Our Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 9-1-1 charges under the Act were a tax as a matter of law, and that the Counties could not seek a remedy for the alleged arrearage under the Act or in tort.Bellsouth Telecommunications v. Cobb County , 305 Ga. 144, (824 S.E.2d 233) (2019). The Supreme Court further directed that the case be remanded to the trial court with direction to grant the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Counties’ claims for damages.

"[T]he power to levy and collect taxes is so great," and, as such, "that power may only be exercised as permitted by statutes enacted by the legislative branch." Bellsouth Telecommunications v. Cobb County, 305 Ga. 144, 151 (2) (824 S.E.2d 233) (2019); see also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III (a) ("All taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws and for public purposes only."). "This structural requirement that both the levy and collection of taxes be done as prescribed by the legislature - like many other structural provisions of our Constitution - preserves liberty because legislators are accountable to the people more directly than bureaucrats or judges."

In January 2023, the plaintiffs-City residents that paid for utilities services that were provided by the City-filed a putative class action complaint, alleging that the City imposed "excessive mandatory rates and charges for the provision of essential municipal utility services consisting of electric, gas, water, and sewer service for which [the plaintiffs] and the putative class have no alternative service provider"; that the charges "generate[d] profits in excess of the actual cost to the City of providing such services"; and that these profits were used to "rais[e] general revenues for the City in lieu of lawful property taxes," such that the excessive profits constituted "illegal taxes." In this respect, the complaint asserted that the excessive profits that the City obtained from the utilities charges constituted a tax under the test set forth in Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb County, 305 Ga. 144, 146-147 (824 S.E.2d 233) (2019). And the tax was illegal, the complaint asserted, because it was not expressly authorized by the Georgia Constitution or by law, as required by Article IX, Section IV, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983.

3) (citing Rockefeller v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Ga. , 251 Ga.App. 699, 554 S.E.2d 623 (2001)) ; Hubbard , 568 S.E.2d at 566 ; Ledee v. Devoe , 250 Ga.App. 15, 549 S.E.2d 167, 173 (2001) (finding Georgia law is well-settled on the notion that the violation of a state statute resulting in the injury of another person constitutes negligence per se ). The statute or regulation relied upon by the plaintiff to establish the legal duty must contain "some ascertainable standard of conduct." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins , 293 Ga. 162, 744 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 2013) ; Cent. Anesthesia Associates, P.C. v. Worthy , 333 S.E.2d at 833 (stating that a statute may create a duty recognized by law requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks, the breach of which constitutes negligence); Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb Cnty. , 342 Ga.App. 323, 802 S.E.2d 686, 688 (2017), rev'd in part on other grounds , 305 Ga. 144, 824 S.E.2d 233 (2019) ("[T]he alleged duty arising from the other statute must be mandatory and imposed expressly by the statute at issue with specificity.") As the court in Amick noted, "[t]he same result is reached through application of [O.C.G.A. §] 51–1–6, which provides: When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby."

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-8 is a general tort statute that "operate[s] in conjunction with a statute ... that imposes a legal duty but does not expressly provide a cause of action." See BellSouth Telecomm., LLC v. Cobb Cty., 342 Ga. App. 323, 329, 802 S.E.2d 686 (2017), rev'd on other grounds, 305 Ga. 144, 824 S.E.2d 233 (2019) ; see also Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 280, 528 S.E.2d 238 (2000) ( Section 51-1-8 "merely set[s] forth general principals of tort law"). That statute cannot, by itself, form the basis of a negligence per se claim because it imposes no legal duties.

Neither Ordinance mandates that use of the Disputed Charges is restricted to compensating the City for the Associated Costs. Compare Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, v. Cobb County, 305 Ga. 144, 147 (1) (824 S.E.2d 233) (2019) (explaining that the Georgia Emergency Telephone Number 911 Service Act, OCGA § 46-5-120 et seq. (the "911 Act"), restricts use of the funds generated pursuant thereto to pay specific costs enumerated in the 911 Act). And so, while the recitals may express the City Council's intention that the Disputed Charges be used to cover certain expenses, nothing from the text of the Ordinances themselves tells us how that revenue is used in practice.

Moreover, to the extent that OCGA § 31-7-75 and the preemption provision could be read as conflicting, the canons of statutory construction dictate that the more recent and specific provisions of the Settlement Act govern over the older and more general provisions of OCGA § 31-7-75. See Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb County , 305 Ga. 144, 151 (1), 824 S.E.2d 233 (2019) ("Where two statutes are in conflict the later-enacted statute prevails over the one enacted earlier, and the more specific statute governs over the more general one."). Despite HAWC's reliance on OCGA § 31-7-96, that provision does not prevent the General Assembly from later passing the Settlement Act and limiting or eliminating HAWC's power to pursue certain legal claims under the General Assembly's authority to delegate to or take away power from a state entity.

She cites the principle that "[w]here two statutes are in conflict, ... the more specific statute governs over the more general one." Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb County , 305 Ga. 144, 151 (1), 824 S.E.2d 233 (2019). See also Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady , 263 Ga. 591, 592 (2), 436 S.E.2d 219 (1993).

See Harris v. Mahone, 340 Ga.App. 415, 417 (1) (797 S.E.2d 688) (2017). Bellsouth Telecommunications LLC v. Cobb County, 305 Ga. 144, 151 (1) (824 S.E.2d 233) (2019). CL SNF, LLC v. Fountain, 312 Ga. 416, 421 (863 S.E.2d 116) (2021).

See Harris v. Mahone, 340 Ga.App. 415, 417 (1) (797 S.E.2d 688) (2017). Bellsouth Telecommunications LLC v. Cobb County, 305 Ga. 144, 151 (1) (824 S.E.2d 233) (2019), citing Glinton v. And R, Inc., 271 Ga. 864, 866-867 (524 S.E.2d 481) (1999). See, e.g., CL SNF, LLC v. Fountain, 312 Ga. 416, 421 (863 S.E.2d 116) (2021), citing Estes v. Jones, 203 Ga. 686, 687 (2) (48 S.E.2d 99) (1948); Hines v. Wingo, 120 Ga.App. 614, 616 (3) (171 S.E.2d 905) (1969).