Opinion
Civil Action 05-998
01-07-2022
STEVEN WAYNE BENDER, Petitioner, v. JAMES WYNDER, et al. Respondents.
DONETTA W. AMBROSE, DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ECF NO. 92
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), ECF No. 92, be denied.
II. REPORT
The background information in this section is taken from the undersigned's Report and Recommendation dated June 5, 2006 (ECF No. 58).
In 2001, Petitioner was convicted of, inter alia, second-degree murder in the death of his estranged wife's boyfriend, Marvin Knieriem. Petitioner's attorney filed a direct appeal on his behalf to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court affirmed Petitioner's judgment of sentence.
Petitioner then filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). The PCRA trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner, but Petitioner informed the court that he wanted to represent himself. The PCRA court denied relief. Petitioner appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, but the order denying PCRA relief was affirmed.
On September 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 5. The undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation dated June 5, 2006, recommending that the habeas petition be denied. ECF No. 58. Following the filing of objections, District Judge Donetta W. Ambrose adopted the Report and Recommendation, denying Petitioner's habeas petition and a certificate of appealability. ECF No. 65. Judgment was entered on June 28, 2006. ECF No. 66. Petitioner appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied his request for a certificate of appealability on April 11, 2007. ECF No. 74.
On December 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief of Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). ECF No. 77. That motion was denied. ECF No. 86. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied Petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability. ECF No. 90.
Now pending before the Court is another motion filed by Petitioner pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) wherein he asserts that he is entitled to relief from the judgment entered in 2006. ECF No. 92.
B. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) entitles the moving party to relief from judgment on several grounds, including the catch-all category “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). A motion under subsection 60(b)(6) must be brought “within a reasonable time, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1), and requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the reopening of a final judgment. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]uch circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context.” Id.
Petitioner alleges two extraordinary circumstances: (1) this Court's error in finding that “Claim 6” asserted in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was unexhausted and procedurally defaulted; and (2) the issuance of the decision in Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2021), announcing a change in the law affecting claims like Claim 6. ECF No. 92 at 12-13.
As to the first “circumstance, ” i.e., the allegation that this Court erred in its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained: “We have noted that ‘some courts have held that legal error without more cannot be corrected under Rule 60(b),' while other courts ‘have held that legal error may be characterized as “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), but only where the motion is made . . . within the time allowed for appeal.'” Sanders v. Downs, 622 Fed.Appx. 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1986)). Thus, even if legal error were a permissible basis for relief under Rule 60(b), such relief is not available through the instant motion, which was filed long after the appeal period had expired.
However, perhaps even more fatal to Petitioner's reliance on this basis for relief is that it is based on an incorrect premise. This Court did not find that Claim 6 was unexhausted or procedurally defaulted; rather, the Court found that, in the PCRA appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had rejected the claim on its merits and that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the relevant federal law nor did it result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of, the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. ECF No. 58 at 16-19.
For these reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to Rule 60 relief on this basis.
Petitioner also argues that a change of law set forth in the Bracey decision, filed on January 20, 2021, constitutes an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to reopen a final judgment under Rule 60(b). The Court disagrees. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained, “a change in the law doesn't even begin to support a Rule 60(b) motion unless the change is actually relevant to the movant's position.” Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 405 (3d Cir. 2015). The change set forth in Bracey is not relevant to Petitioner's case.
In Bracey, the Court of Appeals reviewed a District Court ruling that a claim raised in habeas petition, based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), was untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Subsection 2244(d)(1)(D) concerns the determination of the date on which the one-year period of limitation applicable to habeas petitions begins to run. The Court of Appeals found that its previous decision in Dennis v. Sec'y, Pa. Dept of Corr., 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016), effectively changed what Subsection 2244(d)(1)(D)'s “due diligence” requirement demands of habeas petitioners asserting Brady-related claims. Bracey, 986 F.32d at 279.
Here, although Petitioner's Claim 6 concerned an alleged Brady violation, the claim was not found to be untimely. Because Petitioner's Brady-related claim was not found to be untimely, the change in the law set forth in Bracey is irrelevant to the disposition of his petition. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to Rule 60 relief on this basis either.
Petitioner provides no cause to disturb the Court's dismissal of his habeas petition.
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), ECF No. 92, be denied.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing such objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.