Beling v. City of East Moline

10 Citing cases

  1. Am. Util. Auditors, Inc. v. Vill. of Univ. Park

    2019 Ill. App. 2d 180452 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    The purpose section 8-1-7(a) is "to protect the municipal treasury against the incurring of liabilities which exceed the appropriation or for which none has been made." Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill. App. 2d 263, 277 (1957). It was enacted to protect the taxpayer and operates as a limitation on the powers of all the officers and departments of the municipal corporation.

  2. Collins v. Village of Glen Ellyn

    158 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959)   Cited 3 times

    That no obligation to pay money existed may well be true, but the prohibition is not solely against paying money without an appropriation, but rather, "no contract shall be made . . . and no expense shall be incurred . . . unless an appropriation has been previously made concerning that contract or expense." In the case of Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill. App.2d 263, 144 N.E.2d 865, we quoted the following language from the case of People v. City of Rock Island, 271 Ill. 412, 111 N.E. 291. "Both of the improvements are still to be made, and until the time comes for carrying into effect this plan of public improvements no money is or need be appropriated for that purpose. Until that time comes no liability is incurred by the city to anyone by this ordinance.

  3. Landreth v. Myers, Berry, O'Connor & Kuzma, Ltd.

    2021 Ill. App. 3d 190607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    The purpose of the prior appropriation rule of section 8-1-7(a) of the Code is to protect the municipal treasury from incurring liabilities which exceed an appropriation or for which no appropriation was made. Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill.App.2d 263, 272 (1957). The prior appropriation rule is strictly construed.

  4. City of Peoria v. Peoria Area Advancement Grp., LLC

    2017 Ill. App. 3d 160216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    "[N]o contract shall be made by the corporate authorities, or by any committee or member thereof, and no expense shall be incurred by any of the officers or departments of any municipality *** unless an appropriation has been previously made concerning that contract or expense." 65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(a) (West 2004). ¶ 46 The purpose of the prior appropriation rule is to protect the municipal treasury against incurring liabilities that exceed an appropriation or for which no appropriation has been made. Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill. App. 2d 263, 272 (1957). The prior appropriation requirement is "mandatory and was enacted for the protection of the taxpayer."

  5. Vill. of Freeburg v. Helms

    2013 Ill. App. 5th 120288 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(a) (West 2010). The purpose of section 8-1-7 is to protect the municipal treasury against incurring liabilities which exceed an appropriation or for which none has been made. Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill. App. 2d 263, 272 (1957). The prior-appropriation requirement "is mandatory and was enacted for the protection of the taxpayer."

  6. Kinzer v. City of Chicago

    169 Ill. App. 3d 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 10 times
    In Kinzer, a taxpayer sued the city and its comptroller for expending funds "without an appropriation being made therefor by the city council."

    The court held that since the village could pay the subject expenses only from specific water revenues, it was able to compensate the plaintiff from the statutorily authorized special fund created thereby without a prior appropriation therefor. ( Branigar, 396 Ill. at 545; see also Beling v. City of East Moline (1957), 14 Ill. App.2d 263, 144 N.E.2d 865.) The court also proceeded to distinguish DeKam on the ground that it was the precursor to Simpson, and at the time DeKam was decided the law did not permit a municipality to pay an engineer from the proceeds of special revenue bonds; however, the legislature had amended the statute to allow such expenditures by the time the Simpson case was decided.

  7. Diversified Computer Serv. v. Town of York

    104 Ill. App. 3d 852 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 25 times
    In Diversified Computer Service, this court held that a township's five-year contract with a computer services company was void because the township had not obtained prior appropriation for the contract pursuant to the Municipal Budget Law.

    Section 8-1-7 of the Code provides that "[n]o contract shall be made by the corporate authorities * * * unless an appropriation has been previously made concerning that contract" and that a contract not supported by a prior appropriation is "null and void as to the municipality." It is apparent DCS would be barred from recovery under its lease-purchase agreement if townships were governed by the Municipal Code. (See Chicago Patrolmen's Association v. City of Chicago (1974), 56 Ill.2d 503, 309 N.E.2d 3, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 839, 42 L.Ed.2d 66, 95 S.Ct. 68; Koudelka v. Village of Woodridge (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 884, 413 N.E.2d 1381; Guerine v. City of Northlake (1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 603, 274 N.E.2d 625; Collins v. Village of Glen Ellyn (1959), 21 Ill. App.2d 373, 158 N.E.2d 89; Beling v. City of East Moline (1957), 14 Ill. App.2d 263, 144 N.E.2d 865, appeal denied (1958), 12 Ill.2d 635.) However, townships are not included as municipalities subject to the proscriptions of the Illinois Municipal Code (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par.

  8. Bd. of Ed. of Chicago v. Chicago Teachers Union

    26 Ill. App. 3d 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that the question of jurisdiction in every case " ‘is always open and we may of our own motion dismiss an action where want of jurisdiction appears' "

    ( Eastern Illinois State Normal School v. City of Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, 111 N.E. 573.) Courts cannot disregard the invalidity of a contract which the legislature has prohibited. See Board of Education v. Arnold, 112 Ill. 11, 1 N.E. 163; compare Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill. App.2d 263, 144 N.E.2d 865. In DeKam v. City of Streator, 316 Ill. 123, 146 N.E. 550, the city entered into a contract with an engineer to draw plans for a proposed sewer system.

  9. Wilson v. Village of Forest View

    217 N.E.2d 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)   Cited 3 times

    The court cited Gray v. City of Joliet, 287 Ill. 280, 122 N.E. 550, in which case it was held that where a city may by ordinance "provide for the payment of the expense of levying an assessment from the fund produced by levying it, it cannot relieve itself from liability to pay the reasonable expenses incurred where the city itself voluntarily abandons and dismisses the proceeding before judgment of confirmation." Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill. App.2d 263, 144 N.E.2d 865 (1957), also bears on the instant case. In that case an action was brought to recover $36,000 for services allegedly rendered by plaintiff as the eingineer designing a waterworks system.

  10. Izzo v. City of Loves Park

    155 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959)   Cited 11 times
    In Izzo v. City of Loves Park, 20 Ill. App.2d 117, 155 N.E.2d 312, one count of a complaint based upon a quantum meruit was dismissed because of the failure to allege a prior appropriation.

    Defendant contends that the complaint and each count thereof, fails to state a cause of action for the reason that it is not alleged that an appropriation was made prior to the date of the contract to pay the cost of extending the water works system and for the further reason that the plaintiffs demand quantum meruit recovery and fail to allege facts showing that plaintiffs are entitled to quantum meruit recovery. A prior appropriation by a municipality is not a prerequisite to a valid contract of employment for the construction of a public works where the cost of construction is to be paid from a special fund and not from the general corporate fund. DeLeuw, Cather Co. v. City of Joliet, 327 Ill. App. 453, 64 N.E.2d 779; Beling v. City of East Moline, 14 Ill. App.2d 263, 144 N.E.2d 865; Simpson v. City of Highwood, 372 Ill. 212, 23 N.E.2d 62. Count I of the complaint alleges that it was understood and agreed between the parties that plaintiffs were to be paid for the installation of the water distribution mains and appurtenances described in the contract from a special fund to be created by the sale of revenue bonds and that said special fund was in fact created.