Opinion
Nos. 14-10-00768-CR, 14-10-00769-CR
Opinion filed October 27, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 338th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1225222 1225223.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, BROWN, and CHRISTOPHER.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Nery Eduardo Benavides, was found guilty by a jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child.See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021 (West 2011). The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on each conviction. We affirm.
The aggravated sexual assault of a child charge was brought in cause number 1225222, while the indecency with a child charge was brought in cause number 1225223.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The complainant in both cause numbers is K.A. K.A. was fifteen years' old at the time of appellant's trial and was thirteen when she made her first outcry. While K.A. was in eighth grade at Hambrick Middle School she was reading a book about sexual abuse in her language arts class. K.A. became upset and laid her head down on her desk. When that class period ended, K.A. went to her next class and that teacher sent K.A. to see a counselor. Rose Alvarez is a counselor at an Aldine Independent School District ("AISD") middle school and she was the first witness to testify. K.A. came into Alvarez's office and sat down in the corner of the office. K.A. remained quiet, made no eye contact with Alvarez, and put her face in her hands. Alvarez had to leave her office for lunch duty, so he gave K.A. a piece of paper and asked her to write down her feelings and they would talk about it when she returned. When Alvarez returned to her office thirty minutes later, K.A. was still there. In Alvarez's absence, K.A. had written on the sheet of paper. The paper was entered into evidence as State's Exhibit 1. In addition to detailing K.A.'s feelings, K.A. had also written in three lines: "made me touch his private parts," "licked me in private parts," and "take clothes off and get on top of me." Alvarez then began talking to K.A. about what she had written. The two of them went sentence by sentence through everything K.A. had written. They talked for more than an hour. During that discussion, Alvarez learned the sexual abuse had begun when K.A. was seven or eight and had continued for some period of time. K.A. identified appellant as one of the people who had sexually abused her. Alvarez testified that K.A. made A's and B's and that she had no discipline problems at school. Alvarez informed the school principal of the situation and she then called the police. Deputy Mitchell Pena of the Harris County Sheriff's Department arrived soon after Alvarez had called the police. After he arrived in Alvarez's office, Pena contacted Children's Protective Services ("CPS") about the situation. Alvarez also telephoned K.A.'s mother, M.T. Alvarez asked M.T. if she could come to the school as quickly as possible. She also asked M.T. to come alone. Alvarez was not certain if she told M.T. the reason she was asking her to come to the school. M.T. arrived about 45 minutes after Alvarez called. Despite Alvarez's request that she come alone, M.T. was accompanied by a cousin. M.T. came into Alvarez's office and without talking to Alvarez, Pena, or K.A., she slapped K.A. twice with the flat of her hand. Pena instructed M.T. to calm down. Alvarez then told M.T. that K.A. had said that appellant, her two older brothers, and a cousin had sexually assaulted her. Pena eventually took K.A. to CPS and when he did, M.T. followed in her own car. K.A. testified next. At the time of appellant's trial, K.A. was in the tenth grade at AISD high school. K.A. plays basketball, volleyball, and she runs track. K.A. also testified that she is still an A-B student. K.A. testified that she stays out of trouble, has never been suspended, and has never been in a gang. K.A.'s testimony then turned to the allegations against appellant. K.A. confirmed that she was upset by the book they were reading in her language arts class because the situation in the book "was kind of like what was going on with [her]." K.A. testified that she was about six years old when the abuse began. K.A. could not remember what grade she was in when the abuse started. K.A. verified that she had detailed the sexual abuse she experienced in the writing she had done in Alvarez's office. According to K.A., in the first incident, appellant took her into his bedroom and he touched her breast and private parts underneath her clothes. She testified that appellant stopped when they heard someone coming. K.A. did not tell anyone about the incident because she was afraid no one would believe her. K.A. testified the abuse occurred almost every day. K.A. testified the incidents occurred in appellant's bedroom, her bedroom, and the trailer's bathroom. During some of the incidents, appellant came into K.A.'s room wearing only a towel, he would place K.A. on his lap and make her touch his private parts. K.A. also testified that appellant would place his mouth on her private parts. According to K.A., this occurred about two times. K.A. also testified that appellant would take his clothes off and get on top of K.A. K.A. explained the incidents occurred during the day after she came home from school. According to K.A., there were no adults home when the incidents took place. According to K.A., the incidents went on for a long time. K.A.'s father died when she was a little girl. Her mother, M.T. eventually married another man, Evelio. According to K.A., they lived alone in a three bedroom trailer located off West Little York. The family eventually moved the trailer a few blocks away to a location on Cedar Hill. K.A. could not remember exactly when they moved, but she testified it could have been the summer before she started the fourth grade. K.A. testified that appellant, who was Evelio's nephew from Honduras, lived with them when the trailer was on West Little York, not when they lived on Cedar Hill. K.A. was not certain how long appellant lived with them in the trailer, but she thought it was a long time, more than a year. K.A. testified that while appellant was living in the trailer, she shared a room with her two brothers, E.A. and J.A. According to K.A., while he lived in the trailer, appellant had his own bedroom. K.A. testified that she has lived with her aunt, her mother's sister, in an almost identical trailer, since she reported the abuse. K.A. also testified that, prior to the time she reported the sexual abuse, she had a good relationship with her mother. K.A. considered her mother to be a strict, but good mother. K.A. testified that her mother did not ask her what was wrong when she came to Alvarez's office. K.A. also testified that she has never talked to her mother about the abuse. She also testified that her mother has told her that she does not believe K.A. was sexually abused. However, despite telling K.A. she does not believe she has been sexually abused, K.A. testified that her mother drives her to therapy at the Children's Assessment Center once a week. K.A.'s mother continues to do this even though CPS no longer requires that K.A. go to therapy. During her testimony, K.A. denied having a boyfriend at the time she first reported the sexual abuse. K.A. also denied that she hung around with people she had been told not to hang around with. K.A. denied that when she was thirteen, she wanted to stay out later than her mother allowed. She also denied that she had ever sought out information about how to join a gang or that her brother Edwin had seen her doing that and had reported it to her mother. Deputy Pena was the next witness to testify. Pena testified that he responded to the call reporting a sexual assault. According to Pena, he went to Alvarez's office where he interviewed K.A. Pena described K.A. as scared and afraid, specifically that she was afraid of her mother. Pena testified that M.T. arrived while he was on the telephone with CPS. He then heard M.T. screaming and hitting K.A. Pena then heard K.A. crying and yelling because M.T. had struck her. Pena separated K.A. and her mother and he then explained the situation to M.T. Pena then drove K.A. to the CPS facility. Pena said K.A. was scared and crying the whole time he was with her. Sergeant James Fitzgerald from the Harris County Sheriff's Department testified next. Fitzgerald was assigned to the Children's Assessment Center and he was the investigator on K.A.'s sexual abuse complaints. Fitzgerald was investigating all four people K.A. had accused of abusing her. Fitzgerald was able to contact and talk to both of K.A.'s brothers, but he was unable to locate the cousin, and was not able to talk to appellant. Fitzgerald detailed how he investigated K.A. 's sexual abuse complaints. Initially, he watched the videotape of K.A.'s initial interview with the Houston Police Department at the Children's Assessment Center. According to Fitzgerald, the statements made by K.A. in her police interview were consistent with her initial report of sexual abuse. Fitzgerald also interviewed family members and school counselors to get K.A's history. Fitzgerald testified he did not uncover anything during his investigation that made him question K.A.'s statements. Fitzgerald also testified that K.A. did not exhibit any behavior changes or change in her grades. According to Fitzgerald, this is fairly consistent with delayed outcry cases. Fitzgerald also reported that K.A. did not have any criminal history or history of gang involvement. This was the case despite the fact that one of K.A.'s brothers told Fitzgerald that he thought K.A. was trying to join a gang. One brother also told Fitzgerald he believed K.A. had a boyfriend. However no one could tell Fitzgerald the name and he never followed up on that information. Fitzgerald testified that he found it a little odd that the brothers could not provide any details such as the name of the gang, or some idea of what it was or where the gang was located. The State rested at the conclusion of Fitzgerald's testimony. Appellant then called several witnesses. Appellant's first witness was M.T., K.A.'s mother. M.T. testified that she believed appellant came to live in her trailer in 2000 and that he lived there for about six months. According to M.T., when appellant moved into the trailer, five people were already living there: M.T., Evelio, K.A., and K.A.'s