Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV142563
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue in this appeal is whether California may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over respondents Rebecca Li-Huang (Rebecca) and Harry (He) Huang (Harry), who are residents of Pennsylvania and the defendants in the instant malicious prosecution action brought by appellant Thieu-Huan Bell (Bell), a California resident.
Hereafter, we will refer to respondents by their first names for purposes of clarity and not out of disrespect.
Rebecca and Harry loaned $11,000 to Bell’s brother, Thuan-Nghi Le (Le), by wiring the money to Bell’s mother’s bank account in California. Rebecca and Harry sought to collect the $11,000 debt by first sending demand letters to Bell and her mother in California, then by filing a Pennsylvania collection action that they attempted to serve on Bell in California. After the Pennsylvania action was dismissed with prejudice as to Bell, she filed this malicious prosecution action against Rebecca and Harry in Santa Clara County Superior Court.
Rebecca and Harry filed a motion to quash service of summons pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, which the trial court granted on the ground that California could not exercise personal jurisdiction because they had not “purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of California law.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that California may properly exercise personal jurisdiction in this case and therefore we will vacate the trial court’s order and direct the court to enter a new order denying the motion to quash service of summons.
All statutory references hereafter are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Our summary of the facts is taken primarily from the declarations submitted by the parties in connection with the motion to quash service of summons.
At all relevant times, Rebecca and Harry resided in Pennsylvania. They have not resided in California or visited California since 2004. The record reflects that Rebecca is a financial advisor for Merrill Lynch in Pennsylvania. In 2005, Rebecca became “registered to do business in California....” Her “registration automatically renews through [her] employer.” However, Rebecca has not “transacted any business” in California since 2004. Neither Rebecca nor Harry is in the business of lending money.
Bell is a resident of California, as is her mother, VyDza Tran (Tran). In October 2007, Le, who is Bell’s adult brother and Tran’s son, telephoned Rebecca and Harry to ask them to lend him $11,000, stating that Tran and Bell were not willing to help him. Le promised to repay the money in November 2007. Following Le’s instructions, Rebecca wired $11,000 from her personal Merrill Lynch account in Pennsylvania to a Washington Mutual bank account held by Tran in California. Tran then distributed the loan funds to Le. Bell had no interest in or signature authority for Tran’s Washington Mutual account.
According to Bell, in December 2007 Le “forged a check for $11,000” made payable to Rebecca and Harry from a Bank of America bank account held by Bell and Tran in California. Rebecca received the check in Pennsylvania and deposited it in her Merrill Lynch account. Bank of America returned the check twice due to insufficient funds. Rebecca then sent a letter to Tran, dated March 10, 2008, at an address in Cupertino, California, in which Rebecca stated that she had not been able to reach Le since the $11,000 check was returned and demanded that Tran pay her $11,000 “immediately or we will seek legal actions which will unfortunately involve you and your family.”
Bell responded to Rebecca’s demand letter by sending a March 14, 2008 letter to Rebecca and Harry informing them that the Le family denied any responsibility for repayment of the $11,000 loan given to Le. Rebecca and Harry then sent a second demand letter, dated March 24, 2008, to “Ms. Vydza Tran and Le Family” at the Cupertino, California address. In the second demand letter, Rebecca and Harry asserted that every member of the Le family was wealthy and capable of repaying the loan. They also threatened that “[i]f the $11000 total payment does not clear our Merrill Lynch account by April 15th, we will turn in all evidence to police, FBI and SEC for criminal investigation of Mr. Thuan Le’s activities and his disappearance, and the involvement of your family. Your accounts are clearly involved in activities including money laundering, racketeering and insider trading. All your finances will be scrubbed by the Feds and you will be investigated for his disappearance. We will seek retribution [sic] of $11000 plus interest, legal cost[s] and punitive damage[s] from Ms. Vyzda Tran[’s] assets or estate.” (Underscore omitted.)
Rebecca and Harry sent a third demand letter, dated April 7, 2008, to Tran and Bell at the Cupertino, California address. In the letter, they asserted that Tran and Bell had “signed and deposited a bad check of $11000” and were liable for payment of the $11,000 loan. Rebecca and Harry also stated that they welcomed the lawsuit threatened by the Le family since that could lead to criminal indictment of Le family members.
