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Bell Atlantic Delaware v. Hall

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
Aug 16, 2001
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 00A-10-003-JOH (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2001)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 00A-10-003-JOH

Submitted: April 3, 2001

Decided: August 16, 2001

Appeal from a Decision of the Industrial Accident Board REVERSED and REMANDED.

J. R. Julian, Esq., of J. R. Julian, P.A., attorney for employer-below, appellant Michael I. Silverman, Esq., of Silverman McDonald, attorney for claimant-below, appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

James Hall suffered a work-related injury on September 4, 1996. Because his employer, Bell Atlantic Delaware, Inc., was tardy in late 1999 and early 2000 in making several compensation payments or erred in the amounts paid on several occasions, he requested a hearing before the Industrial Accident Board. At the time of the hearing, however, all payments due had been made and the errors had been corrected.

The Board, nevertheless, entered an order, at Hall's request, directing Bell Atlantic to make its payments without delay or inaccuracy. No sanctions were sought or imposed. The Board may have certain powers to enforce its decisions. The issue, however, is whether the Board erred by issuing this order when there was no actual controversy.

While sympathetic to Hall's plight and the Board's desire to see its decision enforced, the Court holds the Board exceeded its authority in the circumstances of this case.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The disputes between Bell Atlantic and Hall are not new to the Board or this Court. Just several days ago, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of this Court which had upheld a compensation award to Hall. Bell Atlantic paid compensation after Hall suffered the 1996 accident, but a disagreement over his injuries arose after a 1998 non-job related accident. That disagreement led to a hearing before the Board which was this subject of the matter just affirmed.

Bell-Atlantic Delaware, Inc. v. Hall, Del.Supr., No. 107, 2001, Berger, J. (August 9, 2001) (ORDER) affirming this Court in Bell-Atlantic Delaware, Inc. v. Hall, Del.Super., C.A. No. 00A-05-007, Herlihy, J. (February 5, 2001).

Hall requested the hearing now under review in a letter from counsel:

Please kindly file an immediate legal hearing in this matter as a result of [Bell Atlantic]'s failure to make timely payment of partial disability benefits. In advance, thank you for your assistance with this matter. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Letter to Board (October 9, 2000). There is an unexplained oddity in the record submitted to the Court. Counsel's letter is dated October 9, 2000. The Board stamped it received on October 10, 2000. The Board's hearing was apparently on September 14, 2000 during which the hearing officer said Hall's counsel had sent a letter dated August 25, 2000 asking for the hearing. Bell Atlantic filed its notice of appeal on October 11, 2000.

The Board held the "legal hearing" which Hall requested. Only the attorneys for the parties spoke, except for occasional comments by Board members.

The complaint was that Hall had not received several checks on time and that Bell Atlantic had miscalculated the amount of benefits due. The dates some of this happened are unclear or not in the record. What the record does show is that Hall received an initial lump sum payment of $42,680 (date unknown). This was not all he was to have received, however, as a second check for $14,500 was belatedly paid in June. At one point, Bell Atlantic mistakenly deducted taxes from Hall's weekly installment payments. This mistake was corrected.

There is another period of time where payments were not timely made.

Based on Bell Atlantic's counsel's statements to the Board, it would have been in August 2000. Counsel informed the Board that three checks during August had not been issued due to a strike at Bell Atlantic affecting Hall's bargaining unit. It was represented that this resulted in no one being available to process Hall's weekly compensation checks. Counsel told the Board that on September 1st Hall received three checks covering the weeks of August 12, 19 and 26. Hall's counsel did not dispute the explanation for the delay. It would appear, therefore, that this delay may have prompted the alleged August 25th letter requesting a "legal hearing."

Bell Atlantic's counsel also represented to the Board that on September 15th Hall would get two more checks which covered the weeks of September 2 and 9.

Counsel also said payment is made, consistent with Bell Atlantic's payroll, one week after earned.

Based on this record, the Board entered the following order at Hall's request:

WHEREAS, [Hall] and [Bell Atlantic] entered into an Agreement for payment of ongoing temporary partial disability at the rate of $372.23 per week;
WHEREAS, this Agreement was filed with the Board on or about June 8, 2000;
WHEREAS, counsel for [Hall] has written to [Bell Atlantic]'s counsel on many occasions regarding incorrect partial checks or failure to make payment of partial disability;
WHEREAS, [Hall] is still entitled to partial disability payments from [Bell Atlantic];
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 14th day of September, 2000 that all future temporary partial disability payments be provided without delay, interruption or inaccuracy.

Board Order (September 14, 2000).

This is the order which Bell Atlantic asks this Court to review and reverse.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a decision on appeal from the Board, the Court must determine whether the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Absent abuse of discretion or error of law, decision of administrative boards should be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. When reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below.

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fields, Del.Supr., 758 A.2d 506, 509 (2000).

Diamond Fuel Oil v. O'Neal, Del.Supr., 734 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1999).

Betts v. Townsends, Inc., Del.Supr., 765 A.2d 531, 533 (2000).

James Julian, Inc. of Delaware v. Testerman, Del.Super., 740 A.2d 514, 519 (1999).

Stigars v. Speakman, Del.Super., C.A. No. 92A-08-021, Herlihy, J. (March 19, 1993) aff'd. Del.Supr., No. 125, 1993, Moore, J. (September 28, 1993)(ORDER).

DISCUSSION

Hall sought relief from the Board because Bell Atlantic was tardy in several payments due him and had, on several occasions, failed to pay the full amount due. Bell Atlantic did not essentially dispute the mistakes or tardiness. Hall did not, however, seek specific relief or sanction for any tardy payment or underpayment. At the time of the hearing, there were some payments slightly overdue, but he still did not seek any specific relief or sanction provided by statute. Bell Atlantic seizes upon the lack of a specific dispute or request for relief to contend that the Board should not have acted. There was, Bell Atlantic says, no controversy for the Board to decide and no authority for it to issue the order which it did.

These arguments, therefore, raise the issue of what was within the Board's power based on the record before it and Hall's request for relief. The Board is a creation of statute. Its powers are defined by statute. It has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted by statute. With these principles stated, the Court will turn to possibly applicable statutes. There are several statutory remedies for late compensation payments. One remedy authorized, when the Board heard this case in 2000, action as follows:

See, e.g., 19 Del. C. § 2301A, 2320, 2347, 2348, 2360, 2362.

Kent General Hospital v. Blanco, Del.Supr., 195 A.2d 553, 554 (1963).

An insurance carrier for the employer or the self-insurer who neglects or refuses to make the first payment of compensation more than 15 days after a compensable injury, such delay being avoidable or due to negligence, shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $2,500. The fine shall be assessed by the [Board] after the insurance carrier for the employer or the self-insurer is given notice and a hearing on the violation. The fine shall be payable to the Worker's Compensation Fund.
(b) All medical expenses shall be paid within 30 days after bills and documentation for said expenses are received by the employer or its insurance carrier for payment, unless the carrier or self-insured employer notifies claimant or his/her attorney in writing that said expenses are contested or that further verification is required.
(c) In the event that the parties reach a written agreement as to compensation due to claimant, payment of compensation shall commence within 14 days of the date of that agreement. The parties must also file the original agreement, and if applicable, a receipt with the Department of Labor within 14 days of the date of the agreement.
(d) Following an award by the Board, the first payment of compensation shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier no later than 14 days after the award becomes final and binding pursuant to § 2349.
(e) If, following a hearing, the Board determines that the employer or its insurance carrier failed in its responsibilities under sections (a), (b), (c) or (d) above, it shall assess a fine no less than $500 and no more than $2,500. The fine shall be payable to the Workers' Compensation Fund.

1219 Del. C. § 2362. Amended on July 19, 2001 to read: (a) An employer or its insurance carrier shall within 15 days after receipt of knowledge of a work-related injury notify the Department and the claimant in writing of: the date the notice of the claimant's alleged industrial accident was received; whether the claim is accepted or denied; if denied, the reason for the denial; or if it cannot accept or deny the claim, the reasons therefor and approximately when a determination will be made.

This statute is limited, however, to delay in making the first payment. Based on the record before the Board, it is unclear whether the lump sum payment of $42,680 was the initial payment. Apparently, Hall should have been paid $67,180 at that time, but he did not get the balance of $14,500 until some months later. While the current record is incomplete, it would appear that: (1) the lump sum was paid after the Board's earlier decision just affirmed on appeal and (2) there was an agreement in either 1996 after the work-related injury or in 2000 to pay weekly compensation. It would appear, therefore, that Hall cannot invoke this statutory provision.

The September 14, 2000 Board order refers to a June 8, 2000 agreement.

Another possible provision requires him to act and does not involve the Board. That statutory provision states:

If default is made by the employer for 30 days after demand in the payment of any amount due under this chapter the amount may be recovered in the same manner as claims for wages are collectible.

In Huffman v. C. C. Oliphant Son, Inc. the Supreme Court said this provision permitted a worker such as Hall to invoke the relief contained in the Wage Payment and Collection Act. Huffman holds only a court, including this one, but not the Board, has jurisdiction to entertain an action to obtain payment of compensation benefits.

Del. Supr., 432 A.2d 1207 (1981).

19 Del. C. ch. 11.

Huffman, 432 A.2d at 1211.

There is no record Hall made a demand of Bell Atlantic, as this statute requires, before a lawsuit was filed, or that if he did, there is no indication he filed a wage claim action. To some degree, that is a compliment to him as he directly and/or through counsel sought to get paid without filing a lawsuit. But, that otherwise praiseworthy means may have jeopardized his effort to obtain the order he did here.

The Supreme Court in Huffman made it clear the Board has no jurisdiction under this particular statute.

The only other possibly germane statute provides for a contempt process:

If any person, in proceedings before the Board, disobeys or resists any lawful order or process, misbehaves during a hearing or so near the place thereof as to obstruct the hearing, neglects to produce after having been ordered to do so any pertinent document, refuses to appear after having been subpoenaed or, upon appearing, refuses to take the oath as a witness or, after having taken the oath, refuses to be examined according to law, the Board shall certify the facts to any judge of the Superior Court, who shall thereupon hear the evidence as to the acts complained of. If the evidence so warrants, the judge shall punish such person in the same manner and to the same extent as for a contempt committed before the Superior Court or shall commit such person upon the same conditions as if the doing of the forbidden act had occurred with reference to the process of or in the presence of the Superior Court.

The Court's research does not reveal that this statute has been invoked to seek redress for late or under payments. It has been invoked, however, to uphold contempt for failure of a self-insured employer to post a bond securing an award of compensation benefits. The Court in that case rejected the argument that the statute applied only to hearings themselves and not orders.

State, ex rel. Department of Labor v. Trimworks, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90M-JN-23, Taylor, J. (January 23, 1991).

Id. at 2. The Court was interpreting 19 Del. C. § 2123, which was later repealed and is now § 2320(6).

Hall and the Board, therefore, would have had the contempt remedy, too, in addition to his remedies in § 2357 and the Wage Payment and Collection Act. But, he did not seek either remedy and the Board did not initiate a contempt process. Hall, by agreement with Bell Atlantic, was to be paid weekly. This was consistent with his pay while working. As such, absent an order to the contrary from the Board, this is how Bell Atlantic was to pay him. While undisputably tardy, on occasion, Hall was receiving payments calculated on a weekly basis.

Since a contempt citation was neither sought nor entered, as expressly available under § 2320(6), the issue then arises whether the Board had the implied authority under that statute to enter the order it did. It is tempting to say that it did. The order reaffirmed Bell Atlantic's obligations under the law. It provides a more ringing notice of its duties. But, the basis for the order lacked a specific act and purpose beyond those reminders. It would be too much to say that the contempt power impliedly allows such a reminder. In this sense, the Board exceeded its jurisdiction. In doing so, it committed an error of law.

Blanco, 195 A.2d at 554.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Industrial Accident Board is REVERSED and REMANDED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Bell Atlantic Delaware v. Hall

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
Aug 16, 2001
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 00A-10-003-JOH (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2001)
Case details for

Bell Atlantic Delaware v. Hall

Case Details

Full title:BELL ATLANTIC DELAWARE, INC. Employer Below, Appellant, v. JAMES HALL…

Court:Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

Date published: Aug 16, 2001

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 00A-10-003-JOH (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2001)