Opinion
CV-00-11507 LGB (SHx)
April 20, 2001
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, L.L Benas, is suing Defendants, Le Roy Baca, Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, current or former Los Angeles County Supervisors Michael Antonovich, Yvonne Burke, Donald Knabe, Gloria Molina, and Zev Yaroslavsky, and ten unknown named Defendants for purported civil rights and international law violations. Defendants bring a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 25, 2000, in Newhall, in the County of Los Angeles, she was subjected to a severe beating by Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputies. See Compl. at 5. As a result of this beating, Plaintiff claims that she suffered severe physical and emotional injuries. See id. Plaintiff further claims that the Sheriff's Deputies conducted an illegal search of Plaintiff. See id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a baseless criminal summons/citation and was caused to appear under compulsion in court. See id.
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Baca is liable for the foregoing actions as the legal head and policymaker for the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, and that the Los Angeles County Supervisors ("the Supervisors") are liable for the foregoing actions because of their "prior decisions to pay for, or to indemnify for, or to hold harmless for, or to bond punitive damages assessed by juries against Los Angeles deputy sheriffs." See id. at 2, 4.
While not specifically stated in Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff appears to suggest that the Supervisors' past decisions to indemnify, hold harmless for, and bond punitive damages awarded against Los Angeles deputy sheriffs contributed to, or encouraged, the alleged constitutional violations in the instant case.
Plaintiff asserts her claims pursuant to international law, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 1-2. Section 1983 creates a private right of action for any person within the United States who, under color of law, is deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) violation of jus cogens international law; (2) violation of jus dispositivum international law; (3) violation of the First Amendment; (4) violation of the Fourth Amendment; (5) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection; (6) falsification of reports; and (7) conspiracy to violate civil rights. Plaintiff also makes class action allegations of internationally illegal and domestically unconstitutional policies and procedures directed at the female minority group in the Los Angeles area.
Plaintiff filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on October 30, 2000. Defendants Baca and Yaroslavsky filed their answer to the complaint on January 23, 2001. Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings on March 26, 2001. Plaintiff filed her opposition on April 9, 2001. Defendants filed a reply on April 16, 2001.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Pleadings are closed when all pleadings required or permitted in federal actions by Rule 7(a) have been served and filed. See In re Villegas, 132 B.R. 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. BAP 1991). The determination of whether a Rule 12(c) motion constitutes a delay of trial is within the sound discretion of the judge. See 5A Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (2nd ed. 1990).
A Rule 12(c) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's pleadings. See William W. Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:316 (1999). The standard applied in a Rule 12(c) motion is that judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, even if all material facts in the pleading under attack are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990).
In reviewing Rule 12(c) motions, the court must assume the truthfulness of the material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, a defendant is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the complaint raises issues of fact which, if proved, would support recovery. See id. at 230. The motion must be denied unless it appears "to a certainty" that no relief is possible under any state of facts the plaintiff could prove in support of his or her claim. See Mostowny v. United States, 966 F.2d 668, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1992). It is immaterial whether the court believes the plaintiff will succeed at trial. See Wager v. Pro, 575 F.2d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
If matters outside the pleading are relied upon by the court, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is converted into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550.
Plaintiff attached to her opposition photographs purportedly showing the effects of the beating alleged in her complaint. See Pl.'s Opp'n. Attach. These photographs are not part of the pleadings and thus are not considered by the Court in ruling on a motion under Rule 12 (c).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support her first and second causes of action for violation of jus cogens and jus dispositivum international law. See Defs.' Mot. at 1.
In regard to Plaintiff's constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants argue (1) that these claims are barred against the members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors by both qualified and absolute immunity; (2) that they are barred against Los Angeles Sheriff Baca in his official capacity by Eleventh Amendment immunity; and (3) that Plaintiff cannot allege facts to support a section 1983 claim against Sheriff Baca in his individual capacity. See id. at 2.
Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for falsification of police reports should be dismissed as duplicative of Plaintiff's section 1983 claim for deprivation of equal protection of the laws. See id.
