Opinion
J-A19035-16 No. 3268 EDA 2015
10-19-2016
GENE C. BENCKINI T/A BENCKINI NURSERIES Appellant v. CHARLES GRANT, JR. T/A GRANTS AUTO SALVAGE
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered October 8, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2014-C-3970 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, and FITZGERALD, JJ. JUDGMENT ORDER BY FITZGERALD, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Pro se Appellant, Gene C. Benckini, trading as Benckini Nurseries, appeals from the order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellee, Charles Grant, Jr., trading as Grants Auto Salvage. Appellant contends that he timely filed his 2014 complaint within the two-year statute of limitations for conversion that allegedly occurred in 2007. We affirm.
As one court noted, Appellant is a frequent pro se litigant. See Benckini v. Hawk , No. 07-3580, 2009 WL 1078138 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2009).
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth in the trial court's opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 10/7/15, at 2-4; see also Benckini v. Hawk , 654 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316-19 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (summarizing exhaustive history of this case); Benckini v. Lichtenwalner , No. 2956 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11253383 (Pa. Super. Sept. 26, 2013) (joined by Fitzgerald, J.) (unpublished memorandum) (same). Appellant timely appealed and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, which spanned twenty-three paragraphs over six pages. The trial court declined to find waiver as it could discern Appellant's issue.
In support of his issue, Appellant asserts that the thefts that form the basis of his complaint occurred in 2012 and 2013. Appellant thus reasons that his complaint, filed on December 9, 2014, fell within the two-year statute of limitations. Appellant did not support his allegations with citations to the record.
Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of proving that no genuine issues of material fact exist. In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, summary judgment is proper only when the uncontroverted allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In sum, only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court properly enter summary judgment. With regard to questions of law, an appellate court's scope of review is plenary. The Superior Court will reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court has committed an error of law or abused its discretion.Charlie v. Erie Ins. Exchange , 100 A.3d 244, 250 (Pa. Super. 2014) (alteration and citation omitted). "Generally, for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, a claim accrues when the plaintiff is injured." Rancosky v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 130 A.3d 79, 99 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). "Whether the statute of limitations has run on a claim is usually a question of law for the judge; however, at times, a factual determination by the jury may be required." Marble v. Fred Hill & Son , 624 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted). Finally, "[a]lthough this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant." In re Ullman , 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
Instantly, after careful review of the parties' briefs (including a liberal construction of Appellant's pro se brief, see id.), the certified record, and the trial court's decision, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's reasoning. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7 (holding (1) Appellant failed to substantiate allegation that Appellee allegedly misappropriated Appellant's property between 2012 and 2013; (2) Appellee's only interaction with Appellant was in 2007, seven years before Appellant filed the instant complaint; and (3) Appellant's claims are time-barred). Accordingly, having discerned no error of law, we affirm the order below.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/19/2016
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