Bellsouth c. v. McCollum

23 Citing cases

  1. Patterson v. CitiMortgage, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-0339-CC (N.D. Ga. Sep. 26, 2012)   Cited 3 times
    Concluding that defendant was not a stranger to sales contract between plaintiff and buyer

    As a general rule, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict a valid, unambiguous written contract. Frank v. Fleet Finance, Inc. of Ga., 227 Ga. App. 543, 546, 489 S.E.2d 523 (1997) (citations omitted); BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441, 444, 433 S.E.2d 437 (1993). However, "parol evidence may be used to show no valid agreement ever went into existence."

  2. Cohen v. Dekalb County School District

    1:09-cv-1153-WSD (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 2009)   Cited 4 times

    "[I]f there was in fact any essential part of the contract upon which the minds of the parties had not met, or upon which there was not an agreement . . . it must follow that a valid and binding contract was not made." BellSouth Advertising, etc., Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441, 445 (1993). Georgia law provides that for an oral settlement agreement to be valid, it must be " definite, certain and unambiguous."

  3. In Matter of Dunn

    Case No. 09-31182 JPS, Adversary Proceeding No. 09-3054 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Sep. 13, 2010)

    `(I)f there was in fact an essential part of the contract upon which the minds of the parties had not met, or upon which there was not an agreement it must follow than a valid and binding contract was not made.' (Citations and punctuation omitted). BellSouth Advertising, Inc. etc., Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441, 445(2) 433 S.E.2d 437 (1993). 504 S.E.2d at 725.

  4. In Matter of Dunn

    Case No. 09-31182 JPS, Adversary Proceeding No. 09-3054 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Sep. 10, 2010)

    `(I)f there was in fact an essential part of the contract upon which the minds of the parties had not met, or upon which there was not an agreement it must follow than a valid and binding contract was not made.' (Citations and punctuation omitted). BellSouth Advertising, Inc. etc., Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441, 445 (2) 433 S.E.2d 437 (1993). 504 S.E.2d at 725.

  5. In re Dunn

    436 B.R. 744 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2010)   Cited 8 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted). BellSouth Advertising, etc., Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga.App. 441, 445(2) 433 S.E.2d 437 (1993). See also,Camp v. Peetluk,

  6. Extremity Healthcare, Inc. v. Access to Care Am., LLC

    339 Ga. App. 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that doctrine of mutual mistake did not apply to render buyout agreement, in which members of failed joint venture to operate surgical center agreed to buy out interest of withdrawing members, invalid, even if parties mistakenly believed at time of contracting that center's lease was valid given that buyout agreement reflected parties’ consideration of possibility that lease might have to be amended before it could be assigned and that assignment might never occur

    "Although parol evidence cannot be used to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written agreement, parol evidence may be used to show no valid agreement ever went into existence." Moreno v. Smith , 299 Ga. 443 (1), 788 S.E.2d 349, 352 (2016), quoting BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. McCollum , 209 Ga.App. 441, 444 (2), 433 S.E.2d 437 (1993). See Cox Broadcasting Corp. , 250 Ga. at 395, 297 S.E.2d 733. As our Supreme Court has explained, "the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, such as correspondence and discussions, are relevant in deciding if there was a mutual assent to an agreement, and courts are free to consider such extrinsic evidence."

  7. Odum v. Superior Rigging & Erecting Co.

    291 Ga. App. 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 7 times
    Relying on agreement to find borrowed employee relationship where contract provided that crane operator was under “ ‘Lessee's exclusive jurisdiction, supervision and control,’ ” but contract further provided that “ ‘at all times while the Operator is on the job site that Lessee has the right to exercise complete direction and control over the Operator, that Lessor will exercise no control over the Operator and that Lessee has the exclusive right to discharge the Operator from the work he is doing, that Lessee may require Lessor to replace the operator with another of Lessor's employees and that Lessee may put the crane operator to other work’ ”

    As the Odums point out, the Crane Rental Agreement does not contain a price term, and they contend that the lack of this essential term rendered the agreement unenforceable. See generally Bell-South Advertising c. Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441, 444 (2) ( 433 SE2d 437) (1993). The Subcontract Agreement, however, reflects the parties' agreement as to the hourly rate for crane operators, and the parties' execution of the more narrowly tailored Crane Rental Agreement would not constitute a novation or contractual merger such that the Subcontract Agreement was extinguished thereby.

  8. Chong v. Reebaa Const

    284 Ga. App. 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding that slander per se could be found where a general contractor was called a "crook" in the context of a discussion about the contractor's business

    "[A]s price is an essential element of a valid contract, an alleged contract on which there is no firm agreement as to the price is unenforceable." BellSouth Advertising c. Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441, 444 (2) ( 433 SE2d 437) (1993). See also Progressive Life Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 89 Ga. App. 900, 902-903 (1) ( 81 SE2d 519) (1954).

  9. Burns v. Dees

    252 Ga. App. 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 50 times
    Finding contract too indefinite to enforce where it did not state how costs or payments would be allocated, what the parties' responsibilities would be in the event of losses, or provide a formula how sale proceeds or profits would be calculated or how and when profits and proceeds would be distributed

    E.g., with regard to Burns' allegation that he is entitled to a finder's fee for one venture, the essential elements of price and the due date of the payment are absent. See Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656 ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994); Bellsouth Advertising c. Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441 ( 433 S.E.2d 437) (1993). Accordingly, as the claims against Phrazer rest upon the same allegations as the claims against the estate of O'Donnell, the trial court properly granted plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment.

  10. Cox v. Erwin

    541 S.E.2d 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 5 times

    And that therefore, summary judgment was correct because Cox did not prove an essential element of the contract, i.e., the amount of compensation. See e.g., Laverson v. Macon Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 226 Ga. App. 761, 762 ( 487 S.E.2d 621) (1997); BellSouth Advertising, c. Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441, 444 (2) ( 433 S.E.2d 437) (1993) (alleged contract with "no firm agreement as to the price is unenforceable"). In his deposition Cox testified that Ervac agreed to pay sixty percent of the "net profit" derived from his sales.