).         Whether the Colorado action is property of the estate, in fact, was previously addressed in December, 1994, at the hearing on Lynott's objection to the trustee's proposed compromise.