See also Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff, 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 752, 588 N.E.2d 879 (10th Dist.1990) [stating "[c]ourts have interpreted R.C. 124.03 to provide great latitude to the [board] to alter decisions of appointing authorities"].
State ex rel. Ogan v. Teater (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 235, 245, 8 O.O.3d 217, 375 N.E.2d 1233, reaffirmed Jones v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 555 N.E.2d 940; Ohio State Univ. v. Kyle, Franklin App. No. 06AP-168, 2006-Ohio-5517, 2006 WL 3008463, at ¶ 23. See also Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 752, 588 N.E.2d 879 (stating that "[c]ourts have interpreted R.C. 124.03 to provide great latitude to the [board] to alter decisions of appointing authorities"). {¶ 13} In cases of removal for disciplinary reasons, R.C. 124.34 permits an employee or an appointing authority to appeal a decision of the board to the court of common pleas; R.C. 119.12 sets forth the procedure to be followed in such an appeal.
The passage in Hal cited by appellant states that, under the "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" standard," 'while in essence this is a legal question, inevitably it involves a consideration of the evidence and to a limited extent would permit a substitution of judgment by the reviewing common pleas court.'" Hal at ¶ 32, quoting Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff, 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 753 (10th Dist.1990). {¶ 15} Appellant argues that the trial court relied upon dated and incorrect decisions, and that under Floyd's Legacy and Hal it "could and should have assessed the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence."
State ex rel. Ogan v. Teater , 54 Ohio St.2d 235, 245, 375 N.E.2d 1233 (1978), reaffirmed Jones v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff, 52 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 555 N.E.2d 940 (1990); Ohio State Univ. v. Kyle, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-168, 2006-Ohio-5517, at ¶ 23. See also Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff, 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 752, 588 N.E.2d 879 (10th Dist.1990) [stating "[c]ourts have interpreted R.C. 124.03 to provide great latitude to the [board] to alter decisions of appointing authorities"]. {¶27} The findings of the agency are not conclusive, but the trial court must give due deference to the administrative agency's resolution of evidentiary conflicts. Conrad, 63 Ohio St.2d at 111; Gallagher, 2007-Ohio-847 at ¶ 14.
The common pleas court used this standard as it was reviewing the hearing officer's resolution of the evidentiary conflicts. {¶ 32} This Court previously stated in Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff, 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 753 (10th Dist.1990), citing Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275 (1955), that "the determination of whether an agency order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence is primarily a question of the absence or presence of the requisite quantum of evidence." The Beeler court recognized that Andrews "pointed out that, while in essence this is a legal question, inevitably it involves a consideration of the evidence and to a limited extent would permit a substitution of judgment by the reviewing common pleas court."
{¶ 12} "When the common pleas court in its appraisal of the evidence determines that there exist legally sufficient reasons for discrediting certain evidence relied upon by the administrative body and necessary to its determination, the court may reverse, vacate, or modify the administrative order." Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 753. Where, however, the evidence supports the board's decision, the common pleas court must affirm the board and may not substitute its judgment for that of the board.
{¶ 11} The determination of whether reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports the commission's decision is primarily a question of the absence or presence of the requisite quantum of evidence. Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 753, citing Andrews. If the common pleas court finds after its appraisal of all the evidence that reliable, probative, and substantial evidence does not support the commission's decision, or the decision is not in accordance with law, the court may reverse, vacate or modify the commission's decision.
{¶ 17} The determination of whether reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports the board's decision is primarily a question of the absence or presence of the requisite quantum of evidence. Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 753, 588 N.E.2d 879, citing Andrews. See also Gallagher, at ¶ 16, citing Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 207, 12 O.O.3d 198, 389 N.E.2d 1113.
State ex rel. Ogan v. Teater (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 235, 245, reaffirmed, Jones v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 40, 43; Ohio State Univ. v. Kyle, Franklin App. No. 06AP-168, 2006-Ohio-5517, at ¶ 23. See, also, Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 752 (stating "[c]ourts have interpreted R.C. 124.03 to provide great latitude to the [board] to alter decisions of appointing authorities"). {¶ 14} In cases of removal for disciplinary reasons, R.C. 124.34 permits an employee or an appointing authority to appeal a decision of the board to the court of common pleas; R.C. 119.12 sets forth the procedure to be followed in such an appeal.
The determination of whether an agency order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence is primarily a question of the absence or presence of the requisite quantum of evidence. Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 753, citing Andrews. This court has stated that a trial court's role in an administrative appeal "is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence."