Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc.

46 Citing cases

  1. Livingston v. Marion Bank & Trust Co.

    30 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (N.D. Ala. 2014)   Cited 10 times
    Rejecting an "equal opportunity harasser" argument where the defendant failed to identify evidence that the harasser subjected male employees to the treatment that the female plaintiff faced

    The use of the phrase “such as,” which is itself also quoted in an earlier section of Gupta, see 212 F.3d at 582, clearly implies that the items enumerated thereafter are illustrative, not exhaustive. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). More than 14 years before Gupta was decided, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with a plaintiff's Title VII claim alleging that she had been subjected to harassment because of sex that resulted in her constructive discharge.See Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir.1985). The district court had granted summary judgment to the employer as it related to a claim for a hostile work environment under Henson, based on its view that the plaintiff's evidence failed to establish that “she was subject to sexual harassment” because she did “not even claim that she was subject to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Bell, 777 F.2d at 1503 (quoting the district court's decision).

  2. Williams v. Marriott Corp.

    864 F. Supp. 1168 (M.D. Fla. 1994)   Cited 5 times
    Stating absent exceptional circumstances that call into question the integrity of a trial, a party waives any objection to juror misconduct unless it makes a timely objection

    In order to make out a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove the following five elements: 1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected group, 2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, 3) the harassment was based upon gender, 4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment and 5) that her employer knew or should have known of the treatment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, 777 F.2d 1497, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff introduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 1) she was a woman, 2) that she was harassed, 3) that the harassment was based upon gender, 4) that it affected a term, condition or privilege of her employment and 5) that Defendant knew but did not take prompt remedial action.

  3. Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois

    119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997)   Cited 113 times
    Holding that "Title VII does not permit an employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles" and explaining that "a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers' idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed 'because of his sex'"

    Thus, "any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII" (McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis supplied); see also Carson, 82 F.3d at 158-59); and hostile environment claims are "in no way limited . . . to intimidation or ridicule of an explicitly sexual nature" (Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990)). See also Carr, 32 F.3d at 1010; Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993); Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985); Curde v. Xytel Corp., 912 F. Supp. 335, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1995). A woman employed in a male-dominated workplace with an antipathy toward female workers might find her tools constantly missing, her locker broken into, and her work sabotaged, for example, as part of a campaign of harassment motivated by her gender yet devoid of sexual innuendo and contact.

  4. Wheat v. Rogers & Willard, Inc.

    271 F. Supp. 3d 1327 (S.D. Ala. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    In Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America , 758 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985), most of the direct evidence consisted of statements made approximately two years before the plaintiff was terminated. In Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc. , 777 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1985), the Court found two pieces of direct evidence, the first of which preceded the plaintiff's termination by approximately two years. In Miles v. M.N.C. Corp. , 750 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1985), the direct evidence preceded the denial of recall by perhaps as much as two years.

  5. Brown v. Fla. Atl. Univ.

    CASE NO: 16-cv-80251-MIDDLEBROOKS/BRANNON (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2016)

    Brown retorts that, while almost none of the relevant interactions were sexual in nature, Bullard still treated her and her co-workers unequally, and would not have, but for their sex. Disparate and invidious treatment on the basis of sex can occur even in the absence of sexual advances. That is because the nature of the harassment may still reflect "general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (holding that non-sexual discrimination can be evinced through abuser's "sex-specific and derogatory terms" directed at victims or his comparative treatment of both sexes in a "mixed-sex workplace"); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing between sexual harassment and harassment accomplished by "threatening, bellicose, demeaning, hostile or offensive conduct" because of victim's sex). Brown's admission that she never suffered from "sexual harassment" is not fatal to her claim that she reasonably believed Bullard had created a hostile work environment based on sex. Brown cites to a number of acts to support her reasonable belief that she was subjected to a sex-based hostile work environment.

  6. Horne v. Russell County Com'n

    379 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (M.D. Ala. 2005)   Cited 11 times
    In Horne v. Russell County Commission, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1338 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (Albritton, J.), aff'd, 180 F. App'x 903 (11th Cir. 2006), another case cited by the Defendants that Galbreath concedes supports the Defendants' Smitherman argument (see Doc. 10 at 4 ("...Horne did grant summary judgment on the grounds advanced by the Defendants...")), the district court undertook a detailed examination of Smitherman and Cook.

    The Eleventh Circuit has stated that gender-based "[s]exual harassment, like racial harassment, which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality." Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985). Harassment on the basis of sex can be unwelcome sexual advances, but it does not have to be, and instead can be threatening, bellicose, demeaning, hostile or offensive conduct by a supervisor in the workplace because of the sex of the victim of such conduct.

  7. Blalock v. Dale Cty. Bd. of Educ.

    84 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Ala. 1999)   Cited 29 times
    Finding that Plaintiff cannot support a hostile environment claim with allegations that constitute classic examples of alleged disparate treatment

    To demonstrate a hostile work environment, the hostility can be gender based as opposed to purely sexual in nature. Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985). In Bell, the Eleventh Circuit held that sexual harassment includes "threatening, bellicose, demeaning, hostile or offensive conduct in the workplace because of the sex of the victim of such conduct. . . ."

  8. Cronin v. United Service Stations, Inc.

    809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992)   Cited 11 times
    Denying summary judgment on hostile work environment theory when subordinate employee regularly made sexualized comments and engaged in threatening and bellicose conduct directed at his female supervisor

    However, to be actionable under Title VII, the conduct giving rise to a hostile or offensive work environment need not consist of sexual advances or have clear sexual overtones. Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985). For example, conduct of a nonsexual nature that ridicules women or treats them as inferior can constitute prohibited sexual harassment.

  9. T.L. v. Toys ‘R' Us, Inc.

    255 N.J. Super. 616 (App. Div. 1992)   Cited 21 times

    Other circuits have adopted different approaches. See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that in evaluating a Title VII harassment claim, the court must consider "the likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to perform his or her work and upon his or her well-being, as well as the actual effect upon the particular plaintiff bringing the claim."); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment."); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1053 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that to establish a claim under Title VII plaintiff must show harassment "affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment" and that "the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action."). Indeed, one circuit has expressly criticized the Andrews tests.

  10. King v. Hillen

    21 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that the MSPB improperly applied the legal standard for sexual harassment

    , 842 F.2d at 1014, wherein the court observed that "[i]ntimidation and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than sexual advances." In Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) the court remarked that "[s]exual harassment can be . . . threatening, bellicose, demeaning, hostile or offensive conduct by a supervisor in the workplace because of the sex of the victim of the conduct."