half-brothers K. and C. M.T. testified that appellant started working with her husband Evelio the day after his arrival from Honduras. M.T. also testified that appellant and Evelio worked six days a week from six in the morning to six or seven in the evening. M.T. also testified about K.A.'s sexual abuse allegations. M.T. received a call from a school counselor who asked her to come to the school immediately. M.T. told the counselor she needed the reason so she could explain to her boss why she needed to leave work early. According to M.T., the counselor told her that K.A. "had had sex." M.T. admitted she was upset when she arrived at the school and that she slapped K.A. According to M.T., she slapped K.A. because she thought K.A. had had sex with one of her school friends and M.T. felt this had broken her trust by not telling her first. M.T. testified the counselor and the deputy explained the reason she had been called to the school. M.T.'s response was "that's not right. That that's a lie." M.T. told the deputy this even though she had not talked to K.A., she simply did not believe her allegations. In addition, M.T. testified that none of her family believes K.A. M.T. also denied K.A. and the other young children were ever left alone in the trailer, not even after they got off from school. According to M.T., the children would get dropped off the school bus at her sister Blanca's trailer and she would then take care of the children after school. M.T. directly testified she did not believe K.A. was telling the truth. M.T. testified that she had always had an excellent relationship with K.A. until K.A. reached the age of thirteen. According to M.T., K.A. wanted the same amount of freedom that her two older brothers had at that time. When M.T. refused to bend on her rules, K.A. became upset with her. K.A. then always got very quiet around M.T. and started telling her that she wanted to live with M.T.'s sister. M.T. thought K.A. wanted to live with her aunt because "she gives her, her freedom." As an example of the freedom K.A. has living with her aunt, M.T. testified that K.A. now goes to parties every weekend and can stay out until one or two o'clock in the morning. M.T. also testified that K.A. had expressed interest in finding out about gang activities and she believed K.A. was hanging out with a neighbor, a person M.T. believed might not be of good character. However, on cross-examination, M.T. admitted she had never been called to school because K.A. had gotten in trouble, that K.A. gets very good grades, and is on several sports teams. Finally, M.T. testified that she still takes K.A. to therapy once a week. The next witness to testify was Evelio, M.T. 's husband. Evelio testified appellant is his nephew and he arrived from Honduras on April 27, 2000. According to Evelio, appellant started working for him the day after his arrival. Evelio testified they worked six days a week and they worked from six in the morning until six or seven in the evening. Evelio also testified that appellant lived in the trailer for about six months. Evelio testified that he did not believe K.A.'s accusations. He also admitted he had never discussed the allegations with appellant. Evelio also admitted that he, M.T., E.A., and J.A., had met with appellant's defense counsel to prepare for the trial. According to Evelio, they discussed K.A.'s allegations. E.A. was the next witness to testify for appellant. According to E.A., he lived in the trailer with K.A., M.T., Evelio, and his two little brothers. E.A. testified appellant came from Honduras after he did. E.A. testified the first time he met appellant was when he arrived at the trailer from Honduras. E.A. also testified appellant lived in the trailer for about six months. E.A. denied sexually abusing K.A. E.A. classified M.T. as a strict mother. On cross-examination, E.A. admitted he was not able to provide Fitzgerald with any information about any gangs K.A. might have been interested in or the name of any boyfriend K.A. might have had. Finally, E.A. testified that he does not believe his sister and believes she is making up all of the accusations against appellant. Next, appellant testified in his own defense. Appellant testified he arrived in the United States in April of 2000 when he was seventeen. Appellant moved in with his uncle and he lived there for about six months. Appellant also worked with his uncle as a plumber's assistant. According to appellant, he worked in that job from April 2000 until April of 2003. Appellant testified that he and his uncle worked every day, with an occasional Sunday at home. Appellant then denied K.A.'s accusations. Appellant also admitted he never talked to Fitzgerald during his investigation of K.A.'s accusations. On cross-examination, in response to a question asking how long it took him to earn a journeyman's or apprentice plumber's license, appellant answered: "Sir, given my illegal situation, I couldn't obtain a plumbing license, but on behalf of the company, I got a helper's license." Appellant then admitted that both he and his entire family were aware that a conviction meant that he could be permanently deported. When asked about the fact he never met with Fitzgerald during his investigation, appellant admitted his uncle never told him that somebody was looking for him. Appellant also testified that his uncle did not know where he lived, his telephone number, or any way to get in touch with him. Appellant then testified: "Between my uncle and I, we don't spend much time together." Appellant also admitted that he had never spoken with his uncle or any of his uncle's family about K.A.'s accusations. Then, in response to the following: "So, without talking to you, everyone just doesn't believe [K.A.]. They just assume you are telling the truth, correct?" appellant answered "Yes, sir." After appellant testified, appellant rested. The State then called two rebuttal witnesses. The first rebuttal witness was Dr. Danielle Medera, a staff psychologist at the Children's Assessment Center who had worked with K.A. for approximately one year. Medera testified about the effects of sexual abuse on children. According to Medera, "the effects of trauma all depend on the individual." As a result, therapists such as herself, "see a huge spectrum of symptoms in the children depending on age and gender and what not." Medera testified that while some children may experience bad grades and discipline issues as a result of abuse, others, such as a child who is experiencing trauma at home on a daily basis, might do very well in school because they view school as a safe place where they can control their own life. Medera then turned specifically to K.A. Medera testified that K.A. did have a lot of interpersonal issues when she started working with her. According to Medera, K.A. "has problems making eye contact, making friends, trusting people. So while she may have had an A in a regular English class, she has a lot of symptomatology. She may be bright but she's also suffering in a lot of other areas." Medera also testified about children and their memory regarding traumatic events. According to Medera, children frequently have fragmented memories regarding the traumatic event. She then testified that:[d]epending on the child, there may be salient features of the incident that stick with them. It could be sensory issues like sight, smell, where they were.
A lot of times, if you have a child that's been victimized and re-victimized over years, expecting them to go back and remember exactly how old they were on this one incident, you know, at what time of day it was when they were raped on a daily basis, none of us could remember that four years ago. If it is something that happened to you every day, you wouldn't remember the time that it happened on Wednesday, four years ago, necessarily, what dates and times.Medera next testified about delayed disclosure of sexual abuse. According to Medera, over half of her patients had a delayed outcry. Medera explained delayed outcry often results from the fact that the abuser is someone the victim knows and trusts. As a result of that dynamic, the sexual abuse victim starts "feeling shame or guilt" and that causes them to delay disclosing the abuse. Medera then discussed what may cause or trigger a child to disclose sexual abuse. Medera explained this varies from child to child and it is not unusual for the initial disclosure to occur with a non-family member. According to Medera, this is especially true if the victim has a particularly close relationship with a family member, such as a mother. Medera explained the child is trying to protect the family member. Medera also explained that it is not unusual for family members to not believe a child alleging sexual abuse. Medera testified that parents are frequently in denial often because they "don't want to believe that this happens in society, let alone this happened in your house." Medera then turned specifically to K.A.'s case:
[K.A.'s] mother, from what [K.A.] describes in group therapy, does not believe that the abuse happened. The conflict that we see is that [K.A.'s] case is closed with CPS. There's no reason, once CPS stops mandating the child comes to therapy, that she needs to be transported or brought to therapy. So, basically, mom could have stopped bringing her when CPS closed the case. But mom continually brings her to therapy on time. Every week we see [K.A.].
So, for me, my question is, if you really don't believe it happened, why would you continually bring your daughter to therapy? At some level does she know what happened[?]Medera was then asked about 'coaching." Medera testified she did not believe K.A. had been coached. In Medera's experience, the coaching cases she had seen occurred in divorce situations. Medera explained you can frequently discover when a child has been coached because it is difficult for a child to keep straight in their minds the story they are supposed to tell because it really did not happen to them. Medera then testified that she did not have any coaching concerns about K.A. and that K.A. has maintained her version of events since Medera started working with her. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense Counsel]: Would you agree with me, Doctor, that not all kids tell the truth?
[Medera]: Yes, I agree with you.
[Defense Counsel]: Would you also agree with me that even though some kids go through therapy, they might not be telling the truth?
