Bell v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision

3 Citing cases

  1. Person v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision

    327 Or. App. 332 (Or. Ct. App. 2023)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Several decades later, in Bell v. Board of Parole , 283 Or App 711, 391 P.3d 907, rev. den. , 361 Or. 645, 398 P.3d 39 (2017), we considered the relationship between the sentencing court's original decision to sentence a person as a dangerous offender and the determination that the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision must make under ORS 144.228 (1985) as to whether "the condition which made the prisoner dangerous" is now "absent or in remission," such that the person should be considered for parole. ORS 144.228 (1985), which we construed in Bell , is materially identical to ORS 144.228 (1987), the version of the statute that we understand the board to have applied in this case.

  2. Guzek v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision

    325 Or. App. 795 (Or. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    In assessing whether a prisoner is still dangerous at the time of the parole consideration hearing, ORS 144.228 requires the board to consider whether there is evidence that the prisoner has a mental or emotional disorder that would satisfy the terms of the dangerous offender statute, but the board is not limited in its inquiry to the specific diagnosis or traits that were present when the prisoner was originally sentenced as a dangerous offender. Bell v. Board of Parole , 283 Or App 711, 713, 391 P.3d 907, rev. den. , 361 Or. 645, 398 P.3d 39 (2017). That is at least in part because "the existence of a particular diagnosis by a medical professional" is not required when the sentencing court finds that the defendant is a dangerous offender under ORS 161.725.

  3. Houff v. Laney

    Case No. 6:17-cv-01767-CL (D. Or. May. 14, 2019)

    1) The Board lacked authority to defer petitioner's parole date because the psychological evaluations did not provide a "legally sufficient" prerequisite diagnosis;2) The Board "misinterpreted and misapplied the second of the two-step dangerous offender sentencing and release process, when it employed a process and burden substantially different than required by State v. Huntley, 302 Or 418 (1986) & Bell v. Board of Parole, 283 Or. App. 711 (2017)";3) The Board "deprived Petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to be heard by prejudging and predetermining the outcome of the hearing, when it considered invalid risk assessment tools in the psychological evaluations, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."