The court properly refused to admit into evidence three statements allegedly made by plaintiff and recorded in his hospital records about the manner in which his accident happened. These statements were not admissible as admissions against interest, since the evidence adduced outside the jury's presence failed to establish that plaintiff was the source of the information contained in one of the statements, and defendants failed to produce the interpreters through whom the other two statements were made to confirm that they were objective and competent to interpret and that their interpretations were accurate (see Benavides v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2014]; Quispe v Lemle & Wolff, Inc., 266 A.D.2d 95, 96 [1st Dept 1999]). Nor were the statements admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, since they were not germane to the treatment or diagnosis of plaintiff's injuries (see Benavides, 115 A.D.3d at 519; Quispe, 266 A.D.2d at 96).

The court properly refused to admit into evidence three statements allegedly made by plaintiff and recorded in his hospital records about the manner in which his accident happened. These statements were not admissible as admissions against interest, since the evidence adduced outside the jury's presence failed to establish that plaintiff was the source of the information contained in one of the statements, and defendants failed to produce the interpreters through whom the other two statements were made to confirm that they were objective and competent to interpret and that their interpretations were accurate (seeBenavides v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519, 982 N.Y.S.2d 85 [1st Dept. 2014] ; Quispe v. Lemle & Wolff, Inc., 266 A.D.2d 95, 96, 698 N.Y.S.2d 652 [1st Dept. 1999] ). Nor were the statements admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, since they were not germane to the treatment or diagnosis of plaintiff's injuries (seeBenavides, 115 A.D.3d at 519, 982 N.Y.S.2d 85 ; Quispe, 266 A.D.2d at 96, 698 N.Y.S.2d 652 ).

"While hearsay statements may be used to oppose motions for summary judgment, they cannot... be the only evidence submitted to raise a triable issue of fact" (Gomez v Kitchen & Bath by Linda Burkhardt, Inc., 170 A.D.3d 967, 969 [2d Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]). "Hearsay entries regarding the cause of an injury contained in a medical record come into evidence under the business records exception if they are germane to the treatment or diagnosis of plaintiff s injuries (Benavides v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2014] [internal citations omitted]). "Alternatively, the entry may be admissible as an admission, but only if there is evidence that connects the party to the entry" (Benavides, 115 A.D.3d at 519; see also Greca v Choice Assoc. LLC, 154 N.Y.S.3d 780 [1st Dept 2021]).

The court properly refused to admit into evidence three statements allegedly made by plaintiff and recorded in his hospital records about the manner in which his accident happened. These statements were not admissible as admissions against interest, since the evidence adduced outside the jury's presence failed to establish that plaintiff was the source of the information contained in one of the statements, and defendants failed to produce the interpreters through whom the other two statements were made to confirm that they were objective and competent to interpret and that their interpretations were accurate (see Benavides v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2014]; Quispe v Lemle & Wolff, Inc., 266 A.D.2d 95, 96 [1st Dept 1999]). Nor were the statements admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, since they were not germane to the treatment or diagnosis of plaintiff's injuries (see Benavides, 115 A.D.3d at 519; Quispe, 266 A.D.2d at 96).

Similarly, the mother did not preserve any claim that the court improperly considered inadmissible hearsay statements from a caseworker's testimony. The parties agreed to redact portions of testimony containing either hearsay or information irrelevant to the fact-finding, and the court expressly stated that those excerpts were not considered, and the caseworker's testimony was given limited weight overall (see Benavides v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2014]).

Similarly, the mother did not preserve any claim that the court improperly considered inadmissible hearsay statements from a caseworker’s testimony. The parties agreed to redact portions of testimony containing either hearsay or information irrelevant to the fact-finding, and the court expressly stated that those excerpts were not considered, and the caseworker’s testimony was given limited weight overall (see Benavides v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519, 982 N.Y.S.2d 85 [1st Dept. 2014]). We have considered the mother’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Nevertheless, exclusion of this evidence at most amounted to harmless error that did not affect the verdict. An improper ruling on an in limine motion will not affect a verdict unless there is a "reasonable probability that the entries could have affected the jury's determination" (Benavides v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2014]). At trial, the jury concluded that defendant was liable to plaintiff based on overwhelming evidence, including (1) plaintiff's transfer of funds to Blusztein, a lawyer in Israel that represented defendant; (2) defendant and Blusztein's communications regarding the funds; and (3) testimony from plaintiff's lawyer that she had dealt with defendant and Blusztein, when attempting to recover the funds.

