Beef Cattle Co. v. N. K. Parrish, Inc.

5 Citing cases

  1. Blair v. Razis

    926 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that "hearing examiners referred to in section 143.057, TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE have the same obligation to follow precedent Texas court case law as a Civil Service Commission."

    TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. s 312.002 (Vernon 1988); State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737, 745-46 (1960). When a word is not otherwise defined in a statute, the court must attempt to ascertain the legislature's intention from the language used. Beef Cattle Co. v. N.K. Parrish, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1977, no writ). We are not free to formulate some forced or strained definitions for statutory terms.

  2. Opinion No. MW-562

    Opinion No. MW-562 (Ops. Tex. Atty. Gen. Dec. 31, 1982)

    Where a term is not defined in a statute, courts will determine legislative intent by relying on the language the legislature used, and will apply the `ordinary signification' to statutory language. Beef Cattle Company v. N. K. Parrish, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ). Finally, you ask what effect an `automatic' vacancy has on the definition of a `quorum' if a board member is removed for excessive absences and a successor has not been appointed.

  3. Boettcher v. Piney Woods Tractor

    622 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App. 1981)   Cited 2 times

    Maintenance Equipment Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1977, writ dism'd). Castleberry v. Acco Feeds, Division of Anderson, Clayton Co., 525 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1975, no writ); Beef Cattle Co. v. N. K. Parrish, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1977, no writ). Dean Elliott has commented on the last cited case: "It is believed that the learned court fell into error." 1 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 4.11.6-(V), at 376, n. 2 (Rev.Vol. 1981).

  4. Schwertner v. Nalco Chemical Co.

    615 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)   Cited 2 times

    Nalco and Velsicol argue that appellants have not proved that their products involved here were consumer goods, and Velsicol says that because subdivision 31 is a relatively recent addition (1973) to the venue statute, there are few cases by various courts of civil appeals in which the courts attempted to come to grips with what the Legislature meant by the term "consumer goods." The John Deere case, supra, Beef Cattle Co. v. N. K. Parrish, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), and Trucker's Equipment, Inc. v. Sandoval, supra, all hold various products to be consumer goods, to-wit: a tractor, cattle feed, and a hydraulic hose and coupling. All three involve products used for agricultural purposes, and John Deere apparently refers to § 5(b) of 1995 where the language "personal, family, household or agricultural use" is found.

  5. L M-Surco Mfg. Inc. v. Winn Tile Co.

    580 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that "consumer goods" in venue statute should be defined according to the definition of "consumer goods" in the business and commerce code

    Even if the John Deere court was correct in stating that the term should be given a broad interpretation and that the TBCC definition was too narrow, the term need not be given so expansive a definition as to encompass a commercial product purchased by a business entity strictly for use by mixing with other materials in commercial construction. Appellee cites John Deere, supra, Beef Cattle Co. v. N. K. Parrish, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1977, no writ), and Trucker's Equipment, Inc. v. Sandoval, 569 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1978, no writ), all of which hold various products to be consumer goods, to-wit: a tractor, cattle feed, and a hydraulic hose and coupling, respectively. We note, however, that all three involve products used for agricultural purposes.