Opinion
Civil Action 21-00784
07-13-2021
Deborah Behanna, Plaintiff, v. Heather Tesla, et al., Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE LISA PUPO LENIHAN
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DISTRICT JUDGE CATHY BISSOON
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed with prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute as Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's Order dated June 17, 2021.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural History
This case was initiated by a letter written by Deborah Behanna (“Plaintiff”) to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and docketed at the above action civil action number on June 7, 2021. ECF No. 1. The letter states that Plaintiff's husband, Walter Behanna, has been incarcerated at SCI Phoenix since January 21, 2020. Id. It also states that Defendants “Heather Tesla” and Paul Brandt searched her residence without a warrant. Id. No. prayer for relief is stated. On June 15, 2021, this matter was transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff was given until July 2, 2021 to file a clarification of her intentions-whether she intends the letter docketed at ECF No. 1 to institute a new civil action concerning the same facts as adjudicated at 2:20-cv-444 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, or whether she intended the letter docketed at ECF No. 1 to have been filed in 2:20-cv-444. ECF No. 5. As of today, the Court has received no submissions from Plaintiff after issuing the Order.
Defendant's correct name is Heather Testa, as based on documents submitted in Behanna v. Pennsylvania, 2:20-cv-00444-LPL, 2021 WL 1091354, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 20-cv-444, 2021 WL 1089607 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2021).
B. Discussion
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the involuntary dismissal of an action or a claim, and, under this Rule, “a district court has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order.” Qadr v. Overmyer, No. 15-3090, 642 Fed.Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)); see also Adams v. Trs. of N. J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (court may dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b)).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “a district court dismissing a case sua sponte ‘should use caution in doing so because it may not have acquired knowledge of the facts it needs to make an informed decision.'” Qadr, No. 15-3090, 642 Fed.Appx. at 103 (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008)). Before engaging in a sua sponte dismissal, “the district court ‘should provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to explain his reasons for failing to prosecute the case or comply with its orders.'” Id. (quoting Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258).
By the Court's Order dated June 17, 2021, Plaintiff was advised that her failure to submit a clarification of her intentions by July 2, 2021 would result in the dismissal of this case without further notice. Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity to comply and has failed to do so.
1. The Poulis Factors
In Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is proper under Rule 41(b):
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted). In balancing the Poulis factors, no single factor is dispositive, nor do all factors need to be satisfied to result in dismissal of the complaint. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. However, in determining whether a dismissal is warranted, the Court must analyze the factors in light of the “strong policy favoring decisions on the merits.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit has emphasized that “dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions, termed ‘extreme' by the Supreme Court, ” and that they “must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.”Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867-68, 869 (citing Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). “Cases should be decided on the merits barring substantial circumstances in support of the contrary outcome.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 132.
2. Application of the Poulis Factors
a. The extent of the party's personal responsibility.
“[I]n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 873. In determining personal responsibility for the delay, the Court must distinguish “between a party's responsibility for delay and counsel's responsibility.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 133 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). A plaintiff is not conjecturally responsible for her counsel's delay. Id. Any doubt as to personal responsibility should be resolved “‘in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.'” Id. at 138 (quoting Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Here, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, so the responsibility for failing to comply with the Court's order is hers alone. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
b. Prejudice to the adversary.
Prejudice to the adversary is a substantial factor in the Poulis analysis; but like any other factor, it is not dispositive. Hildebrand, 923 F.3d. at 134. “Relevant examples of prejudice include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence[] [and] the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories.'” Id. (quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984)). A party is not required “to show ‘irremediable' harm for [this factor] to weigh in favor of dismissal.” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003)). If the opposition is unable to prepare “a full and complete trial strategy” then there is sufficient prejudice to favor dismissal. Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the Defendants in this case have not yet been served. However, the facts alleged by Plaintiff appear to be those that have been alleged in an earlier complaint, filed by her and her husband Walter in Behanna v. Pennsylvania, 2:20-cv-00444-LPL, 2021 WL 1091354, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 20-cv-444, 2021 WL 1089607 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2021). This Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in that case. It would be prejudicial to the Defendants named here to litigate the same facts involving the same Plaintiffs and the same Defendants. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
c. A history of dilatoriness.
