Opinion
3:23-cv-01632-SB
05-22-2024
GABRIELA C. BELCIU and GIULIANO BELCIU, Plaintiffs, v. LEGACY HEALTH, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN United States Magistrate Judge
Gabriela and Giuliano Belciu (together, “Plaintiffs”), a married couple proceeding as self-represented litigants, bring this action against Mrs. Belciu's former employer, Legacy Health (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to accommodate Mrs. Belciu's request to accommodate her relief beliefs, which conflicted with one of her job requirements. Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that Mr. Belciu lacks statutory standing and Mrs. Belciu fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendant (formerly known as “Legacy Health Systems” and now known as “Legacy Health,” ECF No. 9) notes that it is “incorrectly named” in Plaintiffs' complaint. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.'s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 8.) The Court directs the Clerk of Court to amend the Court's docket to conform with Defendant's correct name, as shown in this opinion.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and not all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Defendant's motion.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), a court must “accept the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and construe all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 894 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ariz. Students' Ass'n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016)). “A court may . . . [also] consider certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). For example, it is appropriate for a court to consider a plaintiff's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) records under the incorporation by reference doctrine, or when the plaintiff attaches such records to the complaint. SeeLavy v. McDonough, No. 2:21-cv-01590, 2022 WL 2805984, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2022) (considering an EEOC decision that the plaintiff attached to her complaint in ruling on a motion to dismiss, noting that “[a] court may . . . take judicial notice of documents attached to or properly submitted as part of the complaint,” and stating that “[i]n the context of employment discrimination cases in particular, it is well established that courts may consider the administrative record of a plaintiff's claims before the [EEOC] . . . as judicially noticeable matters of public record”) (simplified); Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys. Inc., No. 19-cv-03791, 2020 WL 619846, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020) (“[A] [c]ourt may take judicial notice of the EEOC filings or, alternatively, may consider them under the incorporation by reference doctrine.”). There is no dispute as to the authenticity of Mrs. Belciu's EEOC records, which she attaches to and references in the complaint. (See Compl. at 3-4, 6-9, ECF No. 1, referencing and attaching such records; Def.'s Mot. at 4, arguing that the records lack the factual enhancement necessary for Mrs. Belciu to state a claim). Accordingly, the Court may consider Mrs. Belciu's EEOC records.
Mrs. Belciu alleges that she holds a religious belief that conflicted with one of her job requirements. (Compl. at 3-4, 6.) Mrs. Belciu informed Defendant about the conflict and requested a religious accommodation. (Id. at 3, 6.) Defendant denied Mrs. Belciu's request for a religious accommodation on or about September 27, 2021. (Id. at 6.) After placing Mrs. Belciu on unpaid leave on or about October 1, 2021, Defendant terminated Mrs. Belciu on or about October 19, 2021. (Id.)
In response, Mrs. Belciu filed an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC, alleging that Defendant “denied reasonable accommodation for [Mrs. Belciu's] sincerely held religious belief and discharged [Mrs. Belciu] due to [Defendant's] failure to accommodate her religion.” (Id.)
In a “Determination” letter dated November 22, 2022, the EEOC informed Mrs. Belciu and Defendant that it had “considered all the evidence disclosed during [its] investigation and . . . determined that there [was] reasonable cause to believe that [Mrs. Belciu] informed [Defendant] of her sincerely held religious belief, the conflict it posed with a job requirement, and the need for accommodation as early as August 17, 2021.” (Id.) (all caps omitted). The EEOC added that although “[t]here [was] . . . reasonable cause to believe that there was an accommodation that [Defendant] could have provided that would not have posed an undue hardship,” Defendant denied Mrs. Belciu's request for an accommodation, placed Mrs. Belciu on unpaid leave, and discharged Mrs. Belciu, “in violation of Title VII[.]” (Id.) Given its “finding that there [was] reason to believe that [Title VII] violations ha[d] occurred, the [EEOC] attempt[ed] to eliminate the alleged unlawful [employment] practices by informal methods of conciliation . . . [, and thus] invite[d] the parties to join with it in reaching a just resolution of [the] matter.” (Id.)
