Bell v. Burson

1,000+ Citing cases

  1. Dixon v. Love

    431 U.S. 105 (1977)   Cited 493 times
    Recognizing the "important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard" as well as the fact that even after Bell, "courts have sustained suspension or revocation of driving privileges, without prior hearing, where earlier convictions were on the record"

    Without requesting an administrative hearing, appellee brought this action challenging the constitutionality of § 6-206(a)(3). A three-judge District Court, relying on Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, granted appellee relief on the ground that a license cannot constitutionally be revoked under the challenged statute until after a hearing is held to determine whether the licensee meets the statutory criteria. Held: The Illinois statute, as implemented by the Secretary's regulations, is constitutionally adequate under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as analyzed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333.

  2. Mackey v. Montrym

    443 U.S. 1 (1979)   Cited 655 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Mackey and Bell, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a licensee has an important interest in retaining his or her operating privilege, which should be afforded the protection of procedural due process; however the Court did not characterize such an interest as a fundamental or a property right.

    With one judge dissenting, the three-judge District Court granted Montrym's motion. Relying principally on this Court's decision in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the District Court concluded that Montrym was entitled as a matter of due process to some sort of a presuspension hearing before the Registrar to contest the allegation of his refusal to take the test. In a partial summary judgment order issued on April 4, and a final judgment order issued on April 12, the District Court certified the suit under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) as a class action on behalf of all persons whose licenses to operate a motor vehicle had been suspended pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1979).

  3. Reese v. Kassab

    334 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1971)   Cited 25 times
    In Reese v. Kasab, 334 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.Pa. 1971), a three-judge federal district court held that the Pennsylvania "point system" statute, which provided for automatic suspension, without a further hearing, of the operator's license after accumulation of eleven points was unconstitutional under Bell.

    WEIS, District Judge. The Pennsylvania "Point System" is under attack in this case, the plaintiff contending that the procedure providing for suspension of a driver's license without an administrative hearing violates the due process requirements delineated by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). The statute enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature provides a system of assessing "points" by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation upon receipt of notification of convictions of certain specified violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. Notice is given to the driver of the imposition of the points on each occasion and when a total of 11 points is accumulated, the Secretary is directed to suspend the operator's license for a period of 60 days.

  4. Kosmatka v. Safety Responsibility Division of the North Dakota State Highway Department

    196 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1972)   Cited 7 times
    In Kosmatka we held that the commissioner's right to suspend a driver's license for DWI comes within the emergency exception as enunciated in Bell and that, therefore, a hearing was not required under the due process clause before suspending the driver's license of one convicted of that offense.

    Having determined that the statutory construction is contrary to that urged by Kosmatka, we must now consider the constitutional infirmities which he contends invalidate the statutes. The basis of Kosmatka's contention is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). In the Bell case the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the financial responsibility provisions of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-601 et seq. (1958).

  5. Paul v. Davis

    424 U.S. 693 (1976)   Cited 5,546 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Discussing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90

    Pp. 701-710. (c) Kentucky law does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation that has been altered by petitioners' actions, and the interest in reputation alone is thus quite different from the "liberty" or "property" recognized in such decisions as Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, where the guarantee of due process required certain procedural safeguards before the State could alter the status of the complainants. Pp. 710-712.

  6. Goss v. Lopez

    419 U.S. 565 (1975)   Cited 2,857 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Goss, the suspension of the privilege to attend public school was held to be the deprivation of a substantial right requiring notice and hearing. Bell applied the same requirement to suspension of driving privileges.

    Id., at 482. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 573 ("seriously damage" reputation and standing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) ("important interests of the licensees"); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("significant property interest").Indeed, the Court itself quotes from a portion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951), which explicitly refers to "a person in jeopardy of serious loss."

  7. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.

    416 U.S. 600 (1974)   Cited 941 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Mitchell, the Court, quoting a pre- Bell case, stated "[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation".

    On the contrary, it seems apparent that the seller with his own interest in the disputed merchandise would need to establish in any event only the probability that his case will succeed to warrant the bonded sequestration of the property pending outcome of the suit. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Ewing v. Mytinger Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950). The issue at this stage of the proceeding concerns possession pending trial and turns on the existence of the debt, the lien, and the delinquency.

  8. Jennings v. Mahoney

    404 U.S. 25 (1971)   Cited 45 times
    In Jennings v. Mahoney, supra, 404 U.S. 25, decided a few months after Bell, the appellant challenged Utah's procedure for determining whether her driver's license should be suspended under that state's financial responsibility law.

    Decided November 9, 1971 Appellant, an uninsured Utah motorist who was involved in an accident and whose license was suspended, attacks Utah's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act as not affording the procedural due process required by Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535. However, although there is plainly a substantial question whether the statutory scheme on its face affords the procedural due process required by Bell v. Burson, here, where a state court stayed the suspension order pending completion of judicial review and conducted a hearing at which appellant was given an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, there was no denial of procedural due process.

  9. State v. Jones

    708 P.2d 1168 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 9 times
    In Jones, we concluded that the driver's license prerevocation notice and hearing requirements of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S Ct 1586, 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971), have since been substantially limited by the Supreme Court's opinions in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S Ct 2612, 61 L Ed 2d 321 (1979), and Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S Ct 1723, 52 L Ed 2d 172 (1977).

    (Emphasis in original.) Tooley observed that the 1977 amendment was intended to make the statute consistent with Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S Ct 1586, 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971), and Floyd v. Motor Vehicles Division, 27 Or. App. 41, 554 P.2d 1024, rev den (1976). Those cases hold that due process requires notice of an opportunity for a hearing before revocation of a driver's license.

  10. Ruge v. Kovach

    467 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1984)   Cited 37 times
    In Ruge, supra, our supreme court noted that while the Supreme Court blurred the distinction between "right" and "privilege" with respect to driving in Bell, that Court did not define driving as a "right" but rather referred to it as an entitlement.

    While the United States Court has blurred the distinction between "right" and "privilege" with respect to driving, that Court did not define driving as a "right" but rather referred to it as an "entitlement." Bell v. Burson, (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90. Likewise, there exists no fundamental right to drive based upon a fundamental right to employment. SeeMassachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, (1976) 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (governmental employment).