Opinion
23-CV-10048 (LTS)
01-29-2024
CHRISTOPHER BELL, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Christopher Bell, who is proceeding pro se, alleges that his employer, the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”), discriminated against him on the basis of his race, in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
By order dated November 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 15, 2023, which is the operative pleading. (ECF 4.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an Administrative Assistant at Community Educational Council (“CEC”) 6, a DOE entity, brings this action against the DOE using a court-issued employment discrimination complaint form. In response to the question asking him to specify his causes of action, he checks the boxes on the form to assert claims under (1) Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, (2) Section 1981, indicating that he is a Black American, and (3) the New York State and City anti-discrimination statutes. In response to the question asking the nature of the adverse action taken by the DOE, Plaintiff checks the boxes indicating that the DOE did not hire him, retaliated against him, harassed him and/or created a hostile work environment, and states that “threatened [him] with termination and stalking by board member.” (ECF 4, at 5.)
The Court quotes verbatim from the complaint. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise.
In the fact section of the amended complaint, Plaintiff states, “I was discriminated based on my race and endured harsh mistreatment through harassment. After I complained of unfair mistreatment, I was retaliated by Defendant. The [illegible] led me to resign my position after I received threatening email of termination.” (Id.)
Plaintiff refers the Court to attachments to his amended complaint - 138 pages of emails, letters, and visitor log sheets - for further support of his claims. Although Plaintiff does not describe any of the attachments in the fact section of his amended complaint, or explain how the attachments support his claim of race discrimination, some of the emails suggest that (1) Plaintiff and two CEC board members had disagreements regarding Plaintiff's responsibilities, and Plaintiff filed a complaint against one of the board members, alleging harassment; (2) Plaintiff did not receive his work email for one month from the start of his employment; (3) a direct supervisor retaliated against him for unspecified reasons; (4) Plaintiff and his supervisors disagreed about the manner in which supplies were purchased by Plaintiff; (5) Plaintiff accused the Vice President of CEC 6 of misusing school supplies; (6) Plaintiff requested whistleblower status and a transfer to another department; and (7) Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DOE's Office of Special Investigation regarding the alleged misuse of school supplies. On December 9, 2022, Plaintiff resigned from his position, which he had commenced three years earlier, in December 2019.
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
The amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8 because it does not present facts suggesting that Plaintiff is entitled to relief from the Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that the DOE discriminated against him because of his race, but he does not provide concrete examples of conduct that he contends constitute racial discrimination. Moreover, none of the attachments suggests that his employer ever considered Plaintiff's race during any of the alleged workplace disputes. Because these allegations do not state claims upon which relief can be granted under Title VII or Section 1981, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint as set forth below.
1. Title VII
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, or who has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by that statute, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in a Title VII employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Still, the plaintiff need only provide “minimal support for the proposition that the [defendant] was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Id. at 85 (quotation marks omitted). “In making the plausibility determination, the court must be mindful of the ‘elusive' nature of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 86 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff's allegations do not plausibly give rise to an inference of discrimination based on his race. Neither the fact section of the amended complaint nor Plaintiff's attachments mention his race; the only indications that Plaintiff asserts a race discrimination claim are his checking off the Title VII and Section 1981 boxes on the form complaint and his conclusory statement that Defendant discriminated against him because of his race. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state facts in support of his Title VII claims.
Because Plaintiff resigned from this position, the Court assumes for the purposes of this order that Plaintiff is asserting that Defendant constructively discharged him from his position, based on “the existence of intolerable conditions, attributable to the [DOE].” Green v. Town of E. Haven, 952 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2020).
Should Plaintiff file a second amended complaint, he must plead facts connecting any allegedly discriminatory actions on the part of his employer with his race. Moreover, if Plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim, he also must plead facts suggesting that Defendants retaliated against him after he opposed any unlawful discrimination. See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276.
Plaintiff invokes Section 1981 as a basis for his claims. Section 1981 “protects the equal right of ‘[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States' to ‘make and enforce contracts' without respect to race.” Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). The statute “sets forth a remedy for employment discrimination that is independent of Title VII.” Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 2006).
A plaintiff bringing a Section 1981 claim for employment discrimination must plausibly allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for his position, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination. Ruiz v. Cnty of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010). “[A] plaintiff must . . . plead . . . that, but for race, [the plaintiff] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020).
Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that he is a member of a protected class and suggesting that he was qualified for his position. He does not, however, state facts describing any adverse action taken by his employer, or that his race was a “but for” cause for any such adverse action. Because Plaintiff's assertions of race-based discrimination are not supported by specific facts, they cannot support an inference that race was the “but for” cause for the allegedly adverse actions taken against him and the termination of his employment. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state facts in support of his Section 1981 claims.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state valid claims under Title VII and Section 1981, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to file a second amended complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to further amend his amended complaint to provide more facts about his claims. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the second amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the second amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the second amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
e) if Plaintiff attaches exhibits to his second amended complaint, he must describe each exhibit and explain in the fact section of the second amended complaint how the exhibit supports his claims.
Essentially, Plaintiff's second amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's second amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the amended complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the amended complaint must be repeated in the second amended complaint.
Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (“NYLAG”) Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the second amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Second Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-10048 (LTS). A Second Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the amended complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A copy of NYLAG's flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.