Opinion
Civil Action No. 12-cv-01904-PAB
07-24-2012
BELGARDE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, Plaintiff, v. RAHKEEM JONES, and All Other Occupants, Defendants.
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
ORDER OF REMAND
This matter is before the Court sua sponte on the Notice of Removal (the "Notice") [Docket No. 2] filed by defendant Rahkeem Jones.
In every case and at every stage of a proceeding, a federal court must satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction, even if doing so requires sua sponte action. Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City & County of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1980). Generally, a party may remove "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). If at any time, "a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue." Cunningham v. BHP Petroleum Great Britain PLC, 427 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005).
It is well established that "[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing such jurisdiction as a threshold matter." Radil v. Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004). A notice of removal must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
Here, defendant contends that the Court can exercise federal question jurisdiction over this matter. Pursuant to section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code, "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." In order to establish a basis for removal pursuant to § 1331, the federal question must be "presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Defendant does not cite, and the Court has not identified, any federal question within plaintiff's complaint. See generally Docket No. 3 at 1 (initiating a state law unlawful detainer action against defendant).
The Court construes the Notice liberally because defendant is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Rather, defendant attempts to remove this case based upon his assertion of a federal counterclaim. See Docket No. 2 at 2, ¶ 6; see also 2-1 at 7 (asserting counterclaim for alleged violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Fourteenth Amendment). Except for narrow circumstances, "a case may not be removed to federal court solely because of a defense or counterclaim arising under federal law." Topeka Housing Authority v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2005); see Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) ("[F]ederal jurisdiction [cannot] rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.").
A claim that is stated in terms of state law "may be removed to federal court . . . when Congress expressly so provides . . . or when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption." Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (internal citation omitted). Neither of these exceptions appears to be implicated in this case.
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For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that, due to this Court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, this case is REMANDED to the County Court for Arapahoe County, Colorado, where it was originally filed as Case No. 12C315063.
BY THE COURT:
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PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge