The question is not in what county did appellee reside for the longest period of time, but at the time he was injured. Finally, the cases of Murry v. Maner, 230 Ark. 132, 320 S.W.2d 940 (1959), and Belford v. Taylor, 241 Ark. 220, 406 S.W.2d 868 (1966), are not of significance because both cases came up as petitions for prohibition. We explained that where venue is at issue there normally is a question of fact, and prohibition is not the proper remedy when the trial court's authority to act depends upon a disputed question of fact.
2d 828 (1977) (granting the writ where application of the venue statute to a foreign corporation was deemed unconstitutional); Willis Shaw Frozen Express v. Digby, 260 Ark. 284, 538 S.W.2d 706 (1976) (granting the writ where venue was improper); Carney v. Cummings, 258 Ark. 362, 524 S.W.2d 623 (1975) (granting the writ because venue was not proper); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Colvin, 257 Ark. 889, 521 S.W.2d 206 (1975) (denying the writ because venue was proper); Doyle v. Williams, 251 Ark. 797, 475 S.W.2d 170 (1972) (granting the writ where venue was improper); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Roberts, 246 Ark. 864, 440 S.W.2d 208 (1969) (granting the writ where venue was not proper); Ark. Valley Indus., Inc. v. Roberts, 244 Ark. 432, 425 S.W.2d 298 (1968) (granting the writ where venue was wrongly placed); Evans Labs., Inc. v. Roberts, 243 Ark. 987, 423 S.W.2d 271 (1968) (granting the writ where venue was improper); Int'l Harvester, supra (granting the writ because venue was not proper); Belford v. Taylor, 241 Ark. 220, 406 S.W.2d 868 (1966) (denying the writ where the resolution of the venue question depended on disputed facts); Murry v. Circuit Court of Saline Cnty., 230 Ark. 132, 320 S.W.2d 940 (1959) (same); Nw. Motors, Inc. v. Creekmore, 229 Ark. 755, 318 S.W.2d 614 (1958) (granting the writ for improper venue); Hicks v. Wolfe, 228 Ark. 406, 307 S.W.2d 784 (1957) (granting the writ where venue was not proper); Coley, supra (denying the writ because resolving the venue issue depended on disputed facts); Se. Constr. Co. v. Wood, 223 Ark. 325, 265 S.W.2d 720 (1954) (denying the writ because venue was proper); Se. Constr. Co. v. Wood, 223 Ark. 328, 265 S.W.2d 722 (1954) (same); Am. Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 218 Ark. 888, 239 S.W.2d 10 (1951) (granting the writ where venue was improper); E. Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Wood, 218 Ark. 211, 235 S.W.2d 882 (1951) (denying the writ because venue was proper); Sims v. Toler, 214 Ark. 732, 217 S.W.2d 928 (1949) (granting the writ where venue was not proper); Twin
Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Roberts, 248 Ark. 1005, 455 S.W.2d 125 (1970) and Karraz v. Taylor, Judge, 259 Ark. 699, 535 S.W.2d 840 (1976). Prohibition is not a proper remedy when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends on a disputed question of fact. Belford v. Taylor, 241 Ark. 220, 406 S.W.2d 868 (1966). Criminal Procedure Rule 28.1(a) provides:
Generally, where venue is questioned, there must be a determination on the facts. Belford v. Taylor, 241 Ark. 220, 406 S.W.2d 868. Unless the pleadings on their face show that an action was commenced in the wrong county, a defendant objecting to the venue has the burden of proving the essential facts. 92 C.J.S. 772, 74; Tribune Company v. Approved Personnel, Inc., 115 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1959); Cohen Commodity Credit Corp., 172 F. Supp. 803 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Werner v. Braunstein, 20 Misc. 341, 45 N.Y.S. 757. Since appellants failed to offer any evidence on these critical points, and the record is silent otherwise, we find no merit in this contention.