This issue however has been dealt with to a limited extent, in other jurisdictions. In the case of Bell v. Kleinberg, 102 Ga. App. 623, 117 S.E.2d 262 (1960), the Court of Appeals of Georgia was presented with an action to recover one half of the balance due on a promissory note upon which the Plaintiff and Defendant were co-accommodation makers. The Defendant contended, as does the Defendant in this case, that Plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations applicable under general law and not that set forth on the face of the instrument.
In a suit against one who signed a promissory note as an apparent comaker and which included a waiver by all parties to the note, "whether principal, security, guarantor, endorser or other party," of "demand, protest and notice of demand, protest and nonpayment and defenses by reason of any extension of time of its payment that may be given by the holder . . . to them or any of them," it was not error to strike a defensive plea in which the defendant, one of the apparent makers, contended that he, being a surety, was released by an extension of time granted to another for payment. Mansour v. Fulton Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 93 Ga. App. 809 ( 92 S.E.2d 839); Bell v. Kleinberg, 102 Ga. App. 623 ( 117 S.E.2d 262). 2. It must appear from the allegations of the petition that the payee in a note representing a transaction under the Industrial Loan Act was duly licensed to operate thereunder when the obligation was incurred, i.e., when the note was executed.
This is not a case in which one of two payees, upon paying the full debt can recover from his copayee a proportionate part on the theory of contribution, for it was never contemplated that part of the sum due by the maker was to be the property of both payees jointly, or that part was to belong to one and part to the other. See Bell v. Kleinberg, 102 Ga. App. 623 ( 117 S.E.2d 262). Parol evidence is admissible to show in what capacity one indorses a negotiable instrument and to explain the true relationship of all parties. Bowden v. Owens, 33 Ga. App. 700 ( 127 S.E. 664); Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, 7th Ed., p. 559, and cit.; Code § 38-509. The court erred in disallowing the amendment and in sustaining the demurrer to the original petition, and in dismissing the action.
In Georgia, the applicable limitations period for contribution claims filed by one co-maker of a debt against another is four years. Bell v. Kleinberg, 102 Ga. App. 623 (1960); Sherling v. Long, 122 Ga. 797 (1905). However, under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22, "[a]ll actions for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under statutes or acts of incorporation or by operation of law shall be brought within 20 years after the right of action has accrued."