Opinion
No. 15–P–745.
10-12-2016
Ronald BELLANTI & another v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs, Ronald Bellanti and Illumina Media LLC (Illumina), appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court denying their challenge to the decision and final order of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). We affirm.
Background. Brooke Anido began work at Illumina, which is owned by Bellanti, in January, 2007. She was quickly promoted and eventually achieved the position of vice president of operations. From the beginning of her employment, sexual banter was an accepted part of the Illumina work environment. A few months later, however, Bellanti began to make overt sexual advances to Anido, which she rebuffed. Bellanti nevertheless continued to make sexually explicit comments to Anido and eventually professed his love for her. Anido made clear to Bellanti that she was not interested in him, and did not want her feelings in this regard to affect her work responsibilities. Despite Bellanti's promise that he would not hold Anido's feelings against her, he reassigned most of her duties and gave her tedious office tasks in place of her former work.
In June, 2007, after attending a musical performance, Anido befriended one of the band members. This infuriated Bellanti, who called Anido “a fucking groupie whore.” He told her she was a “disgrace to [the] company” and that she was “done.” Over the next several days, Bellanti telephoned Anido incessantly and left angry and remorseful voicemail and text messages. Anido was frightened by Bellanti's increasing hostility; she became concerned for her safety and reported his actions to the police. Anido did not return to work, and had difficulty coping as a result of the actions triggering her departure.
In August, 2007, Anido filed a complaint with the MCAD alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of G.L. c. 151B. A hearing officer found that the plaintiffs had engaged in quid pro quo sexual harassment, that Bellanti was individually liable for his actions, and that the actions had caused Anido to be constructively discharged. The full commission of the MCAD affirmed the hearing officer's decision, including an award of $75,000 in damages for emotional distress. On July 3, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for judicial review in the Superior Court, but then failed to file a transcript of the administrative proceedings. A judge of the Superior Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
Anido subsequently waived this claim.
Both the judge and the MCAD advised the plaintiffs of their obligation to file a transcript.
Discussion. A decision of the MCAD should be affirmed unless the hearing officer's findings and conclusions are unsupported by substantial evidence or are based on an error of law. Ramsdell v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 415 Mass. 673, 676 (1993). See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7) ; c. 151B, § 6. Deference should be given to the hearing officer's fact-finding role, including her right to draw reasonable inferences from the facts found. Smith College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 224 (1978). Credibility determinations are solely for the hearing officer to make, and will not be disturbed on appeal. Ramsdell, supra.
Here, the plaintiffs claim that the MCAD decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and was arbitrary and capricious. The failure to provide a transcript in these circumstances is fatal to a substantial evidence challenge. See Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 783 (2003) ; Ramzi, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 85 Mass.App.Ct. 353, 362 n.19 (2014). Notwithstanding the failure to file a hearing transcript, a judge may set aside a decision if the ultimate findings of the agency are not supported by the subsidiary findings, or if an error of law occurred. Connolly v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Dept., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 187, 193 (2004). Here, upon performing that narrowed review, we agree with the judge that the award of damages for emotional distress was fully supported by the subsidiary findings of the hearing officer, and that the decision is free from any error of law.
Despite their failure to raise the issue below, the plaintiffs also contend that they have a constitutional right to a jury trial. The issue is controlled by Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 562–568 (2004), in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to parties in civil administrative proceedings brought before the MCAD.
To the extent that we do not address the parties' other contentions, “they ‘have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion.’ “ Department of Rev. v. Ryan R., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 380, 389 (2004), quoting from Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).