Where medical testimony thus leaves the question in dispute the Court is "free to adopt that view which is most consistent with reason and justice." Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, at pages 11 to 12, 222 S.W.2d 22, at page 26. Similarly, where medical testimony is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn, one that causation existed between the injury and the work, the other that it did not exist, that inference which seems to the Court the stronger and more reasonable may be drawn. Howell v. Charles H. Bacon Co., D.C., 98 F. Supp. 567.

The finding of the trial court is not speculative or based upon conjecture. In Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22, the final conclusion of the Court was based upon the testimony of medical experts. There are many cases to the effect that medical testimony in many cases is entitled to great weight in determining the nature and extent of an injury and its ultimate consequences. If the trial judge reaches a decision based upon the opinions of medical experts, as in the instant case, there is no reason for this Court to disregard it as having no probative value.

Morrison v. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co., 162 Tenn. 523, 527, 39 S.W.2d 272, 274. But the more recent view is that the injury may be accidental, though the culmination of numerous over-exertions, impacts or jars. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22. Yet examination of the cases, including the Musgrave case, indicates the necessity of causation between a recognizable fortuitous event and the injury. As where a congenitally weak back is strained by the lifting of a particular weight.

The medical testimony more strongly supports the latter, and as a matter of law I am authorized to adopt, and I have adopted, the stronger inference. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22; Graybeal v. Smith, 189 Tenn. 412, 225 S.W.2d 556; Milstead et al. v. Kaylor et al., 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610. It is well settled in the State of Tennessee that disability resulting from an untoward event, which we commonly refer to as an accident, that hastens the onset of an affliction or aggravates a preexisting disease, is compensable.

The medical testimony more strongly supports the latter, and as a matter of law I am authorized to adopt, and I have adopted, the stronger inference. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22; Graybeal v. Smith, 189 Tenn. 412, 225 S.W.2d 556; Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610. It is well settled in the State of Tennessee that disability resulting from an untoward event, which we commonly refer to as an accident, that hastens the onset of an affliction or aggravates a preexisting disease, is compensable. Lucey Boiler Mfg. Corp., v. Hicks, 188 Tenn. 700, 222 S.W.2d 19; Swift Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212 S.W.2d 388. Included within the meaning of accident is extra exertion, required of an employee at any moment or place. Cambria Coal Co. v. Ault, 166 Tenn. 567, 64 S.W.2d 18.

2d 529, 531 (La.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 988 (La. 1981) (arthritis in wrists from heavy lifting: "Under the prevailing trend of the jurisprudence it is not necessary that plaintiff prove his disability results from a sudden unexpected traumatic event. It is sufficient to show merely that the disability was caused by a work activity which can be gradual and progressive in nature."); Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 6 A.2d 48 (1939) (repeated impacts to knee); Manthe v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 239 Minn. 368, 58 N.W.2d 758 (1953) (jars from riding on defective car seat eventually resulting in back injury); Jones v. St. Regis Paper Co., 196 Mont. 138, 639 P.2d 1140 (1981) (preexisting back condition becoming total breakdown from series of small injuries over period of a year); Neilson v. Michael Stern Co., 282 App. Div. 793, 122 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1953) (repeated bumping against steam iron); Atlas Coal Corp. v. Scales, 198 Okla. 658, 185 P.2d 177 (1947) (repeated bruising of knee); Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22 (1949) (band saw continually impacting chest). To promote the objects of the General Assembly reflected in the compensation statute, we construe that act liberally.

Ark. Stat. Ann. 81-1323(c) (Repl. 1976). Although the statute seems to have specific application to verified reports, the principle is in accord with the weight of authority holding that, when medical opinions conflict, the commission may resolve the conflict in the light of the record as a whole, and, in that light, reach the result that accords with reason, justice and common sense. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22 (1949); Buda v. Industrial Commission, 377 Ill. 215, 36 N.E.2d 253 (1941); Gunther v. Strachan Shipping Co., 85 So.2d 543 (La.App., 1956); Fisher v. Buffalo Electric Co., Inc., 2 A.D.2d 612, 151 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1956). This statutory principle should apply to all medical evidence.

160 Tenn. 506, 26 S.W.2d 131. In Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22 (1949) on the question of defining accident this court said: Suffice it to say that we have never laid down any exclusive definition of the term.

But in this state we have followed Professor Larson's suggestion that even where both the cause and effect are gradual rather than sudden, the repeated impact or inhalation theory may be used to show a compensable accidental injury. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, supra, 209 Tenn. 106, 115, 350 S.W.2d 65; Sears-Roebuck Co. v. Starnes, supra. Moreover, in a footnote discussing the jurisdictions adopting this repeated-impact doctrine, Professor Larson cites our opinion in Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22 (1949), where an employee was allowed compensation for an infection caused from continued impacts of a band saw on his chest. We think the same theory would apply for a definite work-connected strain or exertion and, therefore, hold that the Patterson and Nashville Pure Milk Company cases, supra, are not distinguishable and are applicable.

Then follows Section 39.10, wherein this question is discussed at length and in a footnote following the discussion are cases from most State jurisdictions as well as Federal jurisdictions including in these notes many related circumstances to those in the instant case. In this footnote on gradual injuries our case of Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22, is cited, which was an infection caused from continued impacts of a band saw on the chest. In the footnote there are likewise cases pointed out which do not allow compensation in gradual injury cases, but the author points out that in these cases the injury was not sufficiently definite and probably this is the reason that compensation was denied.