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Bell v. Bunch

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District
Feb 25, 2011
No. H032692 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2011)

Opinion


BURTON BELL et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. RICHARD J. BUNCH, Defendant and Appellant. H032692 California Court of Appeal, Sixth District February 25, 2011

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. CV810761, CV020857.

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION NO CHANGE IN THE JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 31, 2011, be modified as follows:

On page 18 in the paragraph under subtitle “B. The Trial” please change the last sentence to read as follows:

“They agreed to do so, in effect waiving the procedure outlined in Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and in rules 3.1590 and 3.1591 of the California Rules of Court concerning statements of decision.”

On page 19, please replace the second paragraph beginning with “Two weeks later” with the following paragraph:

“Two weeks later, Bunch filed a written request for statement of decision in an attempt to “adapt” to the court’s procedure that had deviated from Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and rule 3.1590 of the California Rules of Court in that the court had not issued a tentative decision. Bunch’s Request for Statement of Decision did not specify any principal controverted issues at trial as to which he sought an explanation for the factual or legal basis of the court’s decision. Bunch simultaneously filed objections to the court’s issued statement of decision, which challenged, among other things, what Bunch perceived as the court having improperly forced Peggy to elect remedies and having afforded her the remedy of rescission, which she had not ever pleaded or prayed for. The objections also raised that the statement of decision had not addressed and disposed of all causes of action. But there was no specific objection pointing out that in Bunch’s view, the trial court had failed to determine that Peggy had reasonably relied on Bunch’s misrepresentations as a controverted issue or that the court had resolved this factual issue ambiguously as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 634.”

On page 20, footnote 12, please add the following sentence at the end:

“The amended statement of decision has no legal effect, it having been filed after the judgment.”

On page 26, second full paragraph after the fourth sentence beginning with “Thus, in spite” add a new footnote reference (all footnotes should be renumbered accordingly) – new footnote to be as follows:

“Bunch filed a petition for rehearing in which he cites Code of Civil Procedure section 634 and contends that because the trial court's statement of decision did not mention Burton's ability to obtain funds with which to purchase the property and because Bunch filed objections to the statement of decision, this court is precluded from implying a finding that Peggy reasonably relied on Bunch's false promise based on the substantial evidence that Burton had some ability to obtain funds. Bunch is mistaken. It is true that Code of Civil Procedure section 634 provides for a modified standard of review under which we may not apply the usual substantial evidence rule by implying findings to support the judgment as long as those findings are supported by substantial evidence. But if, as here, a statement of decision has been waived by a party’s failure to timely request one, or if, as here, a party has failed to specify the controverted issues as to which it seeks an explanation of the factual or legal basis of the court's decision, or if, as here, a party fails to properly bring ambiguities or omissions in the statement of decision to the court’s attention after having timely requested a statement of decision on the particular issue, the appellate court will presume that the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which substantial evidence exists in the record; i.e., the necessary findings of ultimate facts will be implied and the only issue on appeal is whether the implied findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792-793; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133-1134; Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 267.) Often, invoking the doctrine of implied findings will cause affirmance on appeal of a judgment or order that might otherwise have been reversed. (In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643, 647.) Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 634 does not provide that in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment, a reviewing court is limited to the evidence cited in the trial court’s statement of decision. (In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333.) Indeed, the court of appeal must consider the entire record. (Ibid.) This is apparent from the rule that a statement of decision “need do no more than state the grounds upon which the judgment rests, without necessarily specifying the particular evidence considered by the trial court in reaching its decision.” (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1125.)

As this court has observed, successful avoidance of the doctrine of implied findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 634 is conditioned on (1) a timely and proper request for statement of decision made under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 (and thus rule 3.1590 of the California Rules of Court as well) that adequately specifies the principal controverted issues as to which the requesting party seeks a statement of decision; (2) a failure by the subsequent statement to resolve the issues so specified or an ambiguity in their resolution; and (3) a record showing that the ambiguity or omission was brought to the trial court's attention. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 558.) There was no timely or proper request for statement of decision here specifying any principal controverted issue as to which Bunch sought the statement—the first condition. Thus, he cannot avoid application of the doctrine of implied findings. Furthermore, in response to a timely and proper request for statement of decision, the court is not required to set out all the evidentiary bases for factual and legal conclusions. It is only required to set out the ultimate findings, not the evidentiary ones. Ultimate findings are core facts such as an element of a claim of defense without which the claim or defense would fail. (Yield Dynamics, supra, at p. 559.) Thus, even if there had been a proper request for statement of decision here, the court did not have to find in it that Burton had the ability to obtain financing. It only had to find that Peggy reasonably relied on Bunch’s statement that he would sell Burton the house for the same price and that she suffered damage as a result, which the court effectively did. Thus, the second condition precedent to successful avoidance of the doctrine of implied findings has also not been met because the trial court did not fail to render ultimate findings on any issue, specified or not. Finally, the form of Bunch’s “objections” to the statement of decision did not call out by specific objection that the court had failed to find on the issue of reliance or that it had done so ambiguously, as provided at Code of Civil Procedure section 634. The objection was instead in the context of asserting that the trial court had improperly afforded Peggy the remedy of rescission—something that she had not requested or prayed for in pleadings. This did not effectively bring the trial court’s attention to any failure in its statement of decision to have resolved a principal controverted issue as set forth in a proper request for statement of decision, or any ambiguity in that resolution, to avoid application of the doctrine of implied findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 634. (Yield Dynamics, supra, at p. 560.) Therefore, the third condition precedent to successful avoidance of the doctrine of implied findings is also missing here.”

On page 27, delete the first full sentence and citation beginning with “Thus, in light...” and replace with the following sentences:

“Thus, in light of Peggy's own knowledge and experience, there is a reasonable inference that she believed that Burton, within a reasonable period of time and perhaps even in the end with her help, could find a way to buy the property from Bunch at the same low price rather than suffer a total loss of equity in it. (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 684 [in context of fraud, issue is whether person who claims reliance was justified in believing the representation in light of his or her own knowledge and experience].) Under the substantial evidence rule, a reviewing court must not only accept as true all evidence tending to support the trial court’s findings, it must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to support the judgment. (In re Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333.) While the court of appeal will not indulge inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture or which were rebutted by clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence (Kuhn v. Dept. of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633), that is not the case here.”

There is no change in the judgment.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

Duffy, J., Mihara, Acting, P.J., McAdams, J.


Summaries of

Bell v. Bunch

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District
Feb 25, 2011
No. H032692 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2011)
Case details for

Bell v. Bunch

Case Details

Full title:BURTON BELL et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. RICHARD J. BUNCH…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Sixth District

Date published: Feb 25, 2011

Citations

No. H032692 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2011)