Opinion
No. 3156.
Decided April 15, 1940.
Under P. L., c. 107, s. 10 as amended by Laws 1933, c. 137, s. 3 a county into which a pauper has removed cannot recover for relief furnished him against the county which formerly relieved him if the pauper had resided in the plaintiff county above three months at the time of his first relief.
Counties are obligated to support paupers found therein "for whose support no person or town" is chargeable (P. L., c. 107, s. 1).
The liability of a county for the support of paupers depends not upon "settlement" but upon mere presence in the county without other means of support.
A town is only liable for the support of such paupers as have gained a "settlement" therein (P. L., c. 105, s. 9; Laws 1933, c. 142, s. 1).
Support by one town of the minor children of parents living in another town prevents the parents from gaining a "settlement" in the town in which they live.
ACTION, for reimbursement under Laws 1933, c. 137, s. 4, for aid furnished by the plaintiff to a pauper who had no settlement in any town. Facts agreed.
For a little over a year prior to October 1934, the pauper and his family resided in Carroll County. During that month of October he asked for and received aid from that county, part of which consisted in the support of two of his minor children in foster homes. The children have been continuously so supported in Carroll County ever since. Shortly after October 1934, the pauper himself removed from Carroll County and in August 1937, took up his residence in Belknap County where he has since remained. On January 12, 1938, he asked for and received aid from the latter county and the County Commissioners thereof immediately notified the County Commissioners of Carroll County that they considered the pauper to be a Carroll County case. Aid has continued to be given to the pauper by Belknap County, and it is agreed that "The affidavit required was presented to Carroll County within the time limited by the statutes, and bills for the support were properly rendered from time to time."
The question of the right of the plaintiff to recover under the facts disclosed was transferred without ruling by Lorimer, J.
Harold E. Wescott, County Solicitor, for the plaintiff.
Burnham B. Davis, County Solicitor, for the defendant.
The question is purely one of statutory interpretation (Wilson v. County, 72 N.H. 112, 113, and cases cited), and the material part of the pertinent statutory provision (P. L. c. 107, s. 10, as amended by Laws 1933, c. 137, s. 3), reads as follows: "The county which shall have relieved any county pauper within one year, or in which he shall have last resided not less than one year, within the last five years, shall be liable to the county in which he may afterward be relieved, if he has not resided in the latter county above three months at the time of his first relief."
The "first relief" mentioned in the last clause of the statute quoted above means the first relief furnished by the county into which a pauper may remove. Merrimack County v. County, 63 N.H. 550. Hence, although the pauper in the case at bar last resided in Carroll County for the statutory period of not less than one year within the last five years preceding his removal to the County of Belknap, and although the relief furnished continuously to his minor children by Carroll County during the entire time since October 1934 was relief furnished to him (Croydon v. County, 47 N.H. 179; Gilmanton v. Sanbornton, 56 N.H. 336), the fact that he resided in Belknap County for more than three months before receiving aid from that county operates to relieve the former county of the burden of his support and to cast that burden upon the latter one. It does not follow from this, however, that Belknap County is also obligated to support his two minor children who have remained in Carroll county. The reason for this is that counties are burdened with the support of paupers found therein "for whose support no person or town in this state is chargeable" (P. L., c. 107, s. 1), and the children in question, whose father cannot support them and whose support, so far as appears, is not chargeable to any other person or to any town, have never lived in any other county than Carroll.
Counsel for the plaintiff, relying upon the Croydon and Gilmanton cases cited above, argues that the support of the pauper's two minor children by Carroll County during the time when he lived in Belknap County operates to prevent his residence there from imposing any liability for support upon the latter county. While the cases relied upon establish the proposition that support by one town of the minor children of parents living in another prevents the parents from gaining a "settlement" in the town in which they live, they are not in point in the case at bar. The reason for this is that a town is only liable for the support of such paupers as have gained a "settlement" therein (P. L., c. 105, s. 9), as that technical term is defined in section one of the above statute as amended by Laws 1933, c. 142, s. 1, while the liability of a county depends not upon "settlement" but upon mere presence in the county without other means of support.
Since the circumstances disclosed are inappropriate to shift the burden of support from the county in which the pauper is to the one from which he came, the order must be
Judgment for the defendant.
All concurred.