In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense. See Tingley v. Brown, 380 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 1980); Milazzo v. State, 377 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 1979); Bellamy v. State, 347 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1977); Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1958). The prohibited netting area encompassed by the Charlotte County waters of Charlotte Harbor may be ascertained with particular exactitude by resort to pertinent Florida law.
We conclude that the challenged terms are of such common understanding and usage that persons of ordinary intelligence are fully able to determine what conduct is proscribed by the challenged enactment. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); Tatzel v. State, 356 So.2d 787 (1978); Bellamy v. State, 347 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1977). The dictionary definition of the term "authorize" is "to endorse, empower, justify or permit."
We are reluctant to conclude that the legislature intended to classify the occasional social game in one's home, hunting camp, boat, etc. as a felony gambling offense — particularly since §§ 849.08, 849.11 and 849.14, Florida Statutes seem to be more directly concerned with such offenses as misdemeanors. The Florida Supreme Court has recently ruled 849.01 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad in the case of Bellamy v. State, 347 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1977). As to the first part of 849.01 the supreme court further strengthened the requirement of habitualness in its recent decision in Schultz v. State, 361 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1978).