Bell v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. Kuk v. State

    602 So. 2d 1213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)   Cited 10 times

    Within ten months after the release of the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Washington, this Court had summarily reversed five murder convictions on the authority of that opinion. Dawson v. State, 449 So.2d 800 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984) (decided April 10, 1984); Hughley v. State, 451 So.2d 439 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984) (decided May 22, 1984); Ponder v. State, 451 So.2d 1382 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984) (decided June 12, 1984); Bell v. State, 455 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984) (decided August 28, 1984); Marsh v. State, 461 So.2d 51 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984) (decided December 11, 1984) (hereinafter "Marsh II"). The last of these five cases, Marsh II, involved the same defendant whose conviction we had affirmed in Marsh I.

  2. Hall v. State

    520 So. 2d 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    Ex parte Washington, 448 So.2d 404 (Ala. 1984). See also Mathews v. State, 491 So.2d 1087 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Bell v. State, 455 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Ponder v. State, 451 So.2d 1382 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Dawson v. State, 449 So.2d 800 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984). The Attorney General argues that the charge on reckless murder was abstract and without prejudice because "the undisputed and unconflicting evidence was of an intentional and only an intentional, homicide."

  3. Biddie v. State

    516 So. 2d 837 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)   Cited 17 times

    Since the announcement of the decision in Washington, supra, this court has consistently followed the principles set out in Washington, supra, and has reversed convictions on the authority of that case. See Dawson v. State, 449 So.2d 800 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Hughley v. State, 451 So.2d 439 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Ponder v. State, 451 So.2d 1382 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Bell v. State, 455 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984). Thus, in light of the above authorities, it is clear that the court's oral charge in the case at bar was reversible error.

  4. Bell v. State

    489 So. 2d 667 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    COURT: Well, at that time when I charged the jury, I think the charge is and always is they were confined to the evidence that had been presented from the witness stand, that they shouldn't go outside the evidence, so the Court's charge to the jury advises them that they couldn't put their personal feelings into it, that they had to face whichever verdict they returned solely on the evidence and I don't know of anything which would cause the Court to feel they did otherwise in reaching any other verdict that they did. First, let me begin saying that this case — the verdict in this case on essentially the same evidence was no different from the verdict which had been previously been reached by a jury on — made up of completely different people for which this case was ultimately reversed by the Court of Criminal Appeals and it was retried with the same evidence, a little bit different and the same verdict. So I can't see that anything was different than what was done in this case." In Bell v. State, 455 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), this Court reversed the defendant's initial conviction for the murder of Maxine Bush because the jury was instructed on "universal malice" murder when the indictment only charged intentional murder. At that first trial and appeal, Bell was also represented by George Jones.

  5. Mathews v. State

    491 So. 2d 1087 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)   Cited 3 times
    In Mathews v. State, 491 So.2d 1087 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (decided May 27, 1986), we again reversed a murder conviction where the indictment had charged only intentional murder and the trial court had instructed the jury on reckless murder.

    Appellant is correct as to the first issue presented. We adhere to what was held in Bell v. State, 455 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), and to what was concisely and precisely stated therein by Judge Patterson as follows: "We need only address Bell's first contention of error. He argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on `universal malice' murder, defined by § 13A-6-2 (a)(2), because the indictment only alleged that he acted intentionally in causing the victim's death (§ 13A-6-2 (a)(1).