A judgment entered contrary to a general verdict as the result of application of principles of law to a special verdict or to answers to interrogatories returned in connection with a general verdict is not a judgment non obstante veredicto but is one entered upon the verdict as the result of giving controlling weight to the special finding of facts made by the jury rather than to the conclusions embodied in the general verdict. The case of Belchak v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, dealing with the question of the rendition of such a judgment, reviewed. It accords with the policy of our decisions to give to a party who claims to have suffered a wrong at the hands of another every reasonable opportunity to establish his right to redress. Where a trial court is confronted by a situation where, even though it might direct judgment for a party against whom a general verdict is rendered, it is of the opinion that it would not be just to the party to foreclose him from any further opportunity to establish his right to recover, either upon the pleadings as they stand or upon amendments to them, it may, in its discretion, direct a new trial instead of the entry of judgment.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AND IN REFUSING TO RENDER JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF The role of an appellate court where an appellant seeks judgment contrary to a general verdict, because of the jury's allegedly inconsistent answers to interrogatories, was first analyzed in Belchak v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 179 A. 95 (1935). In Belchak, the plaintiff recovered damages for injuries suffered when an automobile which his intestate was driving was struck by a freight car as the automobile crossed the defendant's tracks.
For this reason, the judgment cannot stand. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc. , 193 Conn. 558, 577, 479 A.2d 781 (1984) (when verdict in civil case "rests [on] a factual finding contradictory to another finding of the same issue by the trier the judgment cannot stand"); Belchak v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. , 119 Conn. 630, 633, 179 A. 95 (1935) ("The verdict returned by the jury demonstrated conclusively that, in spite of the instructions of the court, [it] had made a mistake in the application of legal principles. Hence it was necessary to set aside [its] verdict.
"We recognize that a trial court has the inherent authority to set aside a verdict even where no motion to set aside the verdict has been filed. See, e.g., A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 206, 579 A.2d 69 (1990); State v. Avcollie, 178 Conn. 450, 455, 423 A.2d 118 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 667, 62 L.Ed.2d 645 (1980); Belchak v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 637, 179 A. 95 (1935). This does not mean, however, that [the defendants] need not have raised issues arising during the trial, in a motion for a directed verdict, in order for the appellate tribunal to review the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside the verdict.
We recognize that a trial court has the inherent authority to set aside a verdict even where no motion to set aside the verdict has been filed. See, e.g., A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 206, 579 A.2d 69 (1990); State v. Avcollie, 178 Conn. 450, 455, 423 A.2d 118 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 667, 62 L.Ed.2d 645 (1980); Belchak v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 637, 179 A. 95 (1935). This does not mean, however, that Seventh BRT need not have raised issues arising during the trial, in a motion for a directed verdict, in order for the appellate tribunal to review the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside the verdict.
"To justify the entry of a judgment contrary to a general verdict upon the basis of answers to interrogatories, those answers must be such in themselves as conclusively to show that as [a] matter of law judgment could only be rendered for the party against whom the general verdict was found; they must negative every reasonable hypothesis as to the situation provable under the issues made by the pleadings; and in determining that, the court may consider only the issues framed by the pleadings, the general verdict and the interrogatories, with the answers made to them, without resort to the evidence offered at the trial." Belchak v. New York, New Haven Hartford R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 634, 179 A. 95 (1935); see DeJesus v. Craftsman Machinery Co., 16 Conn. App. 558, 572, 548 A.2d 736 (1988); Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 201, 508 A.2d 449 (1986). "It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting answers in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences.
Szlinsky v. Denhup, 156 Conn. 159, 165, 239 A.2d 505 (1968). Indeed, we have made it clear that the trial court has the inherent power to set aside the verdict even when no motion by either party is made. Belchak v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 637, 179 A. 95 (1935). Accordingly, we reject Ginsberg's claim.
Goldberger v. David Roberts Corporation, 139 Conn. 629, 633-34, 96 A.2d 309 (1953). In Belchak v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 637, 179 A. 95 (1935), it was held that "[t]he trial court has inherent power to set aside the verdict, even though no motion has been made." See also Munson v. Atwood, 108 Conn. 285, 288, 142 A. 737 (1928); Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 255-56, 102 A. 573 (1917).
Sheeler v. Waterbury, 138 Conn. 111, 114, 82 A.2d 359; Decker v. Roberts, 125 Conn. 150, 157, 158, 3 A.2d 855; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 55. Since the court erred in admitting the plaintiffs' pamphlet into evidence as an exhibit, its denial of the defendant's motion for separate verdicts prejudiced the defendant in that that denial would, under our normal practice, have prevented the defendant from presenting its claim of error in the court's evidentiary ruling. Reid v. New Haven, 133 Conn. 446, 447, 52 A.2d 140; Belchak v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 632, 179 A. 95. It is unnecessary to discuss the defendant's remaining claims of error.
Practice Book 156; Svenberg v. Subotkouski, 133 Conn. 329, 332, 50 A.2d 441. Error was also assigned in the refusal of the trial court to submit an interrogatory to the jury. As far as concerns the appeal before us, the only purpose which the submission of the interrogatory would have served would have been to lay a basis for claims of error at the trial which the defendant might otherwise have been prevented from presenting by the implications of the general verdict; Belchak v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 632, 179 A. 95. The requests to charge would have afforded no sounder ground for error had the interrogatory been submitted than they do in its absence. In fact, the defendant does not contend in its brief that it was prevented by the ruling of the trial court from presenting to us any claims of error at the trial which it has not in fact assigned.