In cases where the sentence is not void and the defendant filed an application for review of their sentence under former OCGA § 17–10–6, “as long as the sentence is one which is otherwise covered by an application, a Sentence Review Panel decision is totally insulated from a trial court's claim of reinvested subject matter jurisdiction over the question of punishment.” Benefield v. State, 276 Ga. 100, 575 S.E.2d 453 (2003). Thus, as “[a]ny order issued by the Panel reducing or refusing to reduce any sentence covered by an application shall be binding on the defendant and the superior court which imposed the sentence,” OCGA § 17–10–6(d), the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is “strictly limited to determining whether the sentences for which [the defendant] had sought review were among those which the Panel was statutorily authorized to reduce.”

Compare OCGA § 9-4-1 (purpose of Declaratory Judgment Act is "to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations") with OCGA § 9-6-20 (mandamus may issue to compel performance) and OCGA § 9-6-40 (prohibition may issue to restrain subordinate court from exceeding its jurisdiction). The cases cited by the dissent in support of its argument that the trial court properly considered Fleming's claims are not controlling. The State was not a party in either Smith Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 273 Ga. 431 ( 543 SE2d 16) (2001) or Jersawitz v. Riley, 269 Ga. 546 ( 500 SE2d 579) (1998), cited for the proposition that the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal is a prerequisite to relief via mandamus or prohibition, and thus its limited right of appeal in criminal matters was not implicated. Benefield v. State of Ga., 276 Ga. 100 (1) ( 575 SE2d 453) (2003), held that the Attorney General, the Department of Corrections, and the Board of Pardons and Paroles were authorized to petition for prohibition on the ground that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction, which is a basis for appeal specifically granted to the State pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5); no such basis exists here. The statements referenced in State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152 (2) ( 635 SE2d 716) (2006) and Moseley v. Sentence Review Panel, 280 Ga. 646 (1) ( 631 SE2d 704) (2006) are dicta and thus not dispositive of any issue in this case.

In accordance with this provision, the Panel's action on Ms. Widner's application established with seeming finality that she would only be required to serve an eight-year term, rather than the fifteen-year sentence imposed by the trial court. See Benefield v. State of Ga., 276 Ga. 100, 101-102 (2) ( 575 SE2d 453) (2003) (holding that, "as long as the sentence is one which is otherwise `covered by an application,' a Panel decision is totally insulated from a trial court's claim of reinvested subject matter jurisdiction over the question of punishment"). Therefore, making today's decision retroactively effective as to her would result in the imposition of a greater sentence than the one she is currently serving.

Therefore, Moseley had standing to challenge the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-6 and to seek injunctive relief against enforcement of its provisions. Benefield v. State of Ga., 276 Ga. 100 ( 575 SE2d 453) (2003) does not support a contrary holding. There, the trial judge entered an order in the underlying criminal case, holding that OCGA § 17-10-6 was unconstitutional "and that the decision of the Panel was `without legal effect to modify, replace, or reduce (the) legal sentence(s)' she had originally imposed."

Thereafter, this Court determined that the Panel lacked the statutory authority to reduce the ten-year sentence for false imprisonment to five years. See Benefield v. State of Ga., 276 Ga. 100, 102 ( 575 SE2d 453) (2003). Keller, District Attorney of the Clayton Judicial Circuit, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Superior Court of Fulton County, requesting it to compel the Department to enforce the original ten-year sentence for false imprisonment.

]" Berky v. State, 266 Ga. 28, 29 ( 463 S.E.2d 891) (1995). Compare Benefield v. State of Ga., 276 Ga. 100 ( 575 S.E.2d 453) (2003) (prohibition sought by State agencies having post-conviction sentencing authority). Although I must concur in the dismissal, I do so reluctantly.