Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3571-12T2
06-16-2014
RONALD BENEDETTO, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Ronald Benedetto, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Simonelli and Haas.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Ronald Benedetto, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
At all times relevant to this appeal, appellant Ronald Benedetto was an inmate at South Woods State Prison serving a term of life imprisonment, with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. He appeals from a final disciplinary determination by the Department of Corrections (DOC) finding he committed prohibited act .802/.752, attempting to give money or anything of value to, or accept money or anything of value from, another inmate, and .802/.754, attempting to give money or anything of value to, or accepting money or anything of value from, a member of another inmate's family or another inmate's friend with an intent to circumvent any correctional facility or DOC rule, regulation, or policy, or with an intent to further an illegal or improper purpose, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record developed before the DOC hearing officer. On January 28, 2013, appellant's friend, who was listed on his visitor list, sent two money orders to two different South Woods inmates. On that same date, the prison received a third money order that was sent to appellant by his father. The three money orders were consecutively numbered and all were issued on the same day. Appellant was charged with committing prohibited act .802/.752.
The second incident occurred on February 1, 2013. On that date, appellant made a business remit in the amount of $100.24 payable to a friend of another inmate, who had recently been transferred from South Woods to Northern State Prison. As a result, appellant was charged with prohibited act .802/.754.
On these facts, the hearing officer found appellant guilty of both charges, and sanctioned him to ten days' detention, ninety days of administrative segregation, and sixty days' loss of commutation time. Following an administrative appeal, the Assistant Superintendent upheld the finding of guilt, but modified the sanction by suspending the administrative portion for sixty days. This appeal followed.
In imposing these sanctions, the hearing officer merged the .802/.754 charge with the .802/752 charge.
On appeal, appellant raises the following contentions:
POINT I
APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HEARING OFFICER RALPH FAILED TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO MARSHALL FACTS IN ORDER TO PUT ON A FAVORABLE DEFENSE AND FOUND HIM GUILTY.
POINT II
HEARING OFFICER CHRISTY RALPH DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO FIND APPELLANT GUILTY OF DISCIPLINARY INFRACTION .802/.752 (ATTEMPTING TO GIVE MONEY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE TO, OR ACCEPTING ANYTHING OF VALUE FROM ANOTHER INMATE).
We have considered appellant's arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E). We add the following brief comments.
The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "An appellate court ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative agency only when the agency's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa v. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
Although prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply, see Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975), when reviewing a determination of the DOC in a matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only whether there is substantial evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited act, but also whether, in making its decision the DOC followed regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-96 (1995). These protections include written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing; an impartial tribunal, which may consist of personnel from the central office staff; a limited right to call witnesses; the assistance of counsel substitute; and a right to a written statement of evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions imposed. Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 525-33.
Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated because he was denied access to his visitor and phone records, which he alleges would have substantiated his claim that he was not guilty of the offenses charged. He also asserts that the sergeant who issued the .802/.752 charge "neglected to sign the charge, thus voiding" it. However, appellant and his counsel substitute did not request these records either before or at his administrative hearing. In addition, the name of the sergeant who issued the charge clearly appears on the report. Thus, appellant's due process rights were not violated.
We also conclude there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the DOC's determination that appellant was guilty of violating each of the prison rules involved here. On the same date, appellant's friend sent two money orders to two South Woods inmates. These two money orders were consecutively numbered with a third money order sent on the same date to appellant by his father. All three money orders were prepared on the same date. Thus, there was sufficient credible evidence that appellant committed prohibited act .802/.752 by attempting to give money to two other inmates by having his friend send them money orders.
Four days later, appellant sent a business remit to an individual who was on the visitor list of a former South Woods inmate, who had recently been transferred to Northern State Prison. Thus, there was also sufficient credible evidence that appellant committed prohibited act .802/.754 by attempting to give money to another inmate's friend.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION