Opinion
A24A1272
10-29-2024
BELLINGER v. THOMPSON, Commissioner of Labor of the State of Georgia et al.
Adrianne Carr Freeman, for Appellant. Katherine Powers Stoff, Atlanta, for Appellee.
Adrianne Carr Freeman, for Appellant.
Katherine Powers Stoff, Atlanta, for Appellee.
Dillard, Presiding Judge.
In 2022, Lynn Bellinger applied for unemployment benefits through the Georgia Department of Labor. The Department denied Bellinger’s claim for benefits, and she then sought to appeal to an administrative hearing officer. The hearing officer found that Bellinger’s appeal was not timely filed, and the Department’s Board of Review affirmed that decision. In turn, the superior court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review. But this Court granted Bellinger’s subsequent application for discretionary review, and she contends that her appeal from the denial of her claim for benefits was timely filed. For the following reasons, we vacate the superior court’s decision and remand the case with direction.
Oral argument was held on August 6, 2024, and is archived on the Court’s website. See Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia, Oral Argument, Case No. A24A1272 (Aug. 6, 2024), available at https://vimeo.com/996706724.
[1–3] When this Court reviews a superior court’s order in an administrative proceeding, our duty is "not to review whether the record supports the superior court’s decision but whether the record supports the final decision of the administrative agency." And judicial review requires us to determine whether "the findings of fact are supported by ‘any evidence’ and examine the soundness of the conclusions of law that are based upon the findings of fact." Finally, as always, we review legal conclusions de novo.
Peace v. Butler, 367 Ga. App. 474, 474, 887 S.E.2d 70 (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Hudson v. Butler, 337 Ga. App. 207, 207, 786 S.E.2d 879 (2016).
Swarn v. Thompson, 369 Ga. App. 321, 322, 893 S.E.2d 474 (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Hudson, 337 Ga. App. at 207, 786 S.E.2d 879.
See Swarn, 369 Ga. App. at 322, 893 S.E.2d 474 (punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original); accord Hudson, 337 Ga. App. at 207, 786 S.E.2d 879.
So viewed, the record shows that Bellinger began working at the Savannah Bee Company in 2012. In January 2022, the Company did "mass layoffs" and discharged Bellinger. She received severance pay, and her separation agreement indicated the Company would not impede her application for unemployment benefits. In February 2022, Bellinger applied for unemployment benefits, but her claim was denied. In doing so, the Department of Labor indicated that Bellinger was ineligible for benefits because she had been "fired for not following rules, orders, or the instructions of [her] employer."
After the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits, Bellinger contacted the president and chief financial officer of the Savannah Bee Company, who indicated that he would promptly investigate the matter. He told her not to appeal and that he would "fix it." But on April 11, 2022, after the Company was unable to resolve the issue, Bellinger filed an appeal from the denial of her unemployment claim.
More than one year later, the matter proceeded to a telephonic hearing before an administrative hearing officer, in which Bellinger was represented by counsel. The hearing officer took evidence as to both the timeliness of Bellinger’s appeal from the denial of her claim and the circumstances of her separation. On May 31, 2023, the hearing officer issued an order affirming the denial of Bellinger’s claim because she failed to file a timely appeal. Bellinger timely appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Board of Review. And on July 25, 2023, the Board affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that the appeal was untimely.
The hearing officer's decision did not address the merits of Bellinger’s claim that she was entitled to unemployment benefits.
Thereafter, Bellinger petitioned for judicial review in superior court. Following a hearing, the superior court on January 22, 2024, summarily affirmed the decision of the Board of Review. Bellinger then filed an application for discretionary review in this Court, which we granted. This appeal follows.
Case No. A24D0255 (Mar. 21, 2024).
Bellinger maintains the Department of Labor and the superior court erred as a matter of law in concluding that her appeal from the denial of her unemployment claim was untimely. We agree.
We thank the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc. for its thoughtful amicus brief.
[4–7] Tasked with interpreting statutory language, we necessarily begin our analysis with "familiar and binding canons of construction." In considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to "presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant." And toward that end, we must afford the statutory text "its plain and ordinary meaning," view the text "in the context in which it appears," read the text "in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would," and seek to "avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage." In sum, when the language of a statute is "plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly."
Holcomb v. Long, 329 Ga. App. 515, 517 (1), 765 S.E.2d 687 (2014); accord Swarn, 369 Ga. App. at 323, 893 S.E.2d 474.
Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1), 765 S.E.2d 687.
Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1), 765 S.E.2d 687; accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337; see also Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839 (1), 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015) ("A statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text.").
Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337; see Chan, 296 Ga. at 839 (1), 770 S.E.2d 851 ("The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context. For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law—constitutional, statutory, and common law alike—that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question." (citations and punctuation omitted)).
Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 518 (1), 765 S.E.2d 687; accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172-73 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337.
Swarn, 369 Ga. App. at 324, 893 S.E.2d 474 (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 518 (1), 765 S.E.2d 687.
Swarn, 369 Ga. App. at 324, 893 S.E.2d 474 (punctuation omitted); see Deal, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 ("[I]f the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end." (punctuation omitted)).
[8] Furthermore, as pertinent here, the General Assembly has declared that "economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state." And as a result, courts are statutorily directed to broadly "construe the provisions of the unemployment statutes in favor of the employee, and statutory exceptions and exemptions that are contrary to the expressed intention of the [codified] law should be narrowly construed."
OCGA § 34-8-2; see Hudson, 337 Ga. App. at 209, 786 S.E.2d 879 ("Georgia has a strong public policy favoring payment of unemployment benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own." (punctuation omitted)).
Hudson, 337 Ga. App. at 209, 786 S.E.2d 879; accord Peace, 367 Ga. App. at 474, 887 S.E.2d 70.
[9] Turning to the statute at issue, OCGA § 34-8-192, when the Department of Labor makes an initial determination as to whether a claimant is entitled to unemployment benefits, that determination shall be final unless a party seeks reconsideration or "appeals the determination within 15 days after the notice was mailed to the party’s last known address or otherwise delivered to the party." And here, the undisputed evidence shows the notice of initial determination sent to Bellinger by the Department of Labor bore a "mail date" of March 18, 2022, and indicated an appeal date of April 4, 2022. But significantly, Bellinger did not actually receive the initial determination until the Thursday before the appeal was due, which was March 31, 2022. She then filed her appeal on April 11, 2022.
April 2 is the fifteenth day after March 18. But April 2, 2022, fell on a Saturday, meaning the appeal date, as measured from March 18, was Monday, April 4, 2022. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (3) (providing that, in computing dates, "if the last day falls on Saturday or Sunday, the party having such privilege or duty shall have through the following Monday to exercise the privilege or to discharge the duty").
As noted above, OCGA § 34-8-192 refers to two possible dates on which the 15-day deadline could begin to run: the date that the "notice was mailed" or the date the notice was "otherwise delivered to the party." And because the statute refers to the mailing date or the delivery date, Bellinger only needed to file her appeal within 15 days of one of those dates to be timely. So, because Bellinger’s appeal was filed within 15 days of the date that she received the initial determination—i.e., the date it was actually "delivered" to her—it is timely. To hold otherwise would render the latter phrase of the statute, referring to delivery, as mere surplusage. Importantly, this construction also comports with our statutory mandate to construe broadly the provisions of the unemployment statutes in favor of the employee and to construe narrowly statutory exceptions.
See Haugen v. Henry Cty., 277 Ga. 743, 744-45 (2), 594 S.E.2d 324 (2004) ("The natural meaning of ‘or,’ where used as a connective, is to mark an alternative and present choice, implying an election to do one of two things." (punctuation omitted)); Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2), 465 S.E.2d 440 (1996) ("[W]here a legislative provision is phrased in the disjunctive, it must be so construed absent a clear indication that a disjunctive construction is contrary to the [codified] legislative intent."); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 124 (3), 274 S.E.2d 549 (1981) ("It is not required that the trier of fact find the existence of each disjunctive phrase of the statute." (punctuation omitted)).
See supra note 20; see also Hamilton v. Edwards, 245 Ga. 810, 812, 267 S.E.2d 246 (1980) ("When notice is required by law to be given to a party who has the right or is required to in some way act or respond to the notice within a prescribed period of time, the date of the notice must run from the date of its receipt unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary.").
See supra note 13 & accompanying text.
See supra note 16 & accompanying text.
For all these reasons, Bellinger’s appeal was timely and she is entitled to a decision on the merits of her claim for benefits. Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is vacated with direction that the case be remanded to the Department of Labor for the purpose of determining whether Bellinger is entitled to unemployment benefits.
Bellinger also contends this Court should reverse the superior court's decision because (1) there is no evidence that the initial determination was actually mailed on the "mail date" printed on it; (2) if late, her appeal was late with good cause; and (3) the administrative hearing officer violated Bellinger’s right to due process by refusing to allow her to develop the record at the hearing. But because we conclude Bellinger’s appeal was timely to the date the initial determination was delivered to her, we need not consider these alternative arguments.
See, e.g., Harris v. Butler, 368 Ga. App. 211, 215 (2), 889 S.E.2d 401 (2023) (vacating judgment and remanding to the superior court with direction to remand to the Department of Labor to determine whether claimant was entitled to unemployment benefits when the Department applied an improper legal standard in determining whether claimant failed to show good cause to reopen her appeal); Peace, 367 Ga. App. at 477-78 (1) & (2), 887 S.E.2d 70 (vacating judgment and remanding to the superior court with direction to remand to the Department of Labor to analyze unemployment claim under pandemic emergency rules).
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.
Brown and Padgett, JJ., concur.