On August 14, 2023, the EEOC sent Mrs. Belciu a letter titled “Conciliation Failure and Notice of Rights.” (Id. at 7) (bold and all caps omitted). In this letter, the EEOC explained that although it “found reasonable cause to believe that violations of [Title VII] occurred with respect to some or all of the matters alleged in the charge[, the EEOC] could not obtain a settlement with [Defendant] that would provide relief for [Mrs. Belciu].” (Id.) The EEOC also explained that it “decided that it [would] not bring suit against [Defendant] at [that] time based on [Mrs. Belciu's] charge and [would] close its file in [the] case” but that did “not mean that the EEOC [was] certifying that [Defendant was] in compliance with the law, or that the EEOC [would] not sue [Defendant] later or intervene later in [Mrs. Belciu's] lawsuit if [she] decide[d] to sue on [her] own behalf.” (Id.) The EEOC further explained that its letter “conclude[d] [its] processing of [Mrs. Belciu's] charge” and constituted “official notice from the EEOC of the dismissal of [Mrs. Belciu's] charge and of [Mr. Belciu's] right to sue” within ninety days of receiving the notice. (Id.)
“Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days of receiving his right-to-sue letter from the [EEOC].” Lee v. United States, 859 Fed.Appx. 839, 839 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).
On November 7, 2023, Plaintiffs timely filed this Title VII action against Defendant. (ECF No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. PLEADING SUFFICIENCY
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Thus, “where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
II. SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS
Courts “have a duty to read a pro se complaint liberally,” Sernas v. Cantrell, 857 Fed.Appx. 400, 401 (9th Cir. 2021), and should treat “pro se litigants . . . with ‘great leniency' when evaluating compliance with ‘the technical rules of civil procedure.'” Seals v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 797 Fed.Appx. 327, 327 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986)). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, there is a “good reason” that courts “afford leeway to pro se parties, who appear without counsel and without the benefit of sophisticated representation: ‘Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel.'” Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
There are, however, limits on the leeway that courts afford to self-represented litigants. For example, although courts “construe pro se pleadings liberally, especially in civil rights cases, . . . [courts] ‘may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not . . . pled[.]'” Owen v. City of Hemet, No. 21-55240, 2022 WL 16945887, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) and quoting Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014)); Salazar v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 812 Fed.Appx. 410, 412-13 (9th Cir. 2020) (same); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (stating that a district court's “liberal interpretation of a pro se civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled”) (simplified).
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Def.'s Mot. at 1.) Defendant argues that Mr. Belciu lacks statutory standing under Title VII because he “does not allege that he was employed, or sought employment, with [Defendant],” and Mrs. Belciu fails to state a religious discrimination claim under a failure to accommodate theory. (Id. at 1-3, 5-7.) As explained below, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Defendant's motion.
I. MR. BELCIU'S CLAIM
A. Applicable Law
“[T]he purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers' unlawful actions.” Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011). Consistent with this understanding, courts have dismissed non-employee plaintiffs' Title VII claims against employers.
In Huynh v. Northbay Medical Center, No. 2:17-cv-02039, 2018 WL 4583393, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018), for example, the plaintiffs were a married couple who proceeded as self-represented litigants and both asserted claims against the wife's former employer, supervisor, and department director for “discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII.” Id. at *1-2. The defendants moved to dismiss the husband's claims on two grounds: (1) the district court “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over [the husband's] Title VII claims because he failed to file a charge with any agency prior to filing [the] action,” and (2) the husband “fail[ed] to state a Title VII claim because he [did] not allege that he was employed by, or applied for employment with, [the] defendants.” Id. at *3. The district court agreed that the husband was not an employee and thus failed to state plausible Title VII claims against the defendants:
Mr. Huynh does not explain his theory of liability . . . to [the defendants]. He was never employed by [the company at issue] nor was he ever subjected to any adverse employment action . . . by the defendants. It appears from the complaint that he simply added his name to his wife's complaint and then co-signed it. Thus, no facts have been alleged to show a plausible claim against the defendants under Title VII. Rather, it is clear from the complaint, as well as the plaintiffs' opposition to the motion, that Mr. Huynh's claims are predicated only on the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory treatment directed at his wife, who was employed by defendants. As Mr. Huynh was not employed by defendants nor subjected to any of the alleged wrongful conduct, his Title VII claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim....Id.