A. Whether Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts to Support the Causes of Action for Violations of Jus Cogens and Jus Dispositivum International Law
1. Jus Cogens Cause of Action
In Plaintiff's first cause of action, she alleges that Defendants' actions "are in clear violation of the jus cogens, peremptory norms of international law that . . . prohibit official torture and all cruel and inhuman punishments." Pl.'s Compl. at 5.
"Jus cogens norms of international law comprise the body of laws that are considered so fundamental that they are binding on all nations whether the nations have consented to them or not." Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp.2d 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992). To determine the scope of jus cogens international law, courts are guided by treaties, state practice, legal decisions, and works of noted jurists. See id.
Torture has been found by several courts to be a violation of jus cogens norms of international law. See id. at 1255. Torture is defined as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 717 n. 16.
Defendants argue that legislative action by the United States government is required to permit a claim under jus cogens. See Defs.' Mot. at 5. Defendants assert that because the United States has not taken legislative action to permit an individual plaintiff to pursue a claim under jus cogens, Plaintiff's claim based on this theory must fail. See id. at 5.
Jus cogens norms of international law do not in themselves create a private right of action for individual citizens. See White, 997 F. Supp. at 1383; Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. at 1255. This is "because `[i]nternational law does not require any particular reaction to violations of law. . . . Whether and how the United States wishes to react to such violations are domestic questions.'" White, 997 F. Supp. at 1383 (citing In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994 ("Marcos II")).
Federal courts may, however, imply a private right of action for violations of jus cogens norms of international law. See Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. at 1255; White, 997 F. Supp. At 1383. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized that private rights of action may be implied for violations of federal constitutional rights for which no express statutory right of action exists. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1999) (holding that the right to sue federal agents for damages could be judicially implied from the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unconstitutional searches and seizures)). Judicial authority to recognize implied remedies for violations of constitutional rights applies equally to violations of jus cogens norms such as those prohibiting genocide, torture, and slavery. See White, 997 F. Supp. at 1383.
However, whether a federal court should imply such a remedy in the context of a particular case is a different question. See id. at 1384. Federal courts must consider whether there are "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." See id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
In the instant action, as in Hawkins and White, three factors weigh heavily against the Court implying a Bivens right of action. First, there are existing remedies for Plaintiff's causes of action. Plaintiff, in fact, has stated claims for constitutional violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Pl.'s Compl. at 1-2.
Second, as noted by the Hawkins and White courts, Congress has acted in the field of torture. See Hawkins, 33 F. Supp.2d at 1256; White, 997 F. supp. At 1384. Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which creates a private action for acts of torture taken under color of law in a foreign nation. See Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. at 1256 (citing Pub.L. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat.73, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350). While this statute appears to be limited to acts of foreign officials, it represents congressional attempts to address the issue of a private remedy for acts of torture. See Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. at 1256. "Courts normally give great deference to congressional policy determinations regarding whether to afford individuals personal rights of action for particular violations." Id. at 1256 (citing a Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423). Courts are thus hesitant "to create a new cause of action in a circumstance where the Legislature has stated that domestic law affords adequate remedies." Id. (citing White, 997 F. Supp. at 1384-85). Because Congress' decision to limit a remedy to foreign torture indicates its intent not to extend a remedy to acts of domestic torture, this Court is reluctant to imply such a remedy.
The third factor counseling hesitation is that the Court is being asked to interfere in an area that is principally entrusted by the federal constitution to Congress or the Executive branch. See Hawkins, 33 F. Supp.2d at 1256; White, 997 F. Supp. at 1385; see also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1428 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("To imply a cause of action from the law of nations would completely defeat the critical right of the sovereign to determine whether and how international rights should be enforced in that municipality.")
Given these factors counseling judicial abstention, this Court will follow the prevailing view among district courts, and decline to imply from international law a private right of action for domestic acts of torture. See Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. at 1255 (citing White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Wash. 1998) ("There is no reported case of a court in the United States recognizing a cause of action under jus cogens norms of international law for acts committed by United States government officials against a citizen of the United States."). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to Plaintiff's first cause of action.
2. Jus Dispositivum Cause of Action
In Plaintiff's second cause of action, she alleges that Defendants' actions "are in clear violation of the jus dispositivum, treaty obligations entered into by the United States of America" which "prohibit official torture and/or cruel and inhuman punishments." Pl.'s Compl. at 6. The treaties allegedly violated by Defendants are: (1) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (2) the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, (3) the American Convention on Human Rights, (4) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and (5) the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See id.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' motion fails to address alleged violations of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Torture Convention"). See Pl.'s Opp'n at 12. However, this treaty was not among the treaties named in Plaintiff's complaint, and is thus not a claim in the action. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim under the Torture Convention is not considered by this Court.
The Supreme Court has stated that "treaties are enforceable in United States courts if either the treaty is self-executing or the Legislature passes legislation implementing the provisions of the treaty." Hawkins, 33 F. Supp.2d at 1256-57 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)).
In Hawkins, the Central District analyzed the treaties identified by Plaintiff in the instant case, and determined that they were not enforceable in U.S. courts. See Hawkins, 33 F. Supp.2d at 1256-57. The Hawkins court found that the first two of the "treaties" named, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, are resolutions, not treaties; are not legally binding; and do not create self-executing rights. See id. at 1257. The Hawkins court also found that the third and fifth treaties named by Plaintiff in the instant case, the American Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, have not been ratified and are therefore not binding on the United States. Finally, the court in Hawkins determined that the fourth treaty named by Plaintiff in this case, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is not self-executing. See id. Additionally, because Congress has not enacted implementing legislation, this treaty does not create a private right of action under which the plaintiff can successfully state a claim. See id.
For the reasons cited in Hawkins, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for a violation of jus dispositivum international law. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to Plaintiff's second cause of action.
B. Whether the Los Angeles County Supervisors Are Entitled to Qualified or Absolute Immunity
Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisors are liable in the instant action based on their "prior decisions to pay for, or to indemnify for, or to hold harmless for, or to bond punitive damages assessed by juries against Los Angeles deputy sheriffs." Pl.'s Compl. at 4. While not specifically stated in Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff appears to suggest that the Supervisors' past decisions indemnifying for, holding harmless for, or bonding punitive damages awarded against Los Angeles deputy sheriffs contributed to, or encouraged, the alleged constitutional violations in the instant case.
1. Oualified Immunity
Defendants contend that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity from suit for the votes they cast to indemnify individual police officers for punitive damages awards.
"[Q]ualified immunity `is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.'" Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). "Immunity `ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.'" Id. at 228. "Public officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if: (1) the `right' they allegedly violated was not `clearly established' at the time of the violation, or (2) if a reasonable [official] would have thought that the defendants' actions were constitutional." Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (Trevino II) (quoting Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1993)). "The threshold determination of whether the law governing the conduct at issue is clearly established is a question of law for the court." Trevino II, 99 F.3d at 917 (citing Act Up? 988 F.2d at 873).
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the right allegedly violated was clearly established. See Trevino II, 99 F.3d at 916-17. If the plaintiff meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that his conduct was reasonable even though it might have violated the law. See id. at 917.
In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden for the reason that the Supervisors did not violate clearly established law. Approximately four years prior to the event Plaintiff complained of, which occurred on or about July 25, 2000, the court in Trevino II found that "far from being "clearly established law," a policy of indemnifying punitive damage awards has never been judicially determined as violating constitutional rights by encouraging police officers to use excessive force." Trevino II, 99 F.3d at 917. To the contrary, cases from other jurisdictions have held that a punitive damages indemnification policy could not cause a constitutional deprivation. See id. (citing Ekergen v. City of Chicago, 538 F. Supp. 770, 772-772 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Brown v. City of Chicago, 573 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Based on the foregoing, the Trevino II court concluded that "a city council does not violate section 1983 if it indemnifies officers against punitive damage awards on a discretionary, case by case basis, and complies in good faith with the requirements of Cal. Govt. Code § 825(b)." Trevino II 99 F.3d at 918. Accordingly, the Trevino II court found that the first prong of the qualified immunity test was satisfied, precluding a need to address the second prong. See id.
In Figueroa v. Gates, a Central District court declined to dismiss a claim on either absolute or qualified immunity bases, noting that the Plaintiff "has alleged the lack of good faith compliance with Section 825(b) [which authorizes a public entity to pay punitive damages if certain requirements, including good faith, are met]." Figueroa v. Gates, 120 F. Supp.2d 917, 921. (C.D. Cal. 2000). In the instant action, there is no such allegation of lack of good faith compliance with section 825(b).
Likewise in the instant action, because it was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation that voting to indemnify officers against punitive damages could violate constitutional rights, this Court finds that the first prong of the qualified immunity test is satisfied. Accordingly, the Court finds that named current and past members of the Los Angeles County Supervisors, in their official capacity, are immune from suit based on qualified immunity.
Plaintiff asserts that she is suing each defendant in his or her individual, as well as official capacities. See Pl.'s Compl. at 2. Defendants make no argument in support of dismissing Plaintiff's claims against current and former Supervisors in their individual capacity. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against named current and former Supervisors, in their individual capacity, remain.
2. Absolute Immunity
Because the Court finds that the named current and former Los Angeles County Supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity as discussed above, the Court does not reach the issue of absolute immunity.
C. Whether Sheriff Baca Has Eleventh Amendment Immunity in His Official Capacity
A local government unit, such as a county, or an official of a local government unit, may be sued under section 1983 if the alleged constitutional violations were committed pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice that represents "official policy." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). On the other hand, a state and its officials, sued in their official capacity, cannot be sued for damages under section 1983 because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute. See Roe v. County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Plaintiff is suing Sheriff Baca as "the legal head and policymaker for the County of Los Angeles Sheriff's Department." See Pl.'s Compl. at 2. Defendants contend that Sheriff Baca is a policymaker for the State of California when acting in his law enforcement capacity and is therefore immune from section 1983 liability. See Defs.' Mot. at 14 (citing County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Peters), 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1170 (1998)).
In a leading case in this area, McMillian v. Monroe County, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama sheriff could not be sued under section 1983 for intimidating witnesses into making false statements and suppressing exculpatory evidence because the sheriff was exercising state authority. See McMillian, 520 U.S. 781 (1997). In reaching its finding, the Court announced two principles to guide a court's determination of whether a county sheriff is a state or county official for purposes of section 1983 liability. See id. at 785-86. First, the inquiry should not be made as a categorical, all-or-nothing determination, since a sheriff may act for the state and the county in different capacities. See id. at 785. Second, the inquiry depends upon an analysis of state law that looks beyond how the sheriff is labeled, to the definition of a sheriff's actual functions under relevant state law. See id. at 786.
While case law in this area is inconsistent, the Ninth Circuit, both before and after McMillian,, has found a California sheriff to be a local law enforcement agent, and therefore subject to section 1983 liability. See County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1148 n. 4 (listing post- and pre-McMillian cases).
In County of Lake, a closely analogous Northern District case, the plaintiff alleged that the sheriff had a de facto policy of encouraging his law enforcement officers to violate the civil rights of women. See id. at 1147. In that case, the court followed the principles set out in McMillian and conducted a comprehensive analysis of California's constitution, statutes, and case law. The court ultimately found that the sheriff was a county official and, thus, not immune from suit. See id. at 1148-53. In Streit v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit performed a similar McMillian-guided analysis, ultimately finding the sheriff in that case to be a county actor. See Streit, 229 F.3d at 236 (9th Cir. 2001). This Court will likewise follow the analysis set out in McMillian.
1. Applying McMillian
First, the McMillian court relied heavily on the Alabama Constitution; in particular, a provision designating a county sheriff as an executive officer. See McMillan, 520 U.S. at 787. Unlike the Alabama Constitution, the California Constitution does not list sheriffs as part of "the state `executive department.'" Streit, 229 F.3d at 561 (noting that the McMillian court found this designation "especially important" for determining liability). Instead, the California Constitution designates sheriffs as county officers. See id. (citing Cal. Const. art. XI § 1(b)).
The other provisions of the Alabama constitution relied upon by the court in McMillian were those that made a county sheriff subject to impeachment for neglect of office, and that moved the authority to impeach a sheriff from a county court to the Alabama Supreme Court. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 788. "By contrast, the California Constitution does not list sheriffs in Article IV, section 18, which provides for impeachment of a variety of state officers before the Legislature. Instead, the authority to impeach a sheriff in California lies with the county grand jury." County of Lake, 107 F. Supp. at 1149 (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 3060; People v. Hulburt, 75 Cal.App.3d 404, 409 (1977). Thus, these constitutional provisions that weighed for finding the sheriff to be a state actor in McMillian, weigh against that finding in the instant case.
Second, it was also critical to the Supreme Court's finding in McMillian that under Alabama law, the state, not the county, would be liable for damages in a suit against a sheriff. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 789. See also Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 413 (9th Cir. 1997) ("who is legally obligated to pay the judgment being sought" is a key factor in determining whether an individual is exercising state or local authority). "Under California law, monetary damages for section 1983 claims are paid by the County and not the state." Streit, 236 F.3d at 562 (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2). Thus, this factor supports a finding in the instant case that the Los Angeles Sheriff functions as a county, rather than as a state, agent.
Various other state law provisions "lead inexorably to the conclusion that the [Los Angeles Sheriff's Department] is tied to the County in its political, administrative, and fiscal capacities." Streit, 236 F.3d at 562. For example, sheriffs are defined and regulated as county employees, and are elected within and by the county. See County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1149 (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 24205). Moreover, in contrast to Alabama, sheriffs under California law must attend and obey state courts only within their county. See id. (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 24205). Additionally, the sheriff's salary in California is set by the County Board of Supervisors, whereas in Alabama a sheriff's salary is set by the Legislature. See id. (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 24000, 25300).
Third, whether the state Attorney General has a supervisory role over the sheriff is another factor considered by the McMillian court. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 790. Here, Article V, section 13 grants the Attorney General a supervisory role over "every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law." Cal. Const. art. V, § 13. This provision is the only support in the California constitution for the proposition that sheriffs are exercising state authority. See County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1150. The County of Lake court concluded that sole reliance on this provision would "prove too much," since "[t]aken to its logical extreme, it would render all local law enforcement agencies in California immune from prosecution for civil rights violations and emasculate Monell, which preserves section 1983 liability against local government." Id. at 1150-51. This Court concurs with the County of Lake court that Attorney General supervision of a sheriff should not be the deciding factor in this analysis.
Finally, "[r]ecognizing that local police power is derived from the State, McMillian requires a court to analyze the delegation of that power to determine whether it was sufficiently complete such that a suit for abuse of that power is not a suit against the state." County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1151. This Court agrees with the district court's reasoning in County of Lake, which was also cited with approval by the Streit court:
It seems clear from the analysis above that California's delegation of authority to [the] Sheriff [here] is sufficiently complete. It is difficult to see how a judgment against a sheriff who, as is alleged here, permits his office to violate the civil rights of women in the way he maintains his staff and sets his policies, will operate as a judgment against the State.
Id. Applying McMillian, the delegation of authority to Sheriff Baca supports a finding that he acted as a policymaker on behalf of the county in the instant action, and is therefore not immune from section 1983 liability.
1. Peters Decision Not Controlling
Defendants in the instant action urge the court to rely upon Peters, which held that a county sheriff was not subject to section 1983 liability for detention of plaintiff after she posted bail, based on a warrant that turned out to be invalid. See Peters, 68 Cal.App.4th at 1174 ("in establishing policies for the release of persons from a county jail, a sheriff acts as a state official, not a policymaker for the county."). Peters relied almost entirely on the holding in Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340 (1998), wherein the California Supreme Court held that district attorneys were state officers, and therefore not subject to section 1983 liability, for acts taken in prosecuting criminal violations of state law and in training their employees in those areas. See County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1152.
