Cook v. Cobb Roper, 22 Ga. App. 328 ( 95 S.E. 1022); Gosa v. E. A. Clark Sons, 43 Ga. App. 310 ( 158 S.E. 608). This being the case, there was nothing to amend by, and the court did not err in disallowing the amendment. Bell v. Scarbrough, 68 Ga. App. 63 ( 22 S.E.2d 113), relied upon by the plaintiff in error, is distinguishable on its facts from the instant case. Furthermore, the affidavit of McLendon which was attached to the amendment was in the following words: ". . W. T. McLendon, who being duly sworn on oath, deposed and said that the facts and things contained in the foregoing amendment are true; that the same were not omitted from the original affidavit for the purpose of delay, and are not now offered for the purpose of delay."
Compare Leagan v. Levine, supra. Appellant attempts to characterize the cause of action which he seeks to assert as being strictly based in fraud as opposed to traditional medical negligence or any notion of the informed consent doctrine, which has judicially been declared to be nonexistent in Georgia. Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737 (1) ( 22 S.E.2d 113) (1975). However, regardless of the semantics of appellant's averments and proof, it is clear that any duty to disclose, the breach of which would constitute an essential element of fraud by silence, would arise only as a result of the physician-patient relationship between appellee and appellant. Since the record reveals that there is no legally cognizable and probative evidence to rebut appellee's showing of his exercise of the requisite degree of care and skill prescribed by OCGA § 51-1-27 and his compliance with his duty set forth in OCGA § 31-9-6 (d) to disclose in general terms the treatment or course of treatment, this case is controlled by Padgett v. Ferrier, 172 Ga. App. 335 (2) ( 323 S.E.2d 166) (1984) and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee.