Such a policy or contract of insurance is void and unenforceable, as being merely a wagering contract. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So.2d 910; Bell v. Natl. Life Accident Ins. Co., 41 Ala. App. 94, 123 So.2d 598; Helmetag's Administrator v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183; Liberty Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696. A brother has no insurable interest in the life of his sister merely because of the relationship. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 52 Ga. App. 464, 183 S.E. 640 (1936); Reynolds v. Prudential Ins. Co., 88 Mo. 679; Newmore v. Western Life Ins. Co., 28 Ohio 69; Lewis v. Ins. Co., 39 Conn. 100; Masonic Benefit Ass'n of Central, Ill. v. Bunch, et al., 109 Mo. 560, 19 S.W. 25; Long v. Montgomery, Mo. App., 22 S.W.2d 206; Morrow v. Natl. Life Ass'n of Des Moines, Iowa, 184 Mo. App. 308, 168 S.W. 881; Dieterele v. Standard Life Ins. Co., Mo. App., 119 S.W.2d 440. It is immaterial that the insured consented, for here one has no insurable interest in the life of another, the law will not permit him to take out insurance on such life, and, if he does so, will not lend its aid to the enforcement of such a contract because against public policy, and the fact that the insured lends it
267 Ala. at 183, 100 So.2d at 705. In Bell v. National Life Accident Insurance Co., 41 Ala. App. 94, 123 So.2d 598 (1960), the Court of Appeals considered whether the doctrine of estoppel can apply to make enforceable a life insurance policy that is otherwise void because of a lack of an insurable interest. The Court held:
The majority of courts hold that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel do not bar the insurer from raising this defense. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra, 584 F. Supp. at 279 ("the insurance company cannot waive or be estopped from asserting lack of insurable interest by its conduct in issuing the policy"); Brewton v. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins., 474 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Ala. 1985) ("[h]aving found that . . . no insurable interest in the premises, we conclude that the doctrines of waiver or estoppel do not apply"); Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Glover, 2 Ark. App. 79, 616 S.W.2d 755, 757 (1981) ("in view of the strong public policy against enforcing insurance contracts in which there is no insurable interest involved, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are completely inapplicable to create coverage which otherwise does not exist under the policy or to place therein a risk expressly excluded from the policy"); Bell v. National Life and Accident Insurance Co., 41 Ala. App. 94, 123 So.2d 598, 601-02 (1960) (having found that "a contract of life insurance issued to one who has no insurable interest in the life of the insured is void ab initio," the court concluded that "the doctrine of estoppel will not apply to make enforceable that which is illegal and void in its inception"); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Masterson, 180 Ark. 170, 21 S.W.2d 414, 417 (1929) (having found an insurance policy in which the beneficiary lacked an insurable interest to be against public policy and void, the court concluded that "[s]ince it is the law which, upon grounds of public policy, pronounces the policy to be void, the doctrine of estoppel has no application"); Couch, supra, ยง 24:9, at 26-27 ("[i]n many jurisdictions the rule prevails that where a life insurance policy is void at its inception because of lack of an insurable interest in the beneficiary, it cannot be rendered valid or enforceable by waiver or estoppel"). Those courts which have refused to apply the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to the insur
Flowers v. Flowers, 284 Ala. 230, 224 So.2d 590; Norton v. Norton, 280 Ala. 807, 193 So.2d 750. Policies (or contracts) secured by a person on the life of another in whom he has no insurable interest are construed as wagering contracts and are void as against public policy. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So.2d 910; Bell v. Natl. Life and Accident Ins. Co., 41 Ala. App. 94, 123 So.2d 598; Kidd v. Patterson, D.C., 230 F. Supp. 69. An assignment of a policy taken out by a person on his own life, is within the principle and reason which render void an original policy on the life of a person in whom the person taking out the policy has no insurable interest: and whether it be absolute or conditional (as collateral security) it is only valid in the hands of the assignee to the extent of the money paid by him with interest thereon. Helmetag's Adm'x v. Miller, Supra, 76 Ala. 183; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 26 L.Ed. 924. A designated beneficiary on a life insurance policy under which the insured was authorized to change the beneficiary at will and without beneficiary's consent has a mere expectancy and no vested right or interest in the policy.