[Medera]: About the sexual abuse?
[Defense Counsel]: Yes.
[Medera]: I do not believe that children make this up.
[Defense Counsel]: You're basically testifying in front of this jury that you don't think that kids make up situations dealing with sexual abuse?
[Medera]: In my clinical experience, the only time I've seen children say something like this is in a coaching case. And in this case coaching isn't relevant.
[Defense Counsel]: I just gave an example where the kids with mama move into a new house with a new stepfather, a new father. The mother never tells the kids, "here, say things about the new father so that I can split up with the new father and go back to your father." It's basically something that's created by the kids themselves.
[Medera]: I understand children saying things to be able to break up the new marriage, but sexual abuse is not something that children can make up to break up anything.
[Defense Counsel]: Your testimony here today is that kids don't make up sexual abuse allegations to break up a family?
[Medera]: In my clinical experience at the CAC, no, I have not seen that situation happen, and especially keeping a story consistent over this length of time. There's no reason for a child to do that.The second rebuttal witness was Stacey Sederis, an assistant district attorney with the Harris County District Attorney's office. Sederis testified regarding two issues: (1) the procedures involved in handling investigations of child abuse allegedly committed by a juvenile, who, by the time the alleged victim makes an outcry, has become an adult; and (2) the District Attorney's decision to not accept charges against K.A.'s two older brothers. The essence of Sederis' testimony is that the reason the District Attorney's office did not accept charges against K.A.'s now adult brothers E.A. and J.A. was a matter of timing. According to Sederis, when a person is suspected of committing a sexual assault as a juvenile, but has become an adult by the time the victim discloses the incident, the district attorney, in order to prosecute the suspect, must get the suspect certified as an adult. Sederis then explained it was the policy of the Harris County District Attorney to not seek to certify a juvenile suspected of committing a crime as an adult unless it is a murder, capital murder, or aggravated sexual assault. Sederis then continued:
In sex cases it's extremely rare for us to certify a sex case, whether it's an indecency or sexual assault of a child because normally what he [sic] want — — kind of the way the office views it is we need to provide as many services as possible to that juvenile so that we can help them kind of transition into adulthood without having any sort of psychological or emotional problems. And the juvenile probation department has many, many services for kids, whereas the adult system doesn't.
So it's very rare for us as an office to certify any sort of sex crime unless the — — unless there's something really aggravating about it; for instance, a gun or any sort of weapon was used, or the complainant was kidnapped, or something like that, then we may consider certification.Sederis then testified that the decision was made not to accept the charges against K.A.'s older brothers because the district attorney's office was "boxed into a legal loophole because [it] did not find out about those cases until later because the complainant didn't outcry on those. I believed in the merits of the case. I believed that we should accept charges on both of those suspects. My superior, the prosecutor above me, also believed that we should accept charges on those cases. We both believed the complainant was telling the truth, we just couldn't because of the age." Following the close of the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of both charges. The trial court assessed appellant's punishment at twenty years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on each conviction. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant raises five issues on appeal. We address each of those issues in turn.I. Sufficiency of the evidence
In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence adduced at trial by the State was insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree.A. The standard of review
In a sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony. Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence presented, credit the witnesses it chooses to, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the jury's discretion, and such conflicts alone will not call for reversal if there is enough credible evidence to support a conviction. Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). An appellate court may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence produced at trial and in so doing substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensure the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Harris v. State, 164 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2005, pet. ref'd).B. Analysis
Appellant was charged with two offenses: aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. To establish the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, the State must prove appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth of another person, including the actor, and the victim was younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B) (West 2011). To establish the offense of indecency with a child, the State must prove appellant engaged in sexual contact with a child younger than seventeen years of age and that appellant is not the person's spouse. Id. at § 21.11(a)(1). "Sexual contact" means any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. at § 21.01(2). In this case, the State presented the testimony of K.A. detailing the sexual abuse inflicted by appellant. K.A.'s testimony described exactly what appellant did to her as well as where the abuse occurred. K.A. also provided a timeframe for when the abuse occurred. This evidence, the testimony of K.A. describing the events, standing alone is sufficient to support appellant's convictions.See Lane v. State, 174 S.W.3d 376, 386 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (concluding that, because the complainant was able to describe the sexual contact, the location where the contact occurred, and her statements were consistent with the statements she made at the Children's Assessment Center, her testimony was sufficient to support the conviction); see also Jensen v. State, 66 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) ("The testimony of a victim, standing alone, even when the victim is a child is sufficient to support the conviction for sexual assault."). The jury also heard the various witnesses who testified they did not believe K.A. had been sexually abused by appellant. However, the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Tinker v. State, 148 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Therefore, the jury could reasonably have chosen to believe K.A.'s testimony and disbelieve the testimony of appellant and K.A.'s family members. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's first issue.II. Date of the alleged offenses in the indictments
In his second issue, appellant contends his due process rights were violated because the indictments did not specify a date or distinguish between conduct on any given date that corresponded reasonably near the date alleged in the indictments: "on or about November 29, 2004." Appellant goes on to argue that K.A. testified the sexual abuse occurred when she was six or seven years old which would place the events in either 2000 or 2001, three years earlier than the date alleged in the indictments. According to appellant, this violated his right to adequate notice as guaranteed by the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In both indictments, the State alleged appellant committed the offenses on or about November 29, 2004. In addition, both jury charges instructed the jury they were not bound by the specific date alleged in the indictment. Instead, the jury was instructed "that a conviction may be had upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense, if any, was committed at any time within the period of limitations." At the time the offenses were committed, the statute of limitations for both aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child is ten years from the date of the victim's eighteenth birthday. See Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 740, §§ 1, 4, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2403 (amended 2007) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.01(1) (West Supp. 2009)) (sexual assault); see also Act of May 30, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1162, § 6, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3802, 3806 (amended 2009) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.01(1) (West Supp. 2009)) (indecency with a child). Typically, the date alleged in an indictment is an approximation that allows the State to prosecute a defendant for acts occurring within the limitations period. Hendrix v. State, 150 S.W.3d 839, 853 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). The "on or about" language of an indictment allows the State to prove a date other than the one alleged in the indictment as long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the indictment and within the statutory limitations period. Id. Therefore, when an indictment alleges that some relevant event transpired "on or about" a particular date, the accused is put on notice to prepare for proof that the event happened at any time within the statutory limitations period. Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We overrule appellant's second issue on appeal.III. Appellant's vouching claim
In his third issue, appellant complains that the prosecutor engaged in egregious conduct by eliciting testimony that impermissibly vouched for K.A. and then referencing that testimony in his closing argument. Appellant contends the prosecutor initially engaged in impermissible vouching by calling Sederis to the witness stand and then he:[L]unged into how the workings of the Harris County District Attorney's intake division worked and how it was that juvenile cases were considered through the juvenile division of the Harris County District Attorney's intake division in order to explain what it was that caused the District Attorney's office to reject filing charges against KA's brothers and to emphasize the credibility of KA and the credibility of the district attorney's office when charges are ultimately brought to bear upon an accused.Appellant also contends that the State engaged in improper vouching during closing argument when the prosecutor, referencing the State's decision to not accept charges against K.A.'s two older brothers, said: "The case law is very clear. Our hands were basically tied, certainly on the younger brother." The end result of all this according to appellant, was that it was as if the prosecutor himself was testifying. In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must reflect that it was brought to the attention of the trial court in accord with applicable rules by a timely request, objection, or motion which specifically sets out the nature of the complaint in a sufficiently comprehensible manner that it informs the trial court of its nature and basis and obtained either an adverse ruling or a refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Moore v. State, 278 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2009, no pet.). Prosecutorial misconduct is an independent basis for an objection that must be specifically urged in order for error to be preserved. Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 603 n. 10 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). In support of his argument that the prosecutor engaged in egregious conduct, appellant referenced numerous pages in the reporter's record. However, nowhere on the referenced pages did appellant lodge a prosecutorial misconduct objection. Therefore, we conclude appellant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. To the extent appellant's third issue can be construed as an issue complaining that the trial court erred by admitting evidence that improperly vouched for K.A.'s credibility, we conclude appellant has also failed to preserve that issue for appellate review as he did not object on that basis in the trial court. We overrule appellant's third issue.