The documentary evidence on which National did not establish that the accident report "was made in the regular course of any business and that it was the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter" ( CPLR 4518[a] ). Moreover, the accident report still contains multiple layers of hearsay (see generallyMatter of Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 122, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863, 397 N.E.2d 374 [1979] ). The entries made in plaintiff's medical records, dated one day and one week after the accident, were neither "germane to the treatment or diagnosis of plaintiff's injuries" nor "admissible as an admission" against interest ( Benavides v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519, 982 N.Y.S.2d 85 [1st Dept. 2014] ; seeGreca v. Choice Assoc. LLC, 200 A.D.3d 415, 416, 154 N.Y.S.3d 780 [1st Dept. 2021] ; Nassa v. 1512 LLC, 198 A.D.3d 600, 600, 153 N.Y.S.3d 843 [1st Dept. 2021] ; Grant v. New York City Tr. Auth., 105 A.D.3d 445, 446, 963 N.Y.S.2d 63 [1st Dept. 2013] ; Quispe v. Lemle & Wolff, Inc., 266 A.D.2d 95, 96, 698 N.Y.S.2d 652 [1st Dept. 1999] ). Thus, "in the absence of evidence controverting his account of the accident or calling into question his credibility[,]" plaintiff was properly awarded partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, even though he was the sole witness to his accident ( Rivera v. Suydam 379 LLC, 216 A.D.3d 495, 496, 189 N.Y.S.3d 126 [1st Dept. 2023] ; see e.g.Pinzon, 211 A.D.3d at 443, 179 N.Y.S.3d 218 ; Valdez v. City of New York, 189 A.D.3d 425, 132 N.Y.S.3d 777 [1st Dept. 2020] ; Rroku, 164 A.D.3d at 1177, 82 N.Y.S.3d 709 ).

Although plaintiff's medical records were certified, Choice did not establish that the statements contained in them on which it relied either were germane to plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment or are directly attributable to plaintiff (see Benavides v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519-520 [1st Dept 2014]; Grant v New York City Tr. Auth., 105 A.D.3d 445, 446 [1st Dept 2013]). The handwritten statement ostensibly by defendant Cekaj Construction Corp.'s principal and the affidavit by the owner of second third-party defendant Donato Plumbing Group, Inc. as to what Cekaj's principal told him about plaintiff's accident are both inadmissible hearsay, and do not qualify as admissions by an opposing party (see generally Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence §§ 8-201; 8-203 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]).

Choice failed to raise an issue of fact in opposition to plaintiffs’ prima facie showing, since its evidence consisted solely of inadmissible hearsay (seeGuzman v. L.M.P. Realty Corp., 262 A.D.2d 99, 100, 691 N.Y.S.2d 483 [1st Dept. 1999] ). Although plaintiff's medical records were certified, Choice did not establish that the statements contained in them on which it relied either were germane to plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment or are directly attributable to plaintiff (seeBenavides v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 518, 519–520, 982 N.Y.S.2d 85 [1st Dept. 2014] ; Grant v. New York City Tr. Auth., 105 A.D.3d 445, 446, 963 N.Y.S.2d 63 [1st Dept. 2013] ). The handwritten statement ostensibly by defendant Cekaj Construction Corp.’s principal and the affidavit by the owner of second third-party defendant Donato Plumbing Group, Inc. as to what Cekaj's principal told him about plaintiff's accident are both inadmissible hearsay, and do not qualify as admissions by an opposing party (see generally Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence §§ 8–201; 8–203 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]).