Along similar lines, in Harris v. PeaceHealth, No. 6:22-cv-01151-AA, 2023 WL 6319068, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2023), the plaintiff did “not allege that he was directly employed by [the defendant] and instead allege[d] that he was employed by [a different entity].” Id. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Title VII claim, the district court explained that “an employer-employee relationship is essential to the Title VII claim,” and the plaintiff's allegations fell “far short of establishing the requisite degree of control necessary to show that [the defendant] was [the] [p]laintiff's joint employer for purposes of Title VII.” Id. at *2.
The Ninth Circuit has made comparable observations regarding the essential nature of the employer-employee relationship in Title VII cases. SeeMurray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Murray is entitled to the protections of Title VII only if she is an employee.”); Patterson v. Vanderver, 259 Fed.Appx. 912, 912 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court properly granted summary judgment on [the self-represented plaintiff's] Title VII claims, because it correctly concluded that [he] was an ‘independent contractor' not an ‘employee' of [the defendant].”). Sister circuits have done the same. SeeKifor v. Massachusetts, No. 23-1013, 2023 WL 4402669, at *1 (1st Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (reviewing the self-represented plaintiff's “appeal[] from the district court's screening dismissal of his complaint under [the in forma pauperis statute],” and holding that the plaintiff's “complaint fail[ed] to state a claim against [two defendants] because he [was] not an ‘employee' . . . for purposes of Title VII”); Simmons v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 972 F.3d 664, 665-66, 668 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that “Title VII claims require an employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant[,]” rejecting the plaintiff James Simmons's request to “essentially . . . adopt an exception where a nonemployee (Simmons) is the intentional target of an employer's retaliatory animus against one of its employees (Simmons's daughter),” and holding that “[b]ecause he was not [the defendant's] employee, Simmons lack[ed] Title VII standing”); Miller v. City of Ithaca, 758 Fed.Appx. 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's “claims against Tompkins County and the County District Attorney,” and explaining that the plaintiff could not “pursue Title VII claims against these defendants because [he] was not employed by Tompkins County”).
B. Analysis
The Court finds that Mr. Belciu's Title VII claim fails, and that Mr. Belciu cannot cure the deficiencies at issue. See generally Cobb v. Dyemartin, 584 Fed.Appx. 404, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that a “[self-represented] litigant should be given leave to amend if it appears at all possible that he or she can cure the deficiencies at issue” (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130)). The Court therefore recommends that the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Mr. Belciu's claim with prejudice.
First, unlike Mrs. Belciu, Mr. Belciu was not Defendant's employee and never applied to work for Defendant, and Title VII applies only to employees. Consequently, Mr. Belciu cannot state a Title VII claim against Defendant. SeeCarr v. United States, No. 20-cv-00744, 2020 WL 4584193, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020) (granting a motion to dismiss and stating that the plaintiff's claim under Title VII “fail[ed] because Title VII . . ., which protects employees, [was] not applicable as [the plaintiff was] not an employee”); Murray v. Pac. Architects & Eng'rs, Inc., No. 15-cv-00087, 2015 WL 4917313, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2015) (“Title VII makes certain employment practices by an ‘employer' unlawful.... Therefore, in order to sufficiently plead his claims under Title VII against PAE, Plaintiff must allege that an employer-employee relationship existed between PAE and himself.... Plaintiff has failed to plead PAE was his employer and thus has not sufficiently pled his Title VII claims against PAE.” (citing Murray, 613 F.3d at 944)).
Mr. Belciu does not dispute that he fails to allege that Defendant employed him or that he ever applied to work for Defendant. (Compare Def.'s Mot. at 4, and Pls.' Resp. Mot. Dismiss (“Pls.' Resp.”) at 1-4, ECF No. 10.) Instead, Mr. Belciu argues that his status as Mrs. Belciu's “lawful spouse . . . establishes [his] derivative claim under Section 61 of the Family Law Act (FLA).” (Pls.' Resp. at 1; see also id. at 3, arguing that Mr. Belciu is “a qualifying family member . . . entitled to a derivative claim to the financial injury inflicted upon . . . [Mrs.] Belciu and . . . her claim,” and “removing the derivative claim . . . would half the already extremely limited ability to rectify the financial injury inflicted upon . . . [Mrs.] Belciu and her qualified family members”).
It appears that the “Family Law Act” is a Canadian statute addressing a spouse's entitlement to damages in personal injury and wrongful death cases. (See Def.'s Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 11, “As far as Legacy can tell, the Family Law Act appears to be a Canadian law.”). Even if there is a Canadian statute referred to as the “Family Law Act,” nothing before the Court suggests that such a statute would or could apply to an employment case in a U.S. court between Oregon residents and an Oregon nonprofit corporation. (See Compl. at 1-2; Def.'s Corp. Disclosure Statement at 1-2, ECF No. 9); cf.Chavis v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 23-cv-1513, 2024 WL 150734, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2024) (stating that the plaintiff's claim failed because there was “no federal statute entitled The Bill of Exchange Act” and the “foreign statutes entitled Bill of Exchange Acts . . . [did] not apply to commercial transactions in the United States between United States citizens,” and noting that courts dismissed as legally frivolous claims under the foreign statutes, including the Canadian statute).
Furthermore, it is well settled that a “Title VII plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a timely EEOC . . . charge, and allegations not included in an EEOC charge ‘may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge[.]'” Nelson v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 857 Fed.Appx. 353, 355 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)); see alsoWinns v. Exela Enters. Sols., Inc., No. 22-16342, 2023 WL 4992825, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023) (“The district court properly granted summary judgment on [the plaintiff's] . . . claims under Title VII . . . because [the plaintiff] did not raise these issues in his [EEOC] charge and therefore failed to exhaust administrative remedies.”). The Court may consider Mrs. Belciu's allegations that Defendant discriminated against Mrs. Belciu by denying her request for a religious accommodation and terminating her employment, because Mrs. Belciu included these allegations in her EEOC charge. (See Compl. at 6, reflecting that the EEOC stated that the “Charging Party alleges that she was denied reasonable accommodation for her sincerely held religious belief and discharged due to Respondent's failure to accommodate her religious belief”). Notably, Mrs. Belciu did not raise any issues relevant to Mr. Belciu before the EEOC, and Mr. Belciu did not file his own charge.
For these reasons, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Mr. Belciu's claim with prejudice. SeeBonner v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 19-cv-00674, 2020 WL 801897, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (“Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII claim because [he] is not an employee. The protections of Title VII apply only to employees. . . Plaintiff fails to address this contention in his Opposition.... Because Plaintiff is not an employee and fails to address this in his Opposition, Plaintiff's [Title VII claim] is DISMISSED without leave to amend.”).
To the extent that this litigation proceeds on Mrs. Belciu's Title VII claim against Defendant, the Court reminds Plaintiffs that only Mrs. Belciu has the authority to appear as an attorney on her own behalf, and that individuals who are not licensed attorneys have no authority to appear as an attorney for others. SeeJohns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“While a non-attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, ‘[h]e has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.'”) (citation omitted); Ritchie v. SEC, No. 22-cv-05845, 2023 WL 3059847, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2023) (“Because Mr. Ritchie . . . is not a licensed attorney, the court finds he has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.... Mr. Ritchie's purported power of attorney as to Mr. Johnson does not alter that conclusion.”).
II. MRS. BELCIU'S CLAIM
Defendant argues that Mrs. Belciu fails to state a religious discrimination claim under a failure to accommodate theory. (Def.'s Mot. at 5-7.) The Court finds that Mrs. Belciu fails to state a claim against Defendant for failing to accommodate her religion but should be provided an opportunity to amend her complaint. The Court therefore recommends that the district judge dismiss Mrs. Belciu's claim without prejudice.
A. Applicable Law
1. Ninth Circuit Precedent
The Ninth Circuit recently reviewed a district court's dismissal of a plaintiff's claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 2023). After the Ninth Circuit explained that it had “jurisdiction to consider the merits of [the plaintiff's Title VII and FEHA] claims,” and “review[ed] de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and construing all inferences in the plaintiff's favor,” the Ninth Circuit held that the district court committed reversible error because the plaintiff “ha[d] stated claims under Title VII and the [FEHA].” Id. at 1218, 1222-28 (simplified).