In response to the demand letters, Bell informed Rebecca and Harry of several facts indicating her lack of responsibility for the $11,000 loan: she had no interest in or signature authority on Tran’s Washington Mutual account to which they had wired the $11,000 loan funds; Tran had distributed all of the funds to Le; and Le had forged the $11,000 bad check on her Bank of America account without Bell’s consent or knowledge. Rebecca and Harry nevertheless filed a collection action against Tran and Bell in small claims court in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On July 11, 2008, Rebecca and Harry served the summons and complaint in the Pennsylvania small claims action on Tran and Bell at an address in Cupertino, California, where Bell did not reside.
Rebecca and Harry filed a second collection action against Tran and Bell in Pennsylvania on October 22, 2008, after Tran and Bell appealed from the adverse judgment in small claims court, “which rendered it void and mandated a trial de novo on the merits.” The second Pennsylvania action was resolved when Tran entered into a $500 settlement and Bell was dismissed with prejudice after refusing to settle. As a result of Rebecca’s and Harry’s actions, Bell incurred legal fees and expenses of $11,115.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
On May 15, 2009, Bell filed a complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court against defendants Rebecca and Harry and their Pennsylvania attorney, Andrew R. Spiegel. Bell alleges that Rebecca and Harry maliciously brought the two Pennsylvania collection actions against her without any factual or legal basis. She further alleges that Rebecca and Harry abused the judicial process in Pennsylvania for the purpose of extorting money. Based on these allegations, the complaint includes causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
Defendant Andrew R. Spiegel was dismissed with prejudice on October 7, 2009, and is not a party to this appeal.
B. The Motion to Quash Service of Summons
Rebecca and Harry responded to the complaint by filing a motion to quash service of summons under section 418.10 on October 5, 2009. In their points and authorities, they argued that the California court could not assert personal jurisdiction in this case because they were Pennsylvania residents who did not have minimum contacts with California that would subject them to either general or specific jurisdiction.
Section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1) provides, “A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: [¶] To quash the service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over him or her.”
According to Rebecca and Harry, general jurisdiction was lacking because they did not conduct business in California, had not resided or visited California since 2004, and the “entirety of their activities relating to [Bell] occurred in Pennsylvania.” Rebecca and Harry also argued that there was no basis for specific jurisdiction because they had not availed themselves of forum benefits in California. In particular, they asserted that “the activity which [Bell] claims created malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, occurred through the filing of litigation in Pennsylvania. Nothing suggests that the Pennsylvania litigation arose from activities related to the California forum.” Additionally, they maintained that it would be unreasonable for the California court to exercise specific jurisdiction because they had no California contacts and the Pennsylvania lawsuits formed the basis for Bell’s claims.
Rebecca and Harry also submitted a reply to Bell’s opposition to the motion to quash service of summons and separately filed evidentiary objections. The trial court did not rule on the evidentiary objections and Rebecca and Harry have not reasserted their evidentiary objections on appeal. Therefore, we need not address Bell’s claim that the evidentiary objections were not preserved for appeal.
C. Opposition to the Motion to Quash Service of Summons
Bell filed her opposition to the motion to quash service of summons on November 16, 2009. She argued that the exercise of specific jurisdiction was proper because the acts of Rebecca and Harry in Pennsylvania had caused effects in California. Specifically, Bell asserted that Rebecca and Harry had responded to the loan request that Le made in California; deposited the loan funds in a California bank account; sent “a number of virulent demand letters” to Bell and her mother in California; served the Pennsylvania action on Tran in California and attempted to serve the Pennsylvania action on Bell at the wrong address in California; caused Bell to incur legal fees; and claimed an interest in personal property (recovery of the loan funds) in California.
Bell also argued that Rebecca and Harry could not show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in California would be unreasonable, because they had purposefully directed their activities towards California and defending the action here would not be overly burdensome since they already had competent local counsel and could appear by telephone until the time of trial.
D. The Trial Court’s Order
On December 2, 2009, the trial court entered its order granting the motion to quash service of summons. The order states, “Here, [Bell’s] evidence does not show that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of California law. (See Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1067 [(Snowney)]--‘Purposeful availment exists whenever the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs its activities towards the forum state in an effort to obtain a benefit from that state.’ ”
Bell subsequently sent a letter to the trial court, dated December 14, 2009, in which she requested reconsideration of the December 2, 2009 order. On December 15, 2009, the trial court entered an amended order stating the December 14, 2009 letter was an improper motion for reconsideration and therefore Bell’s request for reconsideration was denied. The amended order also states that “the court reaffirms its original ruling granting Defendants’ motion to quash service of summons.”
