Indeed, contrary to Allison's argument, "[t]he fact that a child witness is unresponsive or evasive in response to certain questions on the witness stand does not render the child's out-of-court statements inadmissible under [the former Child Hearsay Statute] or violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation rights of the defendant." Kirkland v. State , 334 Ga. App. 26, 32 (2), 778 S.E.2d 42 (2015) ; see also Stegall v. State , 297 Ga. App. 425, 426, 677 S.E.2d 441 (2009) ("the availability requirement of [the former Child Hearsay Statute] is met whenever the victim takes the stand, even if the victim is uncommunicative or unresponsive") (citation and punctuation omitted); Bell v. State , 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1), 589 S.E.2d 653 (2003) (holding that child victim's refusal to respond to questions did not make her an unavailable witness; rather, it merely affected her credibility); Bright v. State , 197 Ga. App. 784, 785 (4), 400 S.E.2d 18 (1990) ("So long as the witness is made available for confrontation and cross-examination, the defendant's rights are protected, even if the witness is uncommunicative or unresponsive."). Instead, "[a] witness’ responsiveness or unresponsiveness, evasiveness or directness, verbal skills, intelligence, memory, perception, and apparent understanding are all factors which can be assessed by the jury and may raise a reasonable doubt."
(Footnote omitted.) Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) ( 589 SE2d 653) (2003). In the present case, A. T. was no longer in the mother's custody at the time of the evidentiary hearing at issue, and the mother's attorney noted on the record that none of the children were there to testify.
Id. See also Bell v. State (child-victim's refusal to respond to questions on direct examination did "not render her unavailable within the meaning of OCGA § 24-3-16" but merely "affected her credibility"); Jones v. State ("[t]he law requires only that the child be available to testify; it does not require the child to corroborate the hearsay testimony"). Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) ( 589 SE2d 653) (2003).Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 SE2d 85) (1991).
The testimony of Ka. H., and the written and videotaped statements of Kr. H., B. P. and E. W. provide sufficient evidence to establish the elements of child molestation with regard to each girl. See Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 (2) ( 589 SE2d 653) (2003); OCGA § 16-6-4 (a). To the extent that any contradictions existed or issues of credibility arose, they were for the jury to resolve:
As we explained in Bright v. State, 197 Ga. App. 784 ( 400 SE2d 18) (1990), Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 ( 589 SE2d 653) (2003); Smith v. State, 228 Ga. App. 144, 146 (3) ( 491 SE2d 194) (1997); Byrd v. State, 204 Ga. App. 252, 253 (1) ( 419 SE2d 111) (1992). [s]o long as the witness is made available for confrontation and cross-examination, the defendant's rights are protected, even if the witness is uncommunicative or unresponsive.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) ( 589 SE2d 653) (2003). 5. Neither were the child hearsay statements of J.L.B. inadmissible for denial of Brock's right to cross-examine the child for the superior court's comment that she was unable to continue her testimony, as above. Through counsel, Brock waived the right to cross-examine the witness.