Although the state's legal characterization of the government actor must be considered, "federal law provides the rule of decision in section 1983 actions." Streit, 236 F.3d at 560 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430 n. 5 (1997); see also County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1153 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 647 n. 30 (1980). Accordingly, in both Streit, and County of Lake, the courts declined to view the California appellate decision in Peters as controlling authority. See Streit, 236 F.3d at 560; County of Lake, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1153. Indeed, both courts explicitly rejected the Peters decision because "it did not undertake its own analysis of the factors . . . which distinguish a California sheriff from a district attorney or from an Alabama sheriff." Id. at 1153. Like the Streit and County of Lake courts, this Court declines to follow Peters.
Based on the McMillian analysis performed above, this Court finds that Sheriff Baca was acting as a policymaker on behalf of the County in the instant action and is therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state actor.
D. Whether Plaintiff's Action May Be Maintained Against Sheriff Baca in His Individual Capacity
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action against Sheriff Baca in his individual capacity. See Defs.' Mot. at 18.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants (including Sheriff Baca) "failed properly to train, to supervise, to retrain, if necessary, to monitor, or to take corrective action with respect to the police and with respect to the types of wrongful conduct alleged in this pleading. . . ." Pl.'s Compl. at 4.
While respondeat superior liability is not available under section 1983, see Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993), individual liability may be premised on a failure to properly supervise:
A supervisor will rarely be directly and personally involved in the same way as are the individual officers who are on the scene inflicting constitutional injury. yet, this does not prevent a supervisor from being held liable in his individual capacity. Like the officers, the [supervisor's] individual liability hinges upon his participation in the deprivation of constitutional rights. But unlike the officers' involvement, which ordinarily is direct and personal, his participation may involve the setting in motion of acts which cause others to inflict constitutional injury.
Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges direct liability against Sheriff Baca for his failure to properly supervise officers who were allegedly violating civil rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
E. Whether Plaintiff's Sixth Count of Falsification of Records Should Be Dismissed as Duplicative
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is duplicative of her fifth cause of action under section 1983, and should therefore be dismissed. See Defs.' Mot. at 6. Plaintiff's sixth cause of action alleges that "defendants have falsified official police reports regarding the subject incident, and therefore, are liable to plaintiff for damages caused by such falsification." See Pl.'s Compl. at 8. Plaintiff's fifth cause of action alleges a violation of section 1983 based on deprivation of equal protection of the laws. See id. at 7.
An officer's falsification of police reports is actionable under section 1983 as a deprivation of equal protection of the laws. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's sixth cause of action describes a deprivation of equal protection of the laws under section 1983, and therefore duplicates Plaintiff's fifth cause of action. See Defs.' Mot. at 6. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff does not specifically allege the basis for her fifth cause of action. See Pl.'s Compl. at 8 (asserting only that Defendants' "bad and tortious conduct" deprived her of equal protection of the laws). Thus, Plaintiff's fifth and sixth causes of action could be based on separate allegations of wrongdoing.
Plaintiff does not dispute this contention, and has provided 28 no other basis for this claim. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 33; Pl.'s Compl. at 1-2, 8.
Even if the two causes of action are duplicative section 1983 claims, duplication of claims is not a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 12 (c). A Rule 12(c) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's pleadings. Defendants have not contended that Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is legally insufficient; only that it is duplicative. Accordingly, Plaintiff's sixth cause of action remains.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's first and second causes of action against all Defendants are dismissed. Plaintiff's third through seventh causes of action against all named current and former Los Angeles County Supervisors, in their official capacity, are dismissed. Plaintiff's third through seventh causes of action against all named current and former Los Angeles County Supervisors, in their individual capacity, are not dismissed. Plaintiff's third through seventh causes of action against Sheriff Baca, in his official and individual capacities, are not dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.