Opinion
2005-301 Q C.
Decided October 20, 2005.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Bernice Siegal, J.), entered October 20, 2004. The order granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Order unanimously modified by providing that defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent of dismissing plaintiff's personal injury cause of action; as so modified, affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON and GOLIA, JJ.
The affirmed medical reports submitted by defendants made out a prima facie case that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Defendants' doctor stated that plaintiff had resolved lumbar and cervical sprains and strains. This shifted the burden to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955).
The plaintiff unsuccessfully opposed the motion. Plaintiff ended his treatment six months after the accident. Three years later, a chiropractor examined plaintiff in connection with this case and, in an affidavit submitted in opposition to the instant motion, relied upon unsworn reports by a doctor who had treated plaintiff. The plaintiff provided no adequate explanation as to why he failed to pursue any treatment for his injuries after the initial six months. In view of the foregoing, the court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment insofar as it dismissed the personal injury cause of action ( Pommells v. Perez, 4 NY3d 566).
We note that the court should not have dismissed plaintiff's cause of action for property damage to his 1993 Toyota, which cause of action survives this motion.