The Ninth Circuit's analysis focused initially on the plaintiff's Title VII and FEHA claims for failure to accommodate her religion. Id. at 1222-24. The Ninth Circuit observed that both statutes “forbid an employer from denying a job to an applicant because of her religion,” and “require employers to accommodate job applicants' religious beliefs unless doing so would impose an undue hardship.” Id. at 1222 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e(j)). The Ninth Circuit explained that “[c]laims under Title VII and FEHA for failure to accommodate religion are accordingly analyzed under a burden-shifting framework.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993) (Title VII)). The Ninth Circuit further explained that under this framework, “the employee must plead a prima facie case of failure to accommodate religion,” and “if the employee is successful, the employer can show that it was nonetheless justified in not accommodating the employee's religious beliefs or practices.” Id. (citing Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Consistent with this understanding, the Ninth Circuit turned to what a plaintiff must allege “[t]o plead a prima facie case of failure to accommodate religion under Title VII and FEHA[.]” Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]o plead [such] a prima facie case . . ., a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that she holds ‘a bona fide religious belief' that conflicts with an employment requirement.” Id. (quoting Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438) (Title VII)). The parties disputed whether the plaintiff had “adequately pleaded a conflict between her job requirements and religious belief,” but the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had “adequately alleged that [an employment requirement] pose[d] a conflict with her religious beliefs.” Id. at 1222-24.
“To establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination under a failure-to-accommodate theory, an employee must [also] show . . . [that] she informed her employer of the belief and conflict[,] and . . . the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected her to an adverse employment action because of h[er] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Keene v.City & Cnty. of S.F., No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *2 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023) (brackets omitted) (quoting Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006)).
In support of its holding, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]he Supreme Court has, albeit in the free exercise context, cautioned against second-guessing the reasonableness of an individual's assertion that a requirement burdens her religious beliefs, emphasizing that a court's ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine whether the line drawn reflects an honest conviction.'” Id. at 1223 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 725 (2014)). The Ninth Circuit further explained that although “[t]his principle does not mean that courts must take plaintiffs' conclusory assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value[,] . . . [a Title VII plaintiff's] burden to allege a conflict with religious beliefs is fairly minimal.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
Given that the defendant did “not otherwise contest the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] prima facie case,” the Ninth Circuit's explained that its next inquiry was “whether the [defendant could] rebut [the plaintiff's] prima facie case by demonstrating that it was justified in not accommodating her religious beliefs.” Id. at 1224. On this issue, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that “[o]nce an employee establishes a prima facie case of failure to accommodate religion, the burden shifts to the employer to show ‘either that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee's religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.'” Id. (quoting Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998)). The Ninth Circuit also explained that “[u]ndue hardship is an affirmative defense . . ., and accordingly dismissal on that ground is proper ‘only if the defendant shows some obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint' or in ‘any judicially noticeable materials.'” Id. at 1224-25 (citing Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544, 557 (10th Cir. 2018) and quoting ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014)).
Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit held that because an undue hardship defense was “not obvious from the face of [the plaintiff's] [c]omplaint,” it could not “consider the [defendant's] undue hardship defense at this stage in the proceedings[,]” i.e., the motion to dismiss/pleading stage. Id. at 1226-27. For all of these reasons, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Title VII and FEHA claims for failure to accommodate her religion. Id. at 1226-28.
2. District Court Decisions
The Court has addressed several Title VII cases involving employees' requests for religious exemptions from an employer's vaccine mandate, which appears to be the employment requirement at issue here. In those cases, the Court recognized that a plaintiff could state a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement by alleging, for example, religious-based beliefs in the sanctity of life and opposition to taking a vaccine connected to, or derived from, aborted fetal cell lines. See Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, No. 3:23-cv-00206-SB, 2023 WL 7612395, at *7-9 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023) (citing Keene, 2023 WL 3451687, at *1-2 and Kather v. Asante Health Sys., No. 22-1842-MC, 2023 WL 4865533, at *4-5 (D. Or. July 28, 2023)), findings and recommendation adopted in full and clarified in part, 2023 WL 7623865, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2023); Trinh v. Shriners Hosps. for Children, No. 3:22-cv-01999-SB, 2023 WL 7525228, at *10-11 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023) (citing Keene, 2023 WL 3451687, at *1-2 and Kather, 2023 WL 4865533, at *4)), findings and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7521441, at *1 (D. Or Nov. 13, 2023); see alsoKather, 2023 WL 4865533, at *4-5 (noting that the plaintiff relied on her “‘Christianity' and resistance to receiving a vaccine developed with fetal cell lines,” and holding that the plaintiff “adequately alleged a sincerely held religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine”).
Other judges in this district have made similar observations regarding employees' requests for religious accommodations. See, e.g., Schafer v. Legacy Health, No. 3:23-cv-01543-HZ, 2024 WL 1932544, at *3-4 (D. Or. May 2, 2024) (citing cases including the example in Kather, which found that a “plaintiff's ‘self-identified Christianity and resistance to receiving a vaccine developed with fetal cell lines [was a] reasonably inferred religious conflict'”) (citations omitted).
Often times in these vaccine mandate cases, the plaintiff's complaint relies on and attaches the paperwork that the plaintiff submitted to the employer in support of her request for a religious exemption. A court may consider material attached to a complaint in assessing whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible Title VII claim. See Bartholomew v. Washington, No. 2305209, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2024 WL 1426308, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2024) (“Plaintiff extensively referenced the religious accommodation notice . . . and religious accommodation form . . . in his complaint and that the documents are therefore incorporated by reference.... The Court may therefore properly consider the documents without converting Defendants' motion into one for summary judgment.”); Medlin v. PeaceHealth, No. 6:23-cv-00012-AA, 2024 WL 712692, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2024) (“On this record, and in the absence of any objection . . ., the Court concludes that Plaintiff's religious exception request is a valid subject for incorporation by reference. [It] . . . will therefore be considered in resolving the Motion to Dismiss.”); see also Gamon v. Shriners Hosps. for Children, No. 3:23-cv-00216-IM, 2024 WL 641715, at *1 n.1 (D. Or. Feb. 15, 2024) (“The background facts come from the First Amended Complaint and the vaccine exemption form Plaintiff attached to the Complaint. The latter document is incorporated by reference[.]”).
Defendant refers to the incorporation by reference doctrine in its reply. (See Def.'s Reply at 3, discussing facts that Mrs. Belciu did “not plead []or incorporate by reference into [her] [c]omplaint”).
B. Analysis
The Court finds that Mrs. Belciu fails to state a Title VII claim for failure to accommodate religion.
1. Elements
To plead a prima facie case of failure to accommodate religion under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she “holds ‘a bona fide religious belief' that conflicts with an employment requirement,” (2) she “informed [her] employer of the belief and conflict,” and (3) the defendant “threatened [the plaintiff] with or subjected [her] to discriminatory treatment, including discharge, because of [her] inability to fulfill the job requirements.” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1222 (discussing what a plaintiff must allege to plead a prima facie case but focusing only on the first element (quoting Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438)); Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438 (describing all three elements); Keene, 2023 WL 3451687, at *1 (describing the same elements (citing Berry, 447 F.3d at 655)).
2. Mrs. Belciu's Complaint
Accepting Mrs. Belciu's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and construing all inferences in her favor, Mrs. Belciu holds an unspecified religious belief that conflicted with an unknown job requirement, informed Defendant about the conflict, and requested a religious accommodation. (Compl. at 3-4, 6.) Defendant denied Mrs. Belciu's request for a religious accommodation, placed Mrs. Belciu on unpaid leave, and then terminated her. (Id. at 3, 6.)
As discussed in more detail above, Mrs. Belciu filed an EEOC charge alleging that Defendant “denied reasonable accommodation for [Mrs. Belciu's] sincerely held religious belief and discharged [Mrs. Belciu] due to [Defendant's] failure to accommodate her religion.” (Id. at 6.) The EEOC determined there was reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred and invited the parties to join in conciliation, but the attempt at conciliation was unsuccessful and therefore the EEOC provided notice on August 14, 2023, of the right to sue within ninety days. (Id. at 6-7.)
3. Disposition
Mrs. Belciu fails adequately to state a claim for failure to accommodate religion under Title VII.
Mrs. Belciu's complaint and EEOC charge include only general references to Mrs. Belciu's request for a religious accommodation and belief that conflicted with one of Defendant's job requirements. Noticeably absent from Mrs. Belciu's complaint are any facts that plausibly suggest, among other things, that there was an actual conflict between Mrs. Belciu's religious belief and job requirement. Neither Mrs. Belciu's complaint nor her EEOC charge identify Mrs. Belciu's religion, her religious belief(s) at issue, or the conflicting job requirement. Thus, Mrs. Belciu fails to state a plausible claim for failure to accommodate religion under Title VII. SeeKather, 2023 WL 4865533, at *5 (dismissing certain plaintiffs' failure to accommodate claims because they “allege[d] facts that hint[ed] at religious beliefs but [did] not specify how those beliefs conflict[ed] with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine,” and stating that “[a] ‘threadbare reference' to religious beliefs is insufficient at the motion to dismiss stage”) (citation omitted).
For these reasons, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Mrs. Belciu's Title VII claim. The Court further recommends that the district judge grant Mrs. Belciu leave to amend because it may be possible that she can cure the deficiencies at issue. SeeCobb, 584 Fed.Appx. at 406 (stating that a “[self-represented] litigant should be given leave to amend if it appears at all possible that he or she can cure the deficiencies at issue” (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130)).
4. Mrs. Belciu's EEOC Letters
Before Mrs. Belciu amends her Title VII claim, the Court briefly addresses Mrs. Belciu's statements regarding the letters she received from the EEOC and attached to her complaint.
The EEOC's “Determination” and right-to-sue letters reflect that the EEOC investigated and had “reasonable cause to believe” certain facts and “reasonable cause to believe” that Title VII violations occurred. (See Compl. at 6, reflecting that in the November 22, 2022 preconciliation letter titled “Determination,” the EEOC informed Mrs. Belciu and Defendant that based on the evidence disclosed during the investigation, the EEOC had (1) “reasonable cause to believe” that Mrs. Belciu informed Defendant of “her sincerely held religious belief, the conflict it posed with a job requirement, and the need for accommodation as early as August 17, 2021,” (2) “reasonable cause to believe” that Defendant could have accommodated Mrs. Belciu without “undue hardship,” and (3) “reason to believe that [a Title VII] violation occurred”; see also id. at 7, demonstrating that in the August 14, 2023 right-to-sue letter, the EEOC informed Mrs. Belciu that it “found reasonable cause to believe that violations of [Title VII] occurred with respect to some or all of the matters alleged in the charge but could not obtain a settlement”).
In her opposition, Mrs. Belciu presents arguments based on the EEOC's statements, including that (1) her “claim of financial injury is unequivocally substantiated by the [EEOC's] independent investigation and conclusive determination of the discrimination violation of . . . Defendant's actions under Title VII . . . for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs,” and (2) she did not file this case in federal court to “relitigate the merits and the legal statuses by which the EEOC . . . has found . . . Defendant in violation of Title VII[.]” (Pls.' Resp. at 2.) Contrary to Mrs. Belciu's argument, the EEOC's letters are not conclusive determinations of Defendant's liability.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2005), is instructive here. In that case, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII claim. Id. at 1208. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred because “she ha[d] presented sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial[.]” Id. at 1214. In support of this argument, the plaintiff “point[ed] to the fact that she obtained a determination letter from the EEOC in her favor,” which stated that “[t]here [was] reasonable cause to believe Respondent discriminated against Charging Party because of her sex, female, when they denied her the opportunity to qualify for a permanent position as an Operations Journeyman.” Id. at 1214-15. The plaintiff believed that the EEOC's “determination, in and of itself, should [have] be[en] sufficient to defeat [the defendant's] motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 1215. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the plaintiff's argument was “without merit.” Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to point to a single case holding that a determination letter from the EEOC [was] sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact,” and “[t]he fact that a determination from the EEOC [was] highly probative . . . [did] not support [the plaintiff's] contention that an EEOC determination letter [was] somehow a free pass through summary judgment.” Id.
As the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mondero demonstrates, an EEOC determination regarding Mrs. Belciu's charge against Defendant is not a conclusive adjudication of rights and liabilities. See Stancombe v. New Process Steel LP, 652 Fed.Appx. 729, 733 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“For both Title VII claims, [the plaintiff] relies on the EEOC determination finding cause to believe that Title VII had been violated as he alleged. Although an EEOC determination may be admissible at trial, it is not an adjudication of rights and liabilities[.] . . . [T]he district court [also] ha[d] a duty to review de novo whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” (citing, inter alia, Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008))).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8), dismiss Mr. Belciu's Title VII claim with prejudice, dismiss Mr. Belciu from this case, and dismiss Mrs. Belciu's Title VII claim without prejudice and with leave to amend her complaint.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.