On February 1, 2010, Bell filed a notice of appeal from the original order of December 2, 2009.
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Bell contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash service of summons because the purposeful availment element of specific jurisdiction was established by the evidence showing that the out-of-state acts of nonresident defendants Rebecca and Harry caused effects in California. We will begin our analysis with an overview of the general rules governing personal jurisdiction in California, followed by a discussion of the applicable standard of review for an order granting a motion to quash service of summons under section 418.10.
An order granting a motion to quash service of summons is an appealable order. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(3).)
A. Personal Jurisdiction
California’s long-arm statute, section 410.10, provides that “[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” The California Supreme Court has instructed that “[a] state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not been served with process within the state comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ‘ “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ [Citations.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)
“[T]he minimum contacts test asks ‘whether the “quality and nature” of the defendant’s activity is such that is “reasonable” and “fair” to require him [or her] to conduct his [or her] defense in that State.’ [Citations.]” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1061.) Whether a nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with California such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process is determined on a case-by-case basis: “ ‘[T]he “minimum contacts” test... is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite “affiliating circumstances” are present.’ [Citations.]” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Pavlovich).)
“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum are ‘substantial... continuous and systematic.’ [Citations.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445.) “If the nonresident defendant does not have substantial and systematic contacts in the forum sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, he or she still may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum, if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits.... [Citations.]” (Id.at p. 446.)
In the present case, we will consider only whether specific jurisdiction exists, since Bell has not claimed on appeal that Rebecca and Harry are subject to general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction is determined under a three-prong test. “A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum” ’ [citation]; and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” ’ [citations].” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.)
The parties’ respective burdens of proof are well established. The plaintiff “ ‘has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, then the defendant has the burden of demonstrating ‘that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
B. Standard of Review
The standard of review for an order granting or denying a motion to quash service of summons under section 418.10 is also well established. “In reviewing a trial court’s determination of jurisdiction, we will not disturb the court‘s factual determinations ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record.’ [Citation.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
We find that the record in the present case shows that there is no conflict in the evidence regarding the facts that are relevant to the determination of jurisdiction. While Rebecca and Harry argue that there is a question of fact as to whether the loan transaction resulted in the formation of a contract in Pennsylvania or California, we do not believe that issue constitutes a question that is material to our determination. The general rule with regard to specific jurisdiction is that “the place of contracting is not dispositive. [Citation.]” (Stone v. State of Texas (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048.) Therefore, we will apply the independent standard of review in determining whether, under the three-prong test for specific jurisdiction (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269), the California court may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants Rebecca and Harry in Bell’s malicious prosecution action.
C. Analysis
1. Purposeful Availment
The first prong--purposeful availment of forum benefits--“ ‘is only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his [or her] activities toward the forum so that he [or she] should expect, by virtue of the benefit he [or she] receives, to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction based on’ his [or her] contacts with the forum. [Citation.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) The California Supreme Court has described five circumstances that indicate purposeful availment by a nonresident defendant: (1) purposefully directing his or her activities at residents of the forum state; (2) purposefully deriving benefits from his or her activities in the forum; (3) creating a substantial connection with the forum; (4) deliberately engaging in significant activities within the forum state; or (5) creating continuing obligations between himself or herself and residents of the forum state. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1063.)
The purposeful availment prong is not satisfied by the mere assertion “that a defendant knew or should have known that his [or her] intentional acts would cause harm in the forum state.... [Citation.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 271.) Under the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783 (Calder), often referred to as the “Calder effects test, ” purposeful availment requires “intentional conduct expressly aimed at or targeting the forum state in addition to the defendant’s knowledge that his [or her] intentional conduct would cause harm in the forum.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 271, fn. omitted; HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1172-1173.)
Bell argues that the purposeful availment prong was satisfied by her showing that Rebecca and Harry either intended to cause effects in California or reasonably should have anticipated causing those effects. According to Bell, her showing included evidence that Rebecca and Harry did the following: deposited the loan funds in a California bank account; sent demand letters to Bell and her mother, Tran, in California; served the Pennsylvania collection on Tran in California and attempted to serve it on Bell in California; claimed a right to recover money from Bell and Tran in California; and anticipated collection of a Pennsylvania money judgment in California.