A history of dilatoriness is generally established by repeated “delay or delinquency.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. While once or twice is normally insufficient, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal where the plaintiff has a history of repeated delay. Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (citation omitted). In addition to repeated acts, “extensive” delay can also create a history of dilatoriness. Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. A “failure to prosecute” does not require that plaintiff take affirmative “steps to delay the trial …. It is quite sufficient if [he/she] does nothing.… ” Id. at 875 (citation omitted).
“While extensive delay may weigh in favor of dismissal, ‘a party's problematic acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case.'” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875). Thus, where a plaintiff has not been previously delinquent the weight given to even a long delay should be mitigated. Id.
Plaintiff does not have a history of dilatoriness as these proceedings are still in their infancy. Plaintiff has now failed to comply with the Court's Order to file a clarification despite being given ample time to do so. This is sufficient evidence, in the Court's view, to indicate that Plaintiff no longer desires to proceed with this action. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
d. Whether the party's conduct was willful or in bad faith.
In determining if plaintiff's conduct constituted willful or bad faith, the “court should look for ‘the type of willful or contumacious behavior' that can be characterized as ‘flagrant bad faith,' such as [a case history of] failing to answer interrogatories for nearly a year and a half, demanding numerous extensions, ignoring admonitions by the court, and making false promises to correct delays.” Id. (citing Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875 (citation omitted)). “Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Although “[a] lengthy delay reflects ‘inexcusable negligent behavior,' id. at 876, . . . that behavior alone does not rise to the level of willfulness or bad faith.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135.
Finally, “[b]ecause the harsh sanction of dismissal should serve to deter bad faith or self-serving behavior, and because of our policy of favoring decisions on the merits, [in the absence of evidence] that the delay was not effectuated willfully or in bad faith, [this factor] should weigh against dismissal.” Id. at 136.
There is no indication in this record that Plaintiff's failure was the result of any excusable neglect. There is also no indication that Plaintiff did not receive the Court's Order, so a finding of willfulness for failing to comply with those orders is inescapable. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
e. Effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal.
A district court must thoroughly consider “alternative sanctions before dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id. (citing Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262). The court should also provide an analysis of effectiveness sufficient “to honor [the] longstanding tradition of favoring decisions on the merits.” Id. In so doing, the court should be mindful that “[a]lternatives are particularly appropriate when the plaintiff has not personally contributed to the delinquency.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 866 (citations omitted). “[A]lternative sanctions need only be effective toward mitigating the prejudice caused by dilatory behavior or delinquency.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 136. They are not required to be “completely ameliorative.” Id.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this case, so it is unlikely that any sanction imposing costs or fees upon her would be effective. Therefore, the Court can see no alternative sanction that would be appropriate other than dismissal.
f. Meritoriousness of claim or defense.
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff's claims are meritorious ‘is moderate.'” Adams, 29 F.3d at 876. The standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and not a summary judgment standard, is applicable in a Poulis analysis. Id. at 869-70.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” (Fowler [v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted)]; see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18, (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff's letter states that Probation Officer Heather Tesla [Testa] and Police Chief Paul Brandt of Carroll Township raided her home without a warrant. ECF No. 1. “They were looking for evidence to use to arrest Walter Behanna.” Id. Although Plaintiff does not mention any dates, these appear to be the same facts that have already been alleged in Behanna v. Pennsylvania, 2:20-cv-00444-LPL, 2021 WL 1091354, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 20-cv-444, 2021 WL 1089607 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2021). Because this Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, it is unlikely that the allegations here, if they are indeed the same ones from the previous case, would have any more merit now than they did in their previous iteration. For the above reasons, what Plaintiff has filed does not appear to set forth a meritorious claim against any named Defendant that would survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, for this reason, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
In sum, as the Poulis factors do weigh in favor of dismissal, it is recommended that this case be dismissed with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed with prejudice for Plaintiffs failure to prosecute as Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's Order dated June 17, 2021.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing such objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Dated: July 13, 2021. 8