Opinion
No. 3:18-CV-2032-G (BH)
08-07-2018
JOE TRAMPAS BENAVIDES, ID # 1812093, Petitioner, v. TRACY HOLMES, District Judge, 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondents.
Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS , CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
By Special Order 3-251, this habeas case has been automatically referred for findings, conclusions, and recommendation. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, this case should be transferred to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as a successive petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Joe Trampas Benavides (Petitioner) was convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in January 2000 in Cause No. F99-21709 in the 363rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, probated for 5 years. (Doc. 3 at 2); see www.dallascounty.org (search for petitioner); Benavides v. Stephens, No. 3:14-CV-2293-L (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2015) (Mag. J. recommendation). His probation was revoked in November 2002, and he was later placed on shock probation in May 2003. See www.dallascounty.org (search for petitioner); Benavides. That probation was revoked in March 2005, and he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, with the sentence to run after another sentence was completed. See www.dallascounty.org (search for petitioner); Benavides, No. 3:14-CV-2293. He unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in No. F99-21709 through a federal habeas petition that was denied as barred by the statute of limitations on October 15, 2015. See Benavides v. Stephens, No. 3:14-CV-2293-L (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2015). His federal petition challenges that same conviction. (Doc. 3.)
II. NATURE OF SUIT
Although filed on the form for a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner contends that his filing is a mandamus petition, not a habeas petition. He claims that the stacking or cumulation order in March 2005 was improper because it violated the January 2000 plea agreement, and he asks that the original plea agreement be followed.
"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty." Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984). Section 1361 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Federal courts lack "the general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties where mandamus is the only relief sought." Moye v. Clerk, Dekalb County Sup. Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973).
Petitioner is not simply asking that the state district court follow the original plea agreement. He is challenging the cumulation or stacking order in the judgment. For this reason, the filing should be construed as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973) (a prisoner seeking to challenge the fact or duration of confinement may only do so within the exclusive scope of habeas corpus); Caldwell v. Thaler, No. 4:12-CV-707-A, 2012 WL 4815344 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2012) (petition that challenged a cumulation order construed as § 2254 petition, and was not a mandamus petition).
II. JURISDICTION
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). They "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). They have "a continuing obligation to examine the basis for jurisdiction." See MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
A district court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a second or successive § 2254 petition without authorization from the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); Crone v. Cockrell, 324 F.3d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 2003). A petition is successive if it raises a claim that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition or otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ. Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2008); Crone, 324 F.3d at 836-37. If it essentially represents a second attack on the same conviction raised in the earlier petition, a petition is successive. Hardemon, 516 F.3d at 275-76 (distinguishing Crone because "Crone involved multiple § 2254 petitions attacking a single judgment"). A second petition is not successive if the prior petition was dismissed due to prematurity or for lack of exhaustion, however. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (declining to construe an application as second or successive when it followed a previous dismissal due to a failure to exhaust state remedies); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-46 (1998) (declining to construe an application as second or successive when it followed a previous dismissal due to prematurity, and noting the similarities of such dismissal to one based upon a failure to exhaust state remedies). Otherwise, "dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review." Stewart, 523 U.S. at 645.
Although Crone involved a challenge to petitioner's holding judgment of conviction followed by a challenge to post-conviction and post-sentence administrative actions that stripped him of good-time credits, Hardemon considered both challenges to be against "the same conviction". --------
Here, Petitioner challenges the same conviction and sentence that he challenged in a prior federal petition that was denied on its merits. Under Hardemon and Crone, he was required to present all available claims in that petition. A claim is available when it "could have been raised had the petitioner exercised due diligence." Leonard v. Dretke, No. 3:02-CV-0578-H, 2004 WL 741286, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2004) (recommendation of Mag. J.), adopted by 2004 WL 884578 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2004). The crucial question in determining availability is whether Petitioner knew or should have known through the exercise of due diligence the facts necessary to his current claims when he filed his prior federal petition challenging the same conviction.
Petitioner's federal petition is successive within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because it raises claims that were or could have been raised in his initial federal petition. When a petition is second or successive, the petitioner must seek an order from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that authorizes this Court to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The Fifth Circuit "may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of [§ 2244(b)]." Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). To present a claim in a second or successive application that was not presented in a prior application, the application must show that it is based on: (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Id. § 2244(b)(2).
Because the Fifth Circuit has not issued an order authorizing the district court to consider this successive petition for habeas relief, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The filing should be construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and should be TRANSFERRED to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pursuant to Henderson v. Haro, 282 F.3d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 2002) and In re Epps, 127 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1997).
SIGNED this 7th day of August, 2018.
/s/_________
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
/s/_________
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE