The rule of evidence provided by the statute quoted does not relate to any proceedings prior to the sale. 2 Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., 1006; Wilson v. Lemon, 23 Ind. 433; Breewman v. Bingham, 5 N.Y. 366; Westbrook v. Willey, 47 N.Y. 458; Carpenter v. Shinners, 41 P. 473 (Cal.); Kepley v. Fouke, 58 N.E. 303 (Ill.); King v. Cooper, 38 S.E. 924 (N. Car.); Johnson v. Harper, 18 So. 198 (Ala.); Carnham v. Sieber, 82 P. 592 (Colo.)
They must be made out by independent proof. Tallman v. White, 2 N.Y. 66; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77; Beekman v. Bigham, 5 N.Y. 366. A certificate of naturalization issues from a court of record when there has been the proper proof made of a residence of five years, and that the applicant is of the age of twenty-one years, and is of good moral character.
Exception was also taken to the admission in evidence of a tax deed upon which plaintiff relies to establish his title. The objection made was that the deed, executed by the county treasurer of Sullivan county in his official capacity, was not admissible or competent to prove title without proof of such proceedings as authorized him to make the sale and make the conveyance; and defendants invoke the rule of law that where a deed is made by a public officer or by any person under a naked power uncoupled with an interest it is not admissible in evidence without proof of the facts which show the power and the right to exercise it, citing in support thereof Sinclair v. Jackson (8 Cow. 543); Beekman v. Bigham ( 5 N.Y. 366) and Thompson v. Burhans ( 61 N.Y. 52). They concede that by chapter 194 of the Laws of 1878 it was provided that every conveyance made by the county treasurer under such act should be presumptive evidence that the sale was regular and that all the previous proceedings were regular according to the provisions of this act, and also that by chapter 594 of the Laws of 1886, amending said section 8, it was further provided that such a deed should be conclusive evidence that the sale and all proceedings subsequent and prior thereto, including the assessment of the land, were regular and valid, but urge that both of those acts were repealed by chapter 218 of the Laws of 1888, and, hence, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish the facts authorizing the execution of the deed so as to bring the case within the rule of the authorities cited. This argument overlooks section 132 of the Tax Law (Ch. 908, Laws 1896) which provides that "Every such conveyance heretofore executed by the com