Buyer introduced evidence to the effect that he ordered jig from sellers for "special" purpose and in order to speed up production of oil burner castings by doing faster work in boring castings than buyer's old jig was capable of doing. Held, that evidence raised issue of whether there was an implied agreement that jig would not only be a workmanlike job but that it would meet the particular requirement for which it was specifically ordered, and case distinguished from Beggs v. James Hanley Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385 where article was ordered not for "special" purpose but by "trade name." See G.L. 1938, c. 459, ยง 15 (1) (4).
(Def.'s Obj. 48) (citing Beggs v. James Hanley Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385, 390, 62 A. 373, 375 (1905); United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918); Cashman Equipment Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc., No. PB-2011-2488, 2021 WL 4398192, at *29 (R.I. Super. Sept. 20, 2021)). Associated Spring also argues that Lycoming "has no evidence that any non-conformance to Lycoming's specifications caused any [b]ushings to migrate in any engines.
"It was for the jury to decide from the evidence whether the article was sold under a patent or trade name, or whether the buyer relied upon the seller's skill and judgment." In Beggs v. James Hanly Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385 [ 62 A. 373, 114 Am. St. Rep. 44], the holding was against an implied warranty, the article being sold under trade name, the holding being on the ground, "that the apparatus contracted for was well known, and in use in other places in the trade". In 59 A.L.R., page 1187, the rule is stated:
pting the need of replacing certain clapboards here and there and of painting the exterior as specified in the contract. The defendant contends that the trial justice misconstrued the contract and that this basic error led him to make all the rulings that are the subject of certain of his exceptions, which he argues as one. The defendant appears to contend thereunder: (1) That the only obligation of the defendant under the written contract was to apply to the outer walls of the house a certain product, sold under the trade name of Texite, in a proper and workmanlike manner, and that having applied Texite in that manner the defendant fully complied with his contract; (2) that the product Texite was requested by plaintiffs and if it did not live up to the representations of the manufacturer, the liability was on the manufacturer and not on this defendant under any implied warranty; (3) that the express warranty in this contract was comparable with that which was involved in the case of Beggs v. James Hanley Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385, and that such case supported the defendant's theory of the law as particularly expressed in his requests for instructions to the jury. In our opinion none of these contentions has merit.
This decision was not based on the special contract as declared on, but on the common counts. In sustaining the decision of the trial justice, this court said: "Defendant's contention that if the evidence showed an express contract recovery could not be had on an implied one of a different nature, Beggs v. James Hanley Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385, or for a different amount, is inapplicable because no express contract for plaintiff's services was established." It seems clear to us that this case cannot support the plaintiff's contention here. He has established an express contract by which the defendant is obligated "to assume the payment of whatever unpaid balance of reservation of title on fixtures only," but he has failed to prove any breach thereof.
Where a known and defined article is supplied, there is no implied warranty that it shall answer the particular purposes intended by the purchaser. Beggs v. James Handley Brewing Co., (R.I.) 62 A. 373, 375; Seitz v. Brewers Ref. Co., 141 U.S. 510; Ohio Electric Co. v. Wis.-Minn. Co., (Wis.) 155 N.W. 112; Pullman Co. v. Rwy. Co., 157 U.S. 94; Davis Co. v. Mallery, 137 Fed. 332; Boston Co. v. Folson, (Mass.) 130 N.E. 197; Ward v. Great Atl. Co., (Mass.) 120 N.E. 225; Oldfield v. Motor Co., (Md.) 113 A. 632; Osborne v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654; G.M.C. Truck Co. v. Kelly, (Okla.) 231 P. 882. On the back of the order there was an express warranty, stipulating that it was in lieu of all other warranties; the order and warranty endorsed thereon governed the transaction.
The testimony of neither impresses a reader as entirely frank. Defendant's contention that if the evidence showed an express contract recovery could not be had on an implied one of a different nature, Beggs v. James Hanley Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385, or for a different amount, is inapplicable because no express contract for plaintiff's services was established. The court's language about an arrangement meant no more than that Scanlon's professional services were not to be rendered gratuitously.
It followed the views of the Keenan case although that case was not referred to and has not been by either counsel in argument before us. We pointed out that Beggs v. Hanley Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385, illustrated the difference between a particular purpose of general and of specific nature and we said: "Under the Sales Act a dealer who sells articles which ordinarily are used in but one way impliedly warrants fitness for use in that particular way unless there is evidence to the contrary. This is only a warranty of merchantability.
Benjamin on Sales, 6th Eng. ed. p. 715-6, quoted in Williston ยง 248 at p. 501. Beggs v. James Hanley Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385, arose prior to the Sales Act. It illustrates that merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose may not be equivalent.