Opinion
8:98CV470.
March 18, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Filing No. 82. Plaintiff, a prisoner, alleges that defendants ("prison officials") have deprived him of his constitutional rights in denying him access to the courts and in being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
I. BACKGROUND
In his amended complaint, Beers contends that he was denied access to the courts in several particulars: his access to the law library is limited to one hour per week; his requests for additional time have been denied; his requests to purchase envelopes to mail legal documents have been denied; and defendants failed to timely mail a legal document in a federal habeas corpus action. Beers also alleges that he has been denied adequate medical care in that prison officials administer a prescription mediation crushed and dissolved in water which causes a sore throat, loss of voice, and heartburn.
In support of its motion, defendants have submitted affidavits and evidence that outline prison policies with respect to the law library and the administration of medication. The evidence includes an affidavit stating that Beers did not submit legal documents for mailing until after the deadline for mailing the documents had passed. In response, Beers has submitted his affidavit stating that he submitted legal papers for mailing on October 25, 1997, in order to meet an October 31, 1997, filing deadline and the papers were not mailed until November 1, 1997. Beers has also submitted the affidavit of a pharmacist familiar with administration of the medication at issue. That affidavit shows that the medication, when crushed and dissolved in water "may produce transient local anesthetic effects on the oral and pharyngeal mucosa" and that the manufacturer of the drug does not recommend the use of the medication in any other manner than in tablet form. See Filing 88, Exhibit 2.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "[I]f there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, there can be no summary judgment." Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 1999). However, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show the existence of such material fact or issue of law precluding summary judgment when qualified immunity is claimed by defendants. Williams v. Kelso, 201 F.3d 1060, 1064 (8th Cir. 2000). Once the predicate facts are established, the reasonableness of the official's conduct under the circumstances is a question of law. Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000).
The determination of whether a state actor is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity is a two-step process: the initial question is whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the [defendant's] conduct violated a constitutional right; and second, whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Id. at 2156. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. Thus, before addressing the issue of whether the law was clearly established, the court must determine whether plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence to support a finding that the corrections officers violated his constitutional rights at all. Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632-33 (8th Cir. 2001).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials' cruel and unusual punishment of inmates, and it has been interpreted as obligating prison officials to provide medical care to inmates in their custody. Id. An inmate's "right to medical care is violated if prison officials' conduct amounts to `deliberate indifference to [the prisoner's] serious medical needs.'" Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Thus, plaintiff's burden on his federal claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to demonstrate: (1) that he suffered objectively serious medical needs; and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs. Williams, 201 F.3d at 1064.
To constitute an objectively serious medical need or a deprivation of that need, the need or the deprivation alleged must be either obvious to the layperson or supported by medical evidence, like a physician's diagnosis. Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding no objectively serious medical need not to be temporarily confined in small shower stall without a showing that it exacerbated breathing ailments); compare Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding no objectively serious medical need when there was no medical evidence that a 17-hour delay in treatment of a broken hand produced any harm); Kayser v. Caspari, 16 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no serious medical need in unsupported self-diagnosis of kidney stones by inmate); Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting a defendant "could not act with deliberate indifference to medical problems that were not obvious or diagnosed"); with Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) (risk of suicide is a serious medical need); Tlamka, 244 F.3d at 632-33 (unreasonable delay in obtaining CPR for heart attack victim is a serious medical need).
A showing of "deliberate indifference" by prison officials requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The deliberate indifference standard in prison medical needs cases is likened to a criminal recklessness standard, which traditionally has contained a subjective component. Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 417 (8th Cir. 2000). Under that standard, an official is deliberately indifferent (reckless) if he disregards a known risk to a prisoner's health. Id. To establish a constitutional violation, it is not enough that a reasonable official should have known of the risk, a plaintiff must establish that the official in question did in fact know of the risk. Id. This knowledge is subject to proof by inferences based on the obviousness of the risk. Id. at 842. This state of mind required is more blameworthy than negligence and mere careless diagnosis or treatment of a known serious medical need of prisoners is insufficient. Williams, 201 F.3d at 1065. Moreover, inadvertent failure to provide medical care is not sufficient to establish liability and mere discomfort and inconvenience do not implicate the Constitution. Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 334 (8th Cir. 2001). An error or oversight, or failure to follow medical instructions can be determined to amount to only negligence, and thus not to amount to deliberate indifference, as a matter of law. Williams, 201 F.3d at 1065. With those standards in mind, the court finds that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Beers's Eighth Amendment claim. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Beers, fails to show that Beers has any objectively serious medical need or has suffered any deprivation of that need. Prison officials concede that plaintiff was administered sleep medication dissolved in water. Prison officials have also shown that the practice is pursuant to prison policies aimed at preventing inmates from either refusing to take medication or hoarding it. Plaintiff has shown only that the manufacturer of the medication recommends that it be swallowed whole and that "transient throat anesthesia or discomfort" can result from the compound's dissolution in water. There is no evidence that such "transient anesthesia or discomfort" amounts to an objectively serious medical condition. Moreover, even if Beers's medical condition could be viewed as objectively serious, there has been no showing that prison officials knew of any serious consequence connected to the administration of the drug in dissolved form. Under the circumstances, Beers has not alleged the violation of a constitutional right. At most, plaintiff has shown negligence.
Access to Courts
Beers also contends that restricting his access to the law library, failing to provide envelopes, and delay in mailing a pleading to a court violated his constitutional right of access to the courts. Inmates undeniably enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts and to the legal system. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996). The right of access to the courts guarantees an inmate the ability to file lawsuits that directly or collaterally attack the inmate's sentence or that challenge the conditions of the inmate's confinement, but it does not extend to the right to "discover grievances" or to "litigate effectively once in court." Id. A prison policy that obstructs privileged inmate mail can violate inmates' right of access to the courts. Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (1998) (en banc). However, an inmate who alleges an access violation is required to show an actual injury to pending or contemplated legal claims. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349, 351. Alleging theoretical inadequacies is insufficient — "inmates must instead show, for example, that a complaint they prepared was dismissed due to a technical requirement that a law library's inadequacies prevented them from knowing, or that a law library was so inadequate that it prevented them from filing a complaint for actionable harm at all." Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). A delay in mailing legal papers can amount to a constitutional violation when it infringes a prisoner's right of access to the courts. Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2002). To succeed in an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded and that he has suffered injury. Moore v. Plaster, 266 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2001). However, a court will not deny relief on the unsupported assumption that the papers involve only frivolous claims. Cody, 256 F.3d at 768.
Beers has not shown any injury, or any connection to a pending or contemplated legal claim, with respect to his allegations that he was denied envelopes or provided with insufficient law library time. The court finds those claims should be dismissed.
Beers has shown sufficient injury, however, with respect to his claim involving the delay in mailing his legal papers. Moreover, the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion show that there are genuine issues of material fact relating to the delay-in-mailing claim. Because Beers has shown that a genuine dispute exists on predicate issues that relate to the qualified immunity issue, he has sufficiently shown infringement of his right of access to the courts with respect to the delay in mailing claim. The court thus finds that defendants' motion for summary judgment on that claim should be denied.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Filing No. 82, is granted with respect to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim; plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed.
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Filing No. 82, on plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the courts is granted in part; plaintiff's claims of denial of access to the law library and failure to provide envelopes are dismissed.
3. Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Filing No. 82, on plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the courts is denied with respect to plaintiff's claim relating to a delay in mailing legal papers.
4. This action is referred to the magistrate for further proceedings regarding the progression of the case.