Benavidez v. Bloomfield Mun. Schools

4 Citing cases

  1. Torres v. Plastech Corp.

    124 N.M. 197 (N.M. 1997)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that the mere fact that a claimant did not know the full extent of his injury from a medical standpoint did not excuse him from filing his claim

    As a result, the Court of Appeals determined that there was substantial evidence of disability. In addition, Plastech asserts that ABF Freight System and Benavidez v. Bloomfield Municipal Schools, 1994 NMCA 023, 117 N.M. 245, 248, 871 P.2d 9, 12, support the Court of Appeals' conclusion. We disagree and conclude that there was not substantial evidence to support an inference of impairment as that term is defined in the Worker's Compensation Act under permanent partial disability, and this conclusion does not conflict with our holding in ABF Freight System and the Court of Appeals' interpretation of that case in Benavidez.

  2. Medina v. Berg Const., Inc.

    122 N.M. 350 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 10 times
    Interpreting "competently" to include "requisite physical, mental, natural or legal qualifications" and determining that the worker could not competently return to work as a truck driver, which was considered to be a "medium" job, because his residual physical capacity was classified as "light"

    Under these circumstances, we hold that a fee of $6500 plus tax is not excessive. See Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Sys., 112 N.M. 533, 535-36, 817 P.2d 726, 728-29 (1991); Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, 121 N.M. 258, 264, 910 P.2d 334, 340 (Ct.App. 1995); Benavidez v. Bloomfield Mun. Sch., 117 N.M. 245, 249, 871 P.2d 9, 13 (Ct.App. 1994). C. COSTS.

  3. Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc.

    121 N.M. 258 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 46 times
    Affirming a reduction in fees awarded in part because the worker was not completely successful in his claims

    Thus, no percentage is presumptively excessive if otherwise supported by other factors or policy considerations. See Benavidez v. Bloomfield Mun. Sch., 117 N.M. 245, 249, 871 P.2d 9, 13 (Ct.App. 1994). We conclude that the amount awarded in attorney fees by the WCJ in this case was within a reasonable discretionary range and that there was no abuse of discretion.

  4. Coslett v. Third Street Grocery

    117 N.M. 727 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that ignorance of law will not toll statute of limitations and that limitations period begins to run when person discovers factual basis for cause of action, even if person does not understand legal rights

    But the benefits being sought by such a claim are disability benefits, and Section 52-1-31(A) is unquestionably a statute of limitations for claims for disability benefits. The decisions that have held that there is no statute of limitations for claims for medical benefits, Zengerle v. City of Socorro, 105 N.M. 797, 800, 737 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Ct.App. 1986), cert. quashed, 105 N.M. 781, 737 P.2d 893 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Whittenberg v. Graves Oil Butane Co., 113 N.M. 450, 827 P.2d 838 (Ct.App. 1991), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 352, 826 P.2d 573 (1992), or vocational rehabilitation benefits, Benavidez v. Bloomfield Mun. Sch., 117 N.M. 245, 871 P.2d 9 (Ct.App. 1994), are founded on the absence of a provision in the Workers' Compensation Act setting a time limit for claims for those types of benefits. In contrast, there is a provision setting a time limit for claims for disability benefits, and there is nothing in the statute to suggest that the applicability of the limitations period depends upon the legal theory forming the basis for the claim for such benefits.