Rebecca and Harry disagree. They contend that Bell did not meet her burden to show purposeful availment because there is no evidence that they reached out to California or that they had an ongoing business relationship with Bell or Le. They further contend that neither transferring funds to a California resident (relying on Floyd J. Harkness Co. v. Amezcua (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 687 (Harkness)) nor “prior contractual contacts” in California (relying on Roman v. Liberty University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670 (Roman)) are sufficient to show purposeful availment. Further, they argue that their act of filing a lawsuit in Pennsylvania against Bell did not give rise to specific jurisdiction in California, because there was no evidence that the Pennsylvania lawsuit would cause harm in California. In short, Rebecca and Harry believe that their connection with California is “too random and attenuated to give rise to specific jurisdiction[.]”
Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find that Bell’s showing is sufficient to establish that the acts of Rebecca and Harry in Pennsylvania constituted purposeful availment of forum benefits under the Calder effects test. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 271.) The evidence shows that Rebecca and Harry deposited the funds they had loaned to Le in Tran’s California bank account. They then attempted to collect payment of the loan from California residents Bell and Tran by first sending demand letters to an address in California, then by filing a collection action in Pennsylvania that they served on Tran and attempted to serve on Bell in California. These acts by Rebecca and Harry constituted intentional conduct “expressly... targeting” Bell in California as a person from whom they could collect payment of the loan they had made to Le. (Ibid; italics omitted.)
It is also reasonable to infer from the language of the demand letters that Rebecca and Harry knew that their “intentional conduct would cause harm in the forum.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 271). When “ ‘the facts are undisputed and only one inference may reasonably be drawn, the issue is one of law....’ [Citation.]” (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1196.) The demand letters expressly threatened Bell and Tran in California that if they did not repay Le’s loan, Rebecca and Harry would report them to the “police, FBI and SEC” for their involvement with “money laundering, racketeering, and insider trading.” (Underscore omitted.) Obviously, Rebecca and Harry sought to cause Bell and Tran to experience, at their homes in California, fear of involvement in a criminal investigation if they did not repay the loan. It is also reasonable to infer that Rebecca and Harry sought to cause harm in California when they filed a collection action in Pennsylvania that they served, or attempted to serve, in California, with the obvious intention of forcing payment of the loan by California residents Bell and Tran.
Thus, the evidence shows that the purposeful availment prong has been satisfied because Rebecca and Harry purposefully directed their activities towards California residents. As a result, they will not be haled into court here “ ‘solely as a result of “random, ” “fortuitous, ” or “attenuated” contacts....’ [Citation.]” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) The decisions in Harkness and Roman, on which Rebecca and Harry rely, do not convince us otherwise since both cases are factually distinguishable.
In Harkness, the California plaintiff’s act of advancing funds to nonresident defendants in Arizona or Mexico was found not to be a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in California because “it is settled that we are not concerned with the performance of the plaintiff in California but exclusively with the nonresident defendant’s activities in this state. It is the latter activities which must provide the basis for jurisdiction. [Citations.]” (Harkness, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 691.) The present case is, of course, distinguishable since it was the activities of the nonresident defendants, which included sending loan funds to California, that provide the basis for specific jurisdiction here.
In Roman, a California high school student was recruited to play football at Liberty University in Virginia. (Roman, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.) He was injured in an incident involving his college roommate and filed a personal injury action in California against Liberty University. The appellate court determined that California could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Liberty University because a single visit to California by a Liberty University recruiter and the mailing of the scholarship agreement to California did not constitute purposeful availment, and there was no nexus between the university’s activities in California and the plaintiff’s injuries in Virginia. (Id. at p. 681.) In contrast, in the present case defendants Rebecca and Harry had multiple contacts with California, by way of a loan deposit, three demand letters, and service of a lawsuit. And, as we will discuss, there is a nexus between the activities of Rebecca and Harry that were aimed at Bell in California and the injury claims raised in her malicious prosecution action.
2. Relatedness
The second prong of the three-prong test for specific jurisdiction is “the relatedness requirement, ” which concerns “whether the controversy is related to or arises out of defendants’ contacts with California.” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1067.) The relatedness requirement is determined under the “substantial connection test, ” which “is satisfied if ‘there is a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1068.)
The California Supreme Court has clarified that under the substantial connection test, “ ‘the intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim to those contacts are inversely related.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he more wide ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[a] claim need not arise directly from the defendant’s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]... Indeed, ‘ “ ‘[o]nly when the operative facts of the controversy are not related to the defendant’s contact with the state can it be said that the cause of action does not arise from that [contact].’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)
In her reply brief, Bell asserts that her claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process in the instant action are related to the acts of Rebecca and Harry in sending the three demand letters to California, noting that the letters are “extensively described” in her complaint and “are central to both of her causes of action.” Bell explains that the demand letters “show that defendants knew the true facts (e.g., that they had only lent money to BELL’s brother in California and not to BELL) and consciously misrepresented those facts in their subsequent legal actions in Pennsylvania. [Citations.]”
Rebecca and Harry assert that Bell’s California causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process relate only to their Pennsylvania lawsuit and not to their forum-related activities. Their view is that “there is no connection between [their] forum-related activities (sending three collection letters to California), and the two causes of action (arising from the commencement of litigation in Pennsylvania, along with attempts to effect service of process in California).” We disagree.
The substantial connection test is easily satisfied in this case because the “operative facts of the controversy, ” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068) as stated in Bell’s complaint, are whether Rebecca and Harry prosecuted the Pennsylvania collection action although they knew or should have known there was no factual or legal basis for their claim that Bell owed payment of the $11,000 loan to Le. These “operative facts” are obviously related to the unsuccessful efforts of Rebecca and Harry to collect payment of the loan from Bell and Tran by sending demand letters to them in California. When Bell and Tran did not comply with the demand letters, despite the threats of Rebecca and Harry to report them to federal law enforcement if they did not, Rebecca and Harry further attempted to collect payment from Bell and Tran by filing the Pennsylvania collection action.
In other words, the claims in Bell’s California complaint for malicious prosecution and abuse of process arise from the Pennsylvania collection action, which in turn arose from the unsuccessful demand letters that Rebecca and Harry sent to California. Accordingly, we find that the “substantial connection test” is satisfied because “ ‘there is a substantial nexus or connection” between Rebecca’s and Harry’s forum-related activities and Bell’s claims in her California lawsuit. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)
3. Fairness
If the purposeful availment and relatedness prongs have been satisfied, the court next examines “ ‘whether the assertion of specific jurisdiction is fair.’ [Citation.]” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) “In making this determination, the ‘court “must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversies; and the shared interest of the several states in further fundamental substantive social policies.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) However, where a defendant has “ ‘purposefully directed [his or her] activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, [he or she] must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Bell points out that Rebecca and Harry failed to present any evidence in the trial court to show that subjecting them to California jurisdiction would be unreasonable, other than the fact that they are residents of Pennsylvania. Rebecca and Harry emphasize their Pennsylvania residency, and reiterate their novel argument below that the assertion of personal jurisdiction in California would offend the principle of comity because the Pennsylvania court has previously determined that “it had jurisdiction over the matter.”
We find that Rebecca and Harry have not presented “a compelling case” that considerations other than the fact of their out-of-state residency would render California jurisdiction unreasonable. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) Their argument regarding comity is unconvincing because “[c]omity is based on the belief ‘ “ ‘that the laws of a state have no force, proprio vigore, beyond its territorial limits, but the laws of one state are frequently permitted by the courtesy of another to operate in the latter for the promotion of justice, where neither that state nor its citizens will suffer any inconvenience from the application of the foreign law.’ ” ’ ” (Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 697, 707.) The principle of comity is irrelevant in this case because no issue regarding the application of the laws of another state has been raised.
We understand Rebecca and Harry to also argue that California jurisdiction is barred under the full faith and credit clause. “Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution, in its pertinent part, provides that ‘[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.’ ” (Bank of America v. Jennett (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 104, 113.) The general rule is that “ ‘ “a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit--even as to questions of jurisdiction--when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 113-114.)
The full faith and credit clause is inapplicable here because the record reflects that the Pennsylvania court did not determine any jurisdictional issues that have been raised in the present case. The Pennsylvania court apparently determined that Bell and Tran were subject to personal jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania collection action. It did not, and could not, determine that Rebecca and Harry were subject to personal jurisdiction in California in Bell’s malicious prosecution action. Therefore, we find that California may exercise personal jurisdiction over Rebecca and Harry in this case without offending either the principle of comity or the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
V. DISPOSITION
The order of December 2, 2009, granting the motion to quash service of summons is vacated and the trial court is directed to enter a new order denying the motion. Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant.
WE CONCUR: MIHARA, J., DUFFY, J.