Hagins was properly allowed to explain why he had testified falsely and inconsistently earlier in the trial to rebut the discrediting effect of the earlier testimony. Bivins v. State, 200 Ga. 729, 740-741 ( 38 S.E.2d 273) (1946); Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727, 731 ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the explanation given by Hagins was only for the purpose of explaining the changed testimony, and that it was not to be considered as evidence against any of the defendants or for any other purpose.

Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 435 ( 349 S.E.2d 717), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1986). See Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727, 730 ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). 3. Appellants also argue that they were afforded ineffective assistance of counsel which improperly prevented them from exercising their rights to testify on their own behalf at trial.

The extent of the rebuke and instructions is within the discretion of the trial judge. Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727 ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). We conclude that the trial court's instructions to the jury as quoted were not direct comments on the failure of the defendant to testify, but were explanations as to why such statements were to be disregarded by the jury.

Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 420 (6) ( 304 SE2d 522) (1983). See id.; Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 232 SE2d 89) (1976). (Citations omitted.)

Benefield v. State. Williams maintains that the trial court improperly relied upon the pre-sentence report in sentencing him. He reasons that because the State produced nothing in aggravation at the pre-sentence hearing, and because the trial court imposed a sentence harsher than that recommended by the State in the settlement agreement, the harsher sentence must have been the result of the trial court's consideration of the pre-sentence report. Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727, 738 ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). Williams's contention that the trial court made use of the pre-sentence report in fixing his sentence has no basis. The fact that the sentence imposed by the court is harsher than the recommended sentence set forth in the State's plea agreement proves nothing.

Popham held that the defendant was entitled to a mistrial where the record showed that the State had not turned its entire file over to the court for an in camera Brady inspection. See Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727 ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). Taylor has made no such showing.

[Cits.]" Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727 (2) ( 232 S.E.2d 89). (1976). Repeated requests by an officer or agent for illegal drugs from one who is known to have possessed them do not raise the defense of entrapment, even if he at first denies having them or a willingness to sell them. Johnson v. State, 147 Ga. App. 92, 93 (1) ( 248 S.E.2d 168) (1978); Garrett v. State, 133 Ga. App. 564, 566 (3) ( 211 S.E.2d 584) (1974).

Houston v. State, supra at 339 (3). Considering the polygraph evidence and witness statements in the context of the entire record, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that the result of the instant proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been given to Moclaire and Endres. Because the omitted evidence does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, the trial court was justified in denying the extraordinary motion for a new trial. See Cato v. State, 195 Ga. App. 619, 620 (1) ( 394 S.E.2d 413) (1990); Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727, 733-736 (8) ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). 2.

The defense's effort to discredit the witness was proper under the rule that "a party may show any fact or circumstance that might affect the credit of an opposing witness" ( Arnold v. State, 163 Ga. App. 10 (4) ( 293 S.E.2d 501) (1982)); it is also proper, where testimony tending to discredit a witness has been drawn from him on cross-examination, to permit the witness to explain the matter. Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727 (5) ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). The complained-of testimony being admissible under the rules relating to impeachment of witnesses, Rule 31.3 was inapplicable and there was no error in admitting the testimony.

Moreover, because the evidence only placed the investigator under suspicion of crime, and did not show a conviction, it may not even be used to impeach the investigator's testimony. See Arnold v. State, 163 Ga. App. 10 ( 293 S.E.2d 501) (1982); Benefield v. State, 140 Ga. App. 727, 735 ( 232 S.E.2d 89) (1976). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.