Opinion
21-CV-2792 (LTS)
08-17-2021
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging that Defendants violated his civil rights. By order dated August 10, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Anthony George Bell, who resides in Brooklyn, New York, brings this complaint, alleging that Defendants violated his rights from “Sept 23, 2017 till [sic] present, ” and that that events giving rise to his claims occurred at “Praxis house Inititives [sic] in NYC.”
Plaintiff alleges:
The city of NY helped Praxis House Initiatives to discriminate against people with HIV and mental health issues; According to Mr. Florencio Queves from Praxis House the city board gave them permission to do so. All the other agenccies [sic] and the state of NY did nothing to prevent it[.]
He alleges further:
The city Counsel know that praxis house was practicing descriminatory [sic] practices. Hell the[y] pretty much gave them the ok.
Why is NYC covering for praxis house[?]
The Mayors office said I [sic] will get back to me on numerous occassions [sic].
I'm still waiting after a year[.]
The Office off [sic] mental health and hygene [sic] and mental health city and state blew me off.
The public advocates office blew me off too. Also other agencies on the city and state level[.]
The City councel [sic], The mayors office and The state of New York has [sic] systematicaly [sic] kept Black mental health, HIV and recovering addicts in neighborhoods that promote, almost garantees [sic] they will fail.
The city counsel put us in a dangerous position at Praxis House.(Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff seeks “50 million from the city of new york, 50 million from the state of new york. both continue to cover up or act like it does not exist. alsso [sic] allowing praxis house to discclose [sic] ou[r] private information[.]” (Id. at 7.
DISCUSSION
Because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his civil rights, the Court construes Plaintiff's claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
Although Plaintiff asserts that his rights were violated, it is not clear from his complaint what any Defendant did or failed to do that violated his rights under the United States Constitution or any federal law. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under section 1983. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to assert enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiff should write his amended complaint legibly, clearly, and coherently, so that the Court is able understand what claims Plaintiff is trying to assert.
Even if Plaintiff did state any claims, his complaint suffers from other deficiencies. Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of New York, the State of New York, the City Council of New York, the Office of Mental Health and Hygiene, Mayor DeBlasio, Governor Cuomo, and the Speaker of the Council. Plaintiff cannot bring claims against any of these Defendants.
A. Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York must be dismissed. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity ....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the State of New York are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
B. New York City Agencies
Plaintiff's claims against the City Council of New York and the New York City Office of Mental Health and Hygiene must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.
Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Plaintiff's claims against the City Council of New York and the New York City Office of Mental Health and Hygiene are therefore dismissed, without prejudice to assertion of those claims as against the City of New York in a proper pleading. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Personal Involvement
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the individual defendants' direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing how Mayor De Blasio, Speaker Johnson, and Governor Cuomo were personally involved in the events underlying his claims. Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants in their personal capacities are therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
D. Municipal Liability
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under § 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not include any facts about what the City of New York did or failed to do that caused a violation of his rights. Plaintiff's allegations thus fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted against the City of New York under section 1983. In order to state a claim against the City of New York arising from the alleged actions of its employees, Plaintiff must plead facts explaining how a policy, custom, or practice of the City of New York was a “moving force” in his injuries. See Cash, 654 F.3d at 333 (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff “must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the alleged injury.”).
Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City of New York, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in which he alleges facts about what the City of New York did or failed to do that caused the violation of his rights
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because the nature and viability of Plaintiff's claims are not clear, the Court grants Plaintiff sixty days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims. First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2010, at Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
In the event that Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the Court encourages him to ask for assistance from someone who can help him organize his thoughts and claims. If Plaintiff needs legal advice related to this matter, he may contact the New York Legal Assistance Group's Legal Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this Court. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint, ” and label the document with docket number 21-CV-2792 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.