Benjamin v. Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC

34 Citing cases

  1. Vaughn v. City of New York

    06-CV-6547 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y. May. 24, 2010)   Cited 35 times
    Granting summary judgment when, despite a gap of only a few months between the protected activity and the alleged adverse action, the plaintiff failed to show causation because she was subject to reprimands and discipline before she engaged in any protected activity

    .A, 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Exhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC is `an essential element' of the Title VII . . . statutory scheme[] and, as such, a precondition to bringing such claims in federal court."); see also Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2003) ("As a precondition to filing a Title VII claim in federal court, a plaintiff must first pursue available administrative remedies and file a timely complaint with the EEOC."). If the EEOC complaint is not timely filed, a civil action is similarly time-barred. Butts v. City of New York Dept. of Hous. Pres. Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civ. Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 136 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000) ("To sustain a claim for unlawful discrimination under Title VII . . . a plaintiff must file administrative charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts."); Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assoc., LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). "Generally, a claim must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

  2. Johnson v. City of New York

    17-CV-7585 (PKC) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 18, 2019)   Cited 7 times

    A plaintiff may not recover for claims of discrimination based on discrete acts that occurred outside of the statutory period, "even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113-14; Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("These discrete acts cannot be transformed into 'a single unlawful practice for the purposes of timely filing.'") (internal citation omitted).

  3. Grimes-Jenkins v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc.

    16 Civ. 4897 (AT) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. May. 22, 2017)   Cited 28 times
    Dismissing failure-to-promote claim where plaintiff "allege[d] that she was discouraged from applying while less qualified men were encouraged to apply" and collecting cases

    As a prerequisite to bringing suit under Title VII, GINA, or the ADA, a plaintiff must first file a timely charge with the EEOC. See Chin v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 685 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2012) (Title VII); Yajaira Bezares C. v. Donna Karan Company Store LLC, Nos. 13 Civ. 8560, 13 Civ. 9123, 2014 WL 2134600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014) (GINA); Benjamin v. Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (ADA). Accordingly, a plaintiff may only raise claims under these statutes if they were included in the EEOC charge or are "reasonably related" to it.

  4. Lebowitz v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

    407 F. Supp. 3d 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)   Cited 66 times
    Finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged participation in protected activity by alleging that they "repeatedly complained to Defendants about the discriminatory treatment that they endured because of their age"

    ) As a condition precedent to bringing a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that she exhausted her administrative remedies. SeeBenjamin v. Brookhaven Science Assocs., LLC , 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining exhaustion of remedies requirement in ADA context). A plaintiff may do so by pleading the claims at issue in a charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").

  5. Telemaque v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.

    14 Civ. 6336 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2016)   Cited 12 times
    Finding allegations regarding sleep problems insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss

    "In this inquiry, the focus should be on the factual allegations made in the [administrative complaint] itself, describing the discriminatory conduct about which a plaintiff is grieving." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[T]he factual allegations in an EEOC charge, rather than any legal theories stated therein, should be the focus....") (citing Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 822 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). "The central question is whether the complaint filed...gave that agency adequate notice to investigate discrimination on both bases."

  6. Apuzza v. NYU Langone Long Island

    22-CV-7519 (JMA)(JMW) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 11, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-14 (2002); see also Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 387 F.Supp.2d 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing one of three claims because the dismissed claim was not filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged conduct). Plaintiff was terminated on September 30, 2021.

  7. Kirkland-Hudson v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist.

    665 F. Supp. 3d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)   Cited 39 times

    Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations that she was assigned an unbalanced schedule assignment and subject to insensitive comments are discrete discriminatory acts. See Gaffney v. Vill. of Mamaroneck Police Dep't, No. 15-CV-5290, 2016 WL 4547499, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2016) (holding that age-related comments were discrete acts); Bain v. Highgate Hotels, LP, No. 08-CV-3263, 2009 WL 10705912, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009) (concluding that "a series of discrete acts consisting of specific failures to assign [plaintiff] to the early shift[,] ... a particular denial of a requested vacation date, or an assignment of an onerous task on some occasions" did "not support invocation of the continuing violation doctrine"); Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that "undesirable work transfers[] and denial of preferred job assignments are considered discrete acts"); see also Birch v. City of N.Y., 675 F. App'x 43, 44 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (characterizing as discrete acts allegations of "punitive transfers, undesirable assignments, and poor performance reviews"). Accordingly, the events alleged to have occurred prior to

  8. Rojas v. Human Res. Admin.

    18-CV-6852(KAM)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2022)

    (“Examples of discrete acts . . . include disparate disciplining, negative performance reviews, termination, failure to promote, and denial of a preferred job position.”); Harvin v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., No. 14-cv-5125(CBA), 2018 WL 1603872, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (defendant's “repeated rejections of a plaintiff's proposed accommodations are each discrete acts”); Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 387 F.Supp.2d 146, 154 (E.D.N.Y., 2005) (“[I]t is well-settled in the Second Circuit that alleged failures to compensate adequately, transfers, job assignments and promotions are discrete acts . . . .”).

  9. Separ v. Cnty. of Nassau

    21-CV-00010 (DRH) (JMW) (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 17, 2021)   Cited 5 times

    "Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice,'" and "each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act." Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-14 (2002); see also Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing one of three claims because the dismissed claim was not filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged conduct). Again, Plaintiff lodged her EEOC complaint on May 7, 2020.

  10. Comerford v. Vill. of N. Syracuse

    5:18-cv-01143 (BKS/TWD) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2021)   Cited 8 times
    In Comerford, the plaintiff attempted to assert a new claim of retaliation (which she had not asserted in her complaint) in response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

    Plaintiff's September 2016 demotion constitutes a "discrete act" of alleged discrimination or retaliation. See Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[E]mployment practices such as failure to promote, failure to compensate adequately, undesirable work transfers, and denial of preferred job assignments are considered discrete acts."); see also Birch v. City of New York, 675 F. App'x 43, 44 (2d Cir. 2017) (characterizing as discrete acts allegations of "punitive transfers, undesirable assignments, and poor performance review"). It occurred prior to April 7, 2017, and is therefore barred for purposes of Plaintiff's Title VII claims,— though it "may constitute relevant background evidence" in connection with Plaintiff's Title VII claims.