This is the second appearance of this case before our court. The general facts of this case are as set forth in the first appeal, Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga.App. 35, 36–38(1), 692 S.E.2d 694 (2010) (“ Belans I ”): In Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga.App. 35, 36–38(1), 692 S.E.2d 694 (2010) (“ Belans I ”), we addressed Belans's claims regarding the trial court's prior confirmation order pertaining to the three properties in Douglas County that are at issue here.

"The trial court is the trier of fact in a confirmation proceeding, and an appellate court will not disturb its findings if there is any evidence to support them." Belans v. Bank of America , 303 Ga.App. 35, 39 (2), 692 S.E.2d 694 (2010). In foreclosure-sale confirmation proceedings, "[t]he court shall direct that a notice of the [confirmation] hearing shall be given to the debtor at least five days prior thereto.

Other cases have established that the notice requirement of OCGA § 44–14–161(c) can be satisfied with less than personal service. See Belans v. Bank of America, (“Belans I ”) 303 Ga.App. 35, 37(1), 692 S.E.2d 694 (2010). Without equating the giving of notice of a confirmation hearing to the respondents with the service of legal process upon a defendant in an ordinary civil case, our courts look to the methods of service provided in the Civil Practice Act for guidance in the determining whether notice of a confirmation hearing is sufficient in a particular case.

This is the second appearance of this case before our court. The general facts of this case are as set forth in the first appeal, Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 35, 36-38 (1) ( 692 S.E.2d 694) (2010) (" Belans I"): In Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 35, 36-38 (1) ( 692 S.E.2d 694) (2010) (" Belans I"), we addressed Belans's claims regarding the trial court's prior confirmation order pertaining to the three properties in Douglas County that are at issue here.

As a result, no admissible evidence supported the trial court's determination that the foreclosure sale brought at least fair market value. See Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga.App. 35, 39(2), 692 S.E.2d 694 (2010) (after eliminating hearsay reports, there was no evidence to support trial court's confirmation of foreclosure sale); see also Andrews, supra, 139 Ga.App. at 381–382, 228 S.E.2d 320 (concluding that when the trial court relies upon inadmissible hearsay, we must reverse since we can no longer presume trial court relied upon legal testimony and discounted incompetent evidence). Accordingly, the trial court erred in confirming the foreclosure sale.

Nash v. Compass Bank, 296 Ga.App. 874, 875, 676 S.E.2d 28 (2009). Compare Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga.App. 35, 38–39(2), 692 S.E.2d 694 (2010) (no evidence to support finding of fair market value where appraiser who prepared appraisal reports did not testify). The appellants' further arguments concerning the bank appraiser's methods and analysis are nothing more than challenges to the credibility of the expert witness and the weight to be given his testimony.

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 35, 39 (2) ( 692 SE2d 694) (2010) ("[A]ttorneys are officers of the court and their statements in their place, if not objected to, serve the same function as evidence. But this principle cannot be extended to convert otherwise incompetent hearsay into competent evidence").

We note that Belans has recently appeared before this court four times in appeals of orders confirming foreclosure sales. In Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 35, 39 (2) ( 692 SE2d 694) (2010) ( Belans I), Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 654, 659 (2) ( 694 SE2d 725) (2010) ( Belans II), and Belans v. Bank of America, 304 Ga. App. XXIV, Case No. A10A0600 (decided July 7, 2010) (unpublished opinion), we reversed orders confirming foreclosure sales because the evidence was insufficient as to the involved properties' fair market values. In Belans v. Bank of America, 306 Ga. App. 252 ( 701 SE2d 889) (2010) ( Belans III), we affirmed the confirmation of the foreclosure sales.

Because of evidence that Belans could not be located and was concealing himself to avoid diligent attempts to serve him personally, the court properly directed that he be served by publication. Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 35, 36-38 ( 692 SE2d 694) (2010). In Belans, we found under similar circumstances, and respecting the same debtor, that "the trial court did not err in concluding that serving Belans by publication with the notice of confirmation hearing was sufficient."

We note that Belans and Bank of America have recently appeared before this court three times in appeals of orders confirming foreclosure sales. In Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 35, 38-39 (2) ( 692 SE2d 694) (2010) ( Belans I), Belans v. Bank of America, 303 Ga. App. 654, 656 (2) ( 694 SE2d 725) (2010) ( Belans II), and Belans v. Bank of America, Case No. A10A0600, decided July 7, 2010, the last of which was not officially reported, we reversed orders confirming foreclosure sales because the evidence was insufficient as to the involved properties' fair market values. See OCGA § 44-14-161.