Opinion
NUMBER 13-17-00168-CR
01-25-2018
ROBERT BENAVIDES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 319th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Contreras and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
Appellant Robert Benavides appeals from his conviction of unauthorized use of a vehicle, a state jail felony, which was enhanced to a third-degree felony by the jury's finding that he had previously been convicted of two state-jail felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.07(a), 12.425(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 C.S.). Appellant received a sentence of seven years and six months incarceration. By one issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Roberto Rodriguez Jr., a Corpus Christi police officer, testified that on July 21, 2016, he went to a local apartment complex to investigate the theft of a motor vehicle. Sergeant Rodriguez stated that he contacted Lamar Smith who advised him that his white 2001 Ford F-250 truck had been stolen from the apartment complex. Sergeant Rodriguez explained that Smith said that, although he possessed the truck, the registered owner was Nolan Williams, Smith's father-in-law.
Samantha Baldwin, a Corpus Christi police officer, testified that she stopped appellant for a traffic violation. According to Officer Baldwin, appellant informed her that he did not have a driver's license or insurance and that he had recently purchased the vehicle so the title was still under the former owner's name. Officer Baldwin explained that she noticed that the registration sticker on the windshield of the vehicle did not match the vehicle's license plate. Officer Baldwin stated that the license plate belonged to a different vehicle, and "the registration sticker had a different license plate number." Dispatch notified her that the vehicle driven by appellant had been reported stolen. Officer Baldwin arrested appellant for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
Officer Baldwin testified that appellant claimed that he had purchased the vehicle from a guy who he believed was named Nelson in Rockport, Texas for $2,900. According to Officer Baldwin, appellant showed her the vehicle's title that had not been transferred to him, and she explained that the last time the title had been signed was in 2010. The trial court admitted photos of the title showing that the truck's registered owner was "Nolan Williams." Title had been transferred in 2010 to Williams from "Tina Monte." The title documents no other transfers of the vehicle. Officer Baldwin testified that appellant claimed to have a bill of sale for the vehicle but that he did not have it at the time.
Officer Baldwin stated that when she asked appellant if he had a key to the truck he said that he did; however, "the key that was in the ignition would not start the vehicle." When the prosecutor asked, "Was the key to the vehicle ever found in the car, to your knowledge," she replied, "No ma'am, it was not." Officer Baldwin testified that she "noticed the ignition area of the vehicle was busted, so they could actually start the car—or start the truck without a key." The trial court admitted pictures of the truck showing the steering wheel area. The prosecutor asked, "And would you call that a busted steering column," and Officer Baldwin said, "Yes, ma'am, it is." Officer Baldwin explained that she was not entirely familiar with the "exact process" of starting a vehicle without a key but stated that she "knew that's very common, that they've broken this. And they essentially break the ignition switch, which is where the key goes, so that it will turn freely and start the car without a key."
The State presented evidence that there were several other keys found in the vehicle at the time appellant was arrested.
Crystal Bustamante, a Corpus Christi police officer, testified that she is trained in auto theft investigations and has worked auto theft cases for ten years. The prosecutor asked, "What are some of the things you noticed that drew [your] attention as to this being a stolen vehicle?" Officer Bustamante responded, "Well, the vehicle, first of all, still had a license plate or displayed a license plate from another vehicle that did not belong on it." The prosecutor asked Officer Bustamante to explain the significance of that, and she replied that many thieves replace the license plates on a stolen vehicle with another license plate that is from a vehicle from a "similar year, make, model even color, so that when it's pulled over, [the fact that it is a stolen vehicle is] still not discovered." Officer Bustamante testified that the license plate on the vehicle belonged to "Jeffrey Bazan."
Officer Bustamante testified that she discovered that the license plate had been reported stolen on March 14, 2016, after this traffic stop occurred. Officer Bustamante opined that the reason that the owner probably did not report the license plate stolen sooner is because the stolen license plate came from the front of the vehicle and "a lot of times people do not realize that their license plate is actually missing from the front of the vehicle." Officer Bustamante said that the owner of the stolen license plate discovered that it was missing "because he received a red-light violation in the mail."
Officer Bustamante found it pertinent that the "ignition switch had been tampered with in the vehicle." She explained, "There was an ignition switch. The whole underneath the steering column area had been dismantled. The covering was off, and the actual ignition switch was hanging from underneath the steering column." The prosecutor asked, "How quickly did it take you to see that," and Officer Bustamante replied, "It was obvious." As previously mentioned, the trial court admitted photos of the steering wheel area. Officer Bustamante described one of the pictures as follows: "This is the ignition switch that I'm referring to. It's just below the steering column, the steering wheel. This is the area below the dash that I was referring to, the covering; it's off and the wiring is exposed. This is just another angle. The switch is just more prevalent here."
Smith and Williams testified that the vehicle was not damaged in this manner when it was stolen.
Officer Bustamante examined the vehicle's title and explained that "[t]o sell the vehicle, this is where you designate that you're selling the vehicle, and where you would handle those matters is on the back. The seller would actually come down here and document the sale of their vehicle" by signing then printing the seller's name and dating it. Officer Bustamante testified that she did not receive a bill of sale from appellant. Officer Bustamante testified that both Smith and Williams advised her that the vehicle was taken without permission and that they both signed stolen vehicle affidavits, which were admitted into evidence without objection.
Smith and Williams testified that neither had given appellant permission to use the vehicle.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment. Id.
In our sufficiency review, "direct evidence of the elements of the offense is not required." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, and juries are permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial and in establishing the defendant's guilt. Id. "Circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Id. "[T]he lack of direct evidence is not dispositive of the issue of a defendant's guilt." Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. "Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Coleman v. State, 131 S.W.3d 303, 314 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. ref'd) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A person commits the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle if that person intentionally or knowingly operates another's motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a).
III. DISCUSSION
By his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle. Specifically, relying on his statement to the arresting officer that he purchased the vehicle, appellant argues that he could not have known that the vehicle had been reported stolen.
Here, appellant drove the vehicle with a steering wheel that had been purposefully damaged so that a person could drive it without a key. Appellant was unable to produce a key for the vehicle. And, when stopped by the officer, appellant stated that the title to the vehicle was still registered in the previous owner's name; however, appellant claimed that a person named "Nelson" had sold the vehicle to him, while the title indicated that the registered owner was Williams. The jury could have reasonably inferred that because appellant had possession of the title, he was aware that "Nelson" was not the registered owner of the vehicle. In addition, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant lied when he stated that a man named "Nelson" sold him the vehicle. Finally, the license plate on the vehicle did not match the license plate listed on the title, a document that appellant had in his possession and referenced when the officer stopped him.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that based on this evidence, a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew that the vehicle was stolen and that he did not have the effective consent of the owner to possess the vehicle. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898-99. We overrule appellant's sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice Do Not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 25th day of January, 2018.