To prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show: (i) a false and defamatory statement was written by the defendant about the plaintiff; (ii) the defendant published it without privilege to a third party; (iii) the defendant exhibited some fault in publishing the statement; and (iv) the statement is actionable as a matter of law or the publication has caused the plaintiff special harm." Messina v. Fontana, 260 F. Supp. 2d 173, 176-77 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Beeton v. Dist. of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 924 (D.C. 2001). For public figures, the fault element is more stringent.
“ ‘(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm.’ ”Beeton v. Dist. of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 923 (D.C.2001) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, when a public figure sues for defamation, he faces a heightened burden with respect to the fault element.
The D.C. Court of Appeals has recognized that back pay is a form of liquidated damage. Beeton v. Dist. of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 925 (D.C.2001). Under Counts Two and Four, Officer Jones alleges she was unable to apply for the rank of detective due to a missed performance evaluation and, therefore, was unable to obtain a promotion.
Plaintiff's claims for liquidated damages may proceed regardless of whether notice was properly given. See Elzeneiny v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-889, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29726 at *8 (D.D.C. March 29, 2010); Chisholm v. District of Columbia, 533 F. Supp. 2d 175, 178-79 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918) (D.C. 2001)). The Court therefore must determine to what extent plaintiff is claiming damages that may qualify as "liquidated."
Damages are liquidated and not addressed by § 12-309 if they are for "an easily ascertainable sum certain." Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 925 (D.C. 2001) ( quoting Hartford Acc. Indem. Co. v. District of Columbia, 441 A.2d 969, 974 (D.C. 1982)); cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (8th ed. 2004) (defining unliquidated damages as "[d]amages that cannot be determined by a fixed formula and must be established by a judge or jury."). Provided that they are "capable of ascertainment by computation," damages are considered liquidated even if the amount has "not already [been] rendered certain by a judgment or agreement.
A. Houlahan's Libel Claim against Landre and Foundation To establish a libel claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the fault of the defendant in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence, and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm. Messina v. Fontana, 260 F. Supp. 2d 173, 176-77 (D.D.C. 2003); Beeton v. Dist. of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 923 (D.C. 2001). Defendants' motion raises the discrete issue of whether or not Houlahan has in fact alleged "a false and defamatory statement."
Appellant also failed to state a claim for defamation (Count 9) because he did not identify any statement attributed (or that can be construed as being attributed) to appellees that was "false and defamatory." Beeton v. District of Columbia , 779 A.2d 918, 923 (D.C. 2001). Instead, appellant alleges that the "evidence and the Exhibits will show that ... Defendants have defamed the Plaintiff."
"A plaintiff bringing a defamation action . . . must show: (1) that the defendants] made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm." Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 923 (D.C. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "We will not dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) which alleges defamation if `the communications of which the plaintiff complains were reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.'"
To prove defamation, "`[a] plaintiff bringing a defamation action . . . must show: (1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm.'" Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 923 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Crowley v. North American Telecomms. Assoc., 691 A.2d 1169, 1173 n. 2 (D.C. 1997) (other citation omitted)). Here, the evidence, as viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Carter, indicates that reasonable jurors could find Mr. Hahn intentionally and recklessly lied about Ms. Carter's theft of government funds.
Finally, we turn to Wright's defamation claim, which Wright brings against Goren only. Under D.C. law, a plaintiff pleading defamation must allege: "(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm." Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 923 (D.C. 2001); accord Farah v. Esquire Mag., 736 F.3d 528, 533-34 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that the defamation claim failed for two reasons: first, that Goren's statements were protected by the common interest privilege because Goren and Henson were leaders of the same non-profit organization at the time the statements were made, and second, that the statements were opinions and therefore not capable of defamatory meaning. The District Court agreed that the common interest privilege applied and